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A B S T R A C T
This thesis uses theoretical models to study the effects of recent develop­
ments in the funding of civil litigation in England and Wales. This involves 
a form of contingency payment (conditional fees), a legal expenses insurance 
tha t can be purchased either before or after an accident has taken place and 
the combination of them. The issue revolves around the implications of lit­
igants’ choices and lawyers’ effort decision. More recently, policy discussion 
has raised the possibility of legal service being delivered in new organisational 
structures.
We first use a model to analyse the combined effects of the insurance and 
the fee arrangements on settlement probabilities, settlement amount, care lev­
els and litigants’ welfare. After tha t, we extend our model to  consider the 
role of risk aversion in litigation and the timing of settlement. Then, we ex­
amine the effects of law firm’s organisational structure and ownership changes 
on its legal effort provision in a property rights framework. Our results show 
tha t plaintiffs generally benefit from an organisational structure which allows 
law firms to  provide legal insurance services. Efficiencies and welfare effects 
of other potential business structures are also examined. Other issues such 
as the three-way relationship between a client, his lawyer and an insurer and 
comparisons between health care insurance and legal expenses insurance are 
also discussed in this thesis.
This thesis differs from other contributions in this area for two reasons. 
First, it recognises the complementarity between fee reform and structural de­
velopments. Second, it considers the effects of these arrangements on lawyer 
effort.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
This thesis uses theoretical models to  study the effects of recent developments 
in the funding of civil litigation in England and Wales. As the Introduction of 
the thesis, this chapter introduces the background and the main changes in the 
legal service market in England and Wales th a t are of interest to us. These are 
the emergence of conditional fees and legal expenses insurance and potential 
changes to the structure and regulation of law firms. In fact, as we shall see, 
these are all closely related. Section 1.1 briefly introduces the market for legal 
services and gives some background on the regulatory changes th a t underlie 
much of the thesis. Section 1.2 discusses the emergence of conditional fees 
and legal expenses insurance, and illustrates some of the arguments related to 
them. Section 1.3 proposes our research questions and explains why they are 
the focus of this thesis. Section 1.4 sets out the structure of the subsequent 
chapters.
1.1 T he m arket for legal services
In England and Wales, the traditional legal service market has been changing 
since 1990s. The introduction of conditional fees and emergency of legal ex­
penses insurance are two significant factors contributing to this change. These 
changes are of interest to economists and others alike since they raise questions 
about incentives and access to justice. They have also encouraged a set of re­
forms relating to the structure of law firms as emphasised by the government’s 
recent Legal Service Bill.
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1.1.1 R eform  of legal services
In July 2003, David Clementi was appointed to carry out an independent re­
view of the regulatory framework for legal services in England and Wales. 
In December 2004, he published a report following his review. The govern­
ment’s Legal Service Bill broadly accepted the main recommendations of the 
report and the review. To fulfill the purpose of promoting competition in le­
gal services market, in addition to regulatory reforms, in the report Clementi 
provides a proposal to change the current legal business structure. He recom­
mends allowing different types of lawyers to  share in the management of what 
he calls Legal Disciplinary Practices (LDP). Non-lawyer managers would also 
be perm itted but lawyers would remain in the majority as managers and only 
legal services could be provided. More im portant, outside owners would be 
perm itted subject to  regulatory approval as “fit to own” . In fact, the govern­
ment envisages more complete “liberalisation” in legal services reform. The 
Legal Service Bill also considers the possibility of Multi-Disciplinary Practices 
(MDP), which offer legal and other services and are not exclusively owned by 
managers, should be established. These new institutions may fundamentally 
change the landscape of legal services market, or even the legal system. The 
effects of them need to be carefully reviewed.
Economic analysis of a market institution is normally based on the analysis 
of its efficiency. However, in the context of legal services, efficiency has to be 
considered with equity. This implies th a t the whole litigation system should 
be made accessible through affordable services, and at the same time encour­
age litigants to avoid litigation: the former reflects the requirement of social
3
equality; the la tter seeks social efficiency when considering the litigation cost 
as a kind of transaction cost.
1.1.2 The civil litigation process
Figure 1.1: A typical process of civil litigation
A typical civil litigation process involves a number of stages.Initially, the po­
tential defendant chooses a level of care to avoid an accident. If this care level 
is insufficient to avoid the accident, the potential plaintiff will incur a loss.1 
After this, the plaintiff has to decide whether to  pursue the defendant. Nor­
mally, the plaintiff has a lack of legal knowledge and therefore has to retain a 
lawyer if he decides to bring a suit. If the formal legal proceedings begin, the 
plaintiff, the defendant and their lawyers will negotiate an agreement to settle 
the suit. If the negotiation fails, the case will go to trial and a judgement will 
finally be given. We show this structure in Figure 1.1. The litigation is costly. 
For the litigants, legal fees can be an im portant factor affecting their litigation 
decisions. In the absence of legal expenses insurance, the plaintiff may be pro­
hibited from starting a suit by the unaffordability of legal fees. For the public,
1In reality, in m any cases both the plaintiff and the defendant can prevent an accident. 
However, in this thesis we follow the typical assum ption in m odels of efficient care that an 
accident is caused entirely by the defendant’s negligence.
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since at least a part of cost of the legal system is borne by tax  payers, the 
number of accidents and the volume of litigation could affect social welfare. 
Of course the litigation is also risky. Not only does trial leave the losing party 
whatever financial loss is the object of litigation, but some jurisdictions, for 
example England and Wales, also require the losing party to meet all costs 
of litigation, including those of the winner. Both conditional fees and legal 
expenses insurance are market responses to these risks.
1.2 Funding legal services
Before 1990, legal services were mainly funded by hourly fees. It is traditionally 
believed th a t hourly fees can mitigate the conflicts of interest between clients 
and lawyers.2 Hourly fees may help to solve the credence good problem often 
associated with legal services since the lawyer’s margins are the same whether 
the case is simple or complex, while they also give incentives to lawyers to 
work slowly and longer since their to tal income will increase by doing so. For 
those who cannot afford legal fees, state funded legal aid had provided access 
to justice until recently. However, since legal aid no longer covers civil cases, 
other funding methods have been developed.
1.2.1 Conditional fees
Conditional fees were first introduced by the government in the Courts and
Legal Services Act 1990, but the relevant statutory instruments were not in
force until 1995. Under conditional fees, a lawyer can charge her client a nor­
2For exam ple, Gravelle & W aterson (1993) claim that, when making settlem ent decisions, 
hourly fees can align the interest of clients and lawyers.
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mal fee which is based on hourly billing, plus a success fee if the case is won. 
The amount of the success fee is limited to a maximum of 100 per cent of 
the normal fees. Initially, the success fee was not recoverable from the losing 
party, but in 2000, section 27 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 amended the 
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 to  allow recovery of success fees from the 
losing party. The regulations th a t accompanied this change in the law (the 
Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000) were far from clear, and the 
result was tha t a great deal of fees-related litigation took place. On 1 Novem­
ber 2005 these regulations were revoked, and now it is much easier to enter 
into conditional fee agreements than  before.3
The introduction of conditional fees was expected to solve two problems. First, 
conditional fees provide incentives to lawyers to undertake high risk cases. 
Second, conditional fees may solve the problem of rising costs of legal aid. The 
common understanding of disadvantage of conditional fees is th a t they may 
result in a conflict of interest between lawyer and client. This is because the 
lawyer’s financial interest in the case may impair her impartiality, causing her 
to ignore the best outcome of the client. In addition to the conflict of interest, 
Lord Bingham’s judgement on Callery v Gray (2001) generalises other critique 
on conditional fees. He concludes tha t conditional fees are open to three forms 
of abuse: “First, lawyers might charge excessive costs knowing th a t their own 
client would not have to pay them. Another, for the same reason, was the
C o n d itio n a l fee agreements, otherw ise known as “no win no fee” agreements, can be 
thought as an English equivalent to  the Am erican contingent fee. T his is because they both  
set legal fees contingent on the outcom e o f the case. In the case of the American contingent 
fees, a client is not charged legal fees if he loses the case. If the client w ins or settles, the  
legal fee is calculated as a share of the eventual dam age judgm ent or settlem ent won by the  
client. Fees usually range from 25% to  50% of the am ount recovered, although 30-40% is 
the m ost comm on.
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lawyers would set the success fee at a level th a t was grossly disproportionate 
to any fair assessment of the risks of failure in the litigation. A third possible 
abuse, with insurers having no incentive to moderate premiums, was tha t they 
might be grossly disproportionate to the risk being underwritten.” The third 
abuse actually is one of the possible combined effects of conditional fees and 
legal expenses insurance.
1.2.2 Legal expenses insurance
Legal expenses insurance is a relatively new form of insurance in the UK, hav­
ing only been available since 1974 (Rickman & Gray 1995 a). It provides cover 
against the risk of making or defending a legal action, whether in court or 
not. I t will pay for lawyers’ fees and other costs arising in legal actions, up 
to the limit of indemnity in the policy. Legal expenses insurance can be pur­
chased either as before-the-event (BTE) insurance or as after-the-event (ATE) 
insurance. BTE insurance provides cover for legal claims tha t may happen 
and is very often sold in the same way and a t the same time as other annual 
insurance contracts, for example when buying motor insurance or household 
insurance. It is very commonly used as a way of bringing compensation claims 
arising from road accidents and from consumer contract disputes. ATE in­
surance provides cover for a specified legal claim after the disputed event or 
accident has happened. It basically protects the policyholder from the risk of 
having to pay his opponent’s legal costs in tha t dispute. ATE is often sold, but 
not necessarily, through legal service providers who are using conditional fee 
agreements. This character of ATE insurance means it is likely to be available 
only where the chances of winning a case are high.
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In England and Wales, the vast majority of legal expenses insurance policies 
are BTE. Legal expenses insurance, especially BTE, sales are underpinned by 
an established network of insurance distributors, of which major insurance 
brands are the key providers. Prom this viewpoint, the legal expenses insur­
ance market has firm foundations. The sales of legal expenses insurance is 
estimated to be £411 million in gross w ritten premiums in 2005.4
The principal rationale of legal expenses insurance is the same as other insur­
ances: the risk averse individual shifts his risk to a risk neutral insurer who 
is better able to bear it by a certain premium. In England and Wales, how­
ever, even lawyers can work on a conditional fee basis, the risk of liability for 
opponents’ legal fees still encourages the development of legal expenses insur­
ance. Also, Kirstein (2000) and others develop strategic grounds for demand­
ing insurance: even risk neutral parties can gain by enhancing their bargaining 
position through lower costs.
1.2.3 The three-way relationship in legal expenses in­
surance
The introduction of legal expenses insurance for the market of legal services 
results in a structural change of the market. Bowles & Rickman (1998) charac­
terise the change as a “three-way” relationship between groups with an interest 
in the provision of goods and services. The client purchases insurance from the 
insurer and receives services from the lawyer. The lawyer supplies legal ser­
vices to the client and receives reimbursement from the insurer. Asymmetric
4D ata  from “Legal E xpenses Insurance - U K ” , the A ssociation o f B ritish  Insurers, De­
cem ber 2006, published by M intel International.
information exists on every side of this relationship. The insurer has imperfect 
information about the client’s risk type and the lawyer’s reimbursement. The 
client has imperfect information about the lawyer’s effort. The lawyer has 
imperfect information about the client’s position. The three-way relationship 
can be understood as each player trying to maximise his interest by means of 
contracting with others. In this relationship, the lawyer is an agent for both 
the insurer and the client. Figure 1.2 illustrates this three-way relationship. 
We now look into it in more detail.
legal expenses 
„ insurance contract
Client --------------------------------  Insurer
lawyer-client \  /  service supply
relationship \  /  contract
Lawyer
Figure 1.2: The lawyer-client-insurer nexus of contracts (Bowles & Rickman 
1998)
The lawyer-client relationship
The key issue in the lawyer-client relationship is the principal-agent problem. 
The client is normally “ignorant” of legal knowledge. In some cases although 
he can observe the lawyer’s legal effort, he does not know either the exact legal 
effort he needs or the effectiveness of the lawyer’s effort. This encourages the 
lawyer’s moral hazard. The introduction of conditional fees is hoped to be a
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remedy of this problem. Since the lawyer’s income is entirely based on the 
outcome of the case under conditional fees, she is supposed to have incentives 
to provide more effective effort. If the client has legal expenses insurance, the 
situation becomes more complicated. In the case of full insurance, the client 
has no incentive to control the lawyer’s effort whether it is effective or not. He 
will encourage the lawyer to  raise inputs on his case. This is another type of 
moral hazard. Then the insurer has to control these two types of moral hazard 
through the insurance contract and through the service payment contract.
The insurer-client relationship
Adverse selection and moral hazard are both involved in the insurer-client re­
lationship. In the sense of adverse selection, it means the propensity of a client 
to  buy insurance may be significantly higher if he has characteristics tha t make 
him more likely than others to bring a legal claim. The economic approach to 
adverse selection is to set the insurance premium on the basis of the client’s 
risk. For the BTE insurance, since the premiums are comparatively low, it 
is not feasible to evaluate individual clients. The development of larger and 
more balanced risk-pools is considerably easier in the case of add-on policies 
than in the case of stand-alone policies. In the sense of moral hazard, there 
are three possible damages. First, the insured client may be more likely to 
initiate a legal claim than an uninsured person. Second, the insured client 
may request more legal services than an uninsured person. Third, the insured 
client may have no incentive to monitor the lawyer’s behaviour. The solutions 
to these problems may have to find from the contracts of the insurance system.
The insurer-lawyer relationship
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Asymmetric information on the lawyer’s legal effort is the most im portant 
problem in the insurer-lawyer relationship. Since monitoring is costly to insur­
ers, lawyers can always reimburse insurers for inappropriate costs. To mitigate 
the harms of asymmetric information insurers bargain hard with lawyers to 
reduce costs, or create panels whose members agree to defined fee levels. How­
ever, these are difficult to operate in practice. In particular, insurers hire 
lawyers for in-house work to assess claims, meaning th a t they may be already 
capable to provide legal services to policy holders. However, law and regulation 
currently prohibit insurers from providing further legal services. Therefore, in­
surers may prefer to contemplate either some degree of vertical integration with 
lawyers or some “robust” fee arrangements with lawyers to reduce costs.
1.3 R esearch questions
As illustrated in previous sections, the emergence of legal expenses insurance 
and conditional fees, together with the reform of legal services, make the analy­
sis of legal service market more complicated. Naturally, a number of questions 
arise from these new market institutions. We focus on three of these. They 
are two positive questions and one normative question:
1. W hat are the combined effects of legal expenses insurance and legal fee 
arrangements on litigation?
2. W hat are the effects of a law firm’s organisational structure on a lawyer’s 
incentives to act in the best interests of clients?
3. W hat is the optimal legal expenses insurance system?
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Question 1 is a positive question which aims to look into the combined in­
fluence of legal expenses insurance and legal fees on the litigants’ behaviour. 
It is clear tha t both legal expenses insurance and conditional fees encourage 
access to justice, but they may also motivate the wastage of social resources on 
litigation, e.g. increase volume of litigation. This possible conflict encourages 
us to study this question. Question 1 is directly relevant to the discussion of 
litigation reform. It concerns the design of optimal legal expenses insurance 
system per se in a framework where fee arrangements and funding methods 
are restricted by regulation.
Question 2 is a positive question. It is one of the key issues of the current 
debate on legal services reform. As we mentioned before, the Clementi Re­
port (2004) on legal services reform and the government’s Legal Service Bill 
suggest tha t legal services providers move from one of the currently allowed 
organisational structures (sole trader, partnership, incorporated partnership) 
to an organisational structure where there is at least some element of outside 
ownership. Answering Question 2 is im portant to the examination of potential 
effects of current legal services reform.
Question 3 is a normative question. It is closely related to the purpose and 
policies of current legal services reform. Based on positive exercises of Question 
1 and Question 2, we try  to understand the optimal legal expenses insurance 
system in perspectives of social cost, the client’s best interest and structure 
developments of legal services. Meanwhile, answering Question 3 is an essential 
prerequisite to any policy change on fee arrangements and on institutional 
development.
12
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1.4 P lan  o f chapters
The previous section raises three interesting research questions. In Chapters 3 
- 4, we begin to answer these questions by developing some theoretical frame­
works. However, we start from Chapter 2, where we explain the reasons of 
choosing frameworks tha t we do. The chapters are structured as follows.
Chapter 2 is a survey of existing theoretical economic literature in litigation. 
In the chapter, we first examine the literature on litigation settlement. After 
that, we look into the analysis of fee shifting rules. The principal-agent prob­
lem in litigation is one of the key issues we focus on. The economic models of 
the following chapters are basically based on these literature. In particular, a 
close scrutiny is given to the literature related to conditional fees. Finally, the 
role of legal expenses insurance is reviewed although very few studies explicitly 
address this question. The gaps between the existing studies are illustrated in 
the chapter. Chapter 2 actually suggests tha t none of the research questions 
in Section 1.3 has been answered yet.
In addition to confirming our research questions, Chapter 2 also presents origi­
nal extensions of the recent paper by Emons & Garoupa (2006). In particular, 
it shows th a t the results in their paper rely on particular functional forms. 
Moreover, similarities and differences between legal expenses insurance system 
and health care insurance system are also documented in Chapter 2.
As the most im portant relationship within legal services, the three-way rela­
tionship between the client, the lawyer and the insurer, which is illustrated in
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the triangle of Figure 1.2, dominates our research. However, to answer our re­
search questions and also analyse this relationship more efficiently, in Chapter 
3 and 4 we focus on two key decision makers in the triangle. In Chapter 3, the 
“key player” is the client, while in Chapter 4, it is the lawyer.
Figure 1.3: Chapter 3: the client is the key player
Chapter 3 focuses on the client’s trial/settlem ent decision. In the chapter we 
look into the combined effects of legal expenses insurance and fee arrange­
ments on settlement. As shown in Figure 1.3, contracts and other players’ 
actions have im portant effects on the client’s choice. Our analysis starts from 
the comparison between three regimes: no insurance, after-the-event (ATE) 
and before-the-event (BTE) insurance, and follows by comparing between two 
specified fee arrangements: the hourly fee and the conditional fee. Several 
issues, such as the plaintiff’s risk type, distribution of the accident loss, recov­
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erability of insurance premium and timing of the settlement, are examined in 
the discussion section. In particular, the comparison reaches some firm con­
clusions when the loss arising from the accident is uniformly distributed. The 
basic one-shot model used for most of the chapter is finally extended to be a 
dynamic one. Chapter 3 partly answers our first research question — “what 
are the combined effects of legal expenses insurance and conditional fees?”5
Law yer
Figure 1.4: Chapter 4: the lawyer is the key player
As shown in Figure 1.4, Chapter 4 encompasses the lawyer’s effort choice under
the three-way relationship. The chapter focuses on two interesting questions.
First, the combined effects of fee arrangements and legal expenses insurance
on the lawyer’s legal effort are examined in an environment where the client
relies totally on the lawyer’s advice about the needs of the case. We highlight
5An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Annual Conference of European  
Law and Econom ics A ssociation (EA LE), Madrid, Septem ber 2006.
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interactions of litigants by introducing a contest success function. Second, 
the effects of the law firm’s organisational structures on its legal effort provi­
sion are analysed. The basic model of the chapter is a property right model 
of industrial organisation based on Grossman & Hart (1986). We illustrate 
th a t reputation incentives play an im portant role in the lawyer’s effort choice. 
Issues of the firm’s investment into its human capital are discussed as well. 
The chapter is ended by the analysis of social welfare. Chapter 4 answers our 
second research question — “W hat are the effects of a law firm’s organisa­
tional structure on a lawyer’s incentives to act in the best interests of clients?”6
Figure 1.5: The legal expenses insurance system
Combining the analysis and conclusions of Chapter 3 and 4, we can answer
our third research question “what is the optimal legal expenses insurance
6An earlier version of th is chapter was presented at the Annual Conference of AsLEA, 
Taipei, August ‘2007 and the Annual Conference of EALE, Copenhagen, Septem ber 2007.
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system?” As contracts’ designer, now the insurer becomes the key player in 
the three-way relationship. When designing the system, the insurer has to 
consider the combined effects of insurance and legal fee arrangements on set­
tlement (Chapter 3) and on the lawyer’s effort provision (Chapter 4). Figure
1.5 illustrates this situation and shows the key role of the insurer. The answer 
to the research question 3 is recorded in Chapter 5.
It is clear tha t Chapters 3 - 4  can be seen as the analysis of litigation from 
different perspectives. However, they can also be understood as the analysis 
of litigation within different contexts. Chapter 3 examines the interactions be­
tween the plaintiff and the defendant and focuses on the litigant’s behaviour. 
Chapter 4 solves the organizational structure problem of the law firm and fo­
cuses on the lawyer’s legal effort provision. Since legal expenses insurance and 
conditional fees exist mainly in the English cost rule jurisdictions, in this thesis 
the English rule is used as the fee shifting rule in all analysis chapters. How­
ever, even though legal expenses insurance is rare in the US, in Chapter 3 we 
still discuss the implications of insurance and settlement under the American 
cost rule (as well as the English one).
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows. In Chapter 2, apart from 
the critical review of the current economic studies on litigation, we firstly ex­
tend the model of Emons & Garoupa (2006) to atta in  some new insights, and 
secondly, compare legal expenses insurance with health care insurance. These 
works may help one to gain a better understanding on legal expenses insur­
ance. In Chapter 3, a comparison between ATE conditional fees and BTE 
hourly fees, which are the prevailing funding methods in England and Wales,
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emerges. This involves the issues of settlement versus trial, the accident dis­
tribution, litigants’ risk aversion, insurance recoverability and social welfare. 
A dynamic extension is also introduced to examine the settlement timing. In 
Chapter 4, we introduce the theory of industrial organisation into the context 
of litigation. The chapter is the first to  study the relationship amongst the 
lawyer’s legal effort, fee arrangements and the organisational structures of the 
law firm. In line with the current policy debate, we examine the law firm’s 
possible alternative organisational structures and find some of these structures 
encourage higher legal effort from the lawyer, to  the interest of the client.
Chapter 5 concludes by discussing the implications of the previous chapters. 
As part of this, suggestions for extensions to the current models and future 
works are given. We hope this thesis can be extended both theoretically and 
empirically and contribute to the knowledge of the economic analysis of liti­
gation and legal services.
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Chapter 2
The economics of civil litigation: 
a survey
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2.1 In troduction
Started by Landes (1971), Gould (1973) and Posner (1979), the economic anal­
ysis of civil litigation is one of the most fruitful areas of law and economics 
research. Economists are interested in the resolution of legal disputes for sev­
eral reasons. First, the solutions of disputes (e.g. settle or go to trial) have 
im portant implications for the costs of operating the legal system. Second, eco­
nomic analysis can help to explain the interactions of litigants and therefore 
offer recommendations for a more efficient legal system (encouraging settle­
ments and discouraging worthless suits). Third, the costs and the solutions of 
disputes affect incentives for litigants to avoid dispute in the first place. Hence, 
the economic analysis of litigation has focused both upon the interactions of 
litigants and upon the effects of legal fees and procedural rules on the litigants’ 
behaviour (see Cooter & Rubinfeld (1989) and Miceli (1997) for previous re­
views) .
In this chapter, we focus on the following four topics. First, in Section 2.2, we 
summary the economic models which analyse settlement decisions and pre-trial 
negotiation. We start from the “non-strategic” models to show how litigants’ 
optimism affects their settlement decisions. Then we move to more complicated 
“strategic” settings. We show how screening and signaling are modeled in the 
litigation context. We also review dynamic pre-trial negotiation models in 
Section 2.2.3. In Section 2.3, we look into the studies of fee shifting rules. Our 
review focuses on the effects of fee shifting rules on legal expenditure and on 
settlement. Section 2.4 examines principal-agent problems in litigation. The 
analysis is based on legal fees’ effects on agency problems. Since contingent
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fees are prohibited and conditional fees are allowed in England and Wales, in 
2.4.2, we detail the studies of conditional fees. In Section 2.5, we briefly review 
the literature associated with legal expenses/costs insurance. In Section 2.6, 
we compare legal expenses insurance with health care insurance and review 
the literature on health insurance system. Section 2.7 briefly summarises.
2.2 T he econom ic m odel o f litigation
The basic economic model of litigation has two parties, a plaintiff tha t has 
a potential claim against the defendant. Under the American cost rule, the 
plaintiff’s expected value of the claim EUP equals his estimate of the probability 
of prevailing pp multiplied by the expected trial award, which is normally 
assumed to be the accident loss L, minus the costs of proceeding to the next 
stage of litigation Cp.
EUP —* ppL Cp.
The defendant’s objective function for expected cost ECd is developed in par­
allel fashion, as the defendant’s estimate of the probability the plaintiff will 
prevail pd times the expected award L plus the defendant’s costs of proceeding 
to the next stage of litigation q .
ECd =  PdL +  cd.
Of course, the variables in the above model can be endogenous. For example, 
Cornell (1990) develops an environment where both parties’ selections of costs 
may affect their estimates of the outcome, and one party’s choice of c may 
affect the other party ’s estimate of its own cost of proceeding to the next
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stage. EUP and ECd primarily determines the incentives given to litigants, 
including, most im portant, the decision whether settle or go to trial.
2.2.1 Settlem ent versus trial: non-strategic m odels
Since one of the main purposes of litigation is to induce settlements rather 
than costly trials, it is particularly im portant to examine the factors which 
will affect litigants’ settlement decision. The “classical” studies (mainly in­
cluding Gould (1973), Posner (1979) and Landes (1971)) assume tha t there is 
no private information to be communicated during negotiations between two 
parties and, indeed, no explicit modeling of a bargaining framework in which 
this could occur. In this sense, they are “non-strategic”1; both parties assess 
their expected gain from trial on the basis of their knowledge and these assess­
ments determine whether, and what, scope for settlement exists—neither takes 
account of the other’s actions. These studies propose the necessary condition 
for settlement is th a t the plaintiff’s minimum offer—the least amount he will 
take in settlement of his claim—be smaller than the defendant’s maximum 
offer. Extending to our basic model, define L j, % — p, d as the recovery the 
plaintiff and the defendant expect to receive/pay at trial. We also assume tha t 
both are risk neutral, th a t their expenditures on the case are independent of 
Li and Pi, and of each other’s. The plaintiff’s minimum offer is his expected 
gain from trial EUP, which is pp(Lp — cp) — (1 — pp)cp, while the defendant’s 
maximum offer is his expected trial cost, ECd =  Pd(Ld + Cd) +  (1 —Pd)cd• Thus
1Following Rickman (1998) and Fenn & Rickman (2001), we can identify three broad 
phases of theoretical work by economists on litigation. They are non-strategic models, one- 
shot models and dynamic strategic models.
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the necessary condition for settlement is
PpLp Cp < PdL>d +  Cd-
Rearranging above condition yields
Pp Lp  Pd,Ed ^  (C p  T - c d).
A minimum requirement for the above condition to hold is ppLp > pjLj.  In a 
more basic presentation, L = Lp = Ld, the condition becomes pp > pa- Posner 
labels this as a “mutual optimism” condition: the more optimistic both parties 
are about their chances at trial, the worse are the prospects for settlement. 
Going back to our condition, clearly, anything tha t raises ppLp — PdLd and/or 
lowers Cp + Cd will narrow the range within which a settlement can occur and 
thereby increase the likelihood of trial. Thus, substantial bargaining costs 
can prevent settlement, as can low court costs and high stakes. But it is 
not a sufficient condition for settlement to take place; e.g. parties may fail 
to agree on a settlement amount. However, without private information and 
a bargaining framework, it is difficult to explain why and how two rational 
agents disagree when they know tha t gains from trade exist (e.g. see Salant 
(1984) and Schweizer (1989)). Also, within this context, it is impossible to 
specify a settlement amount. Instead, this will be determined by the two 
sides’ relative bargaining strengths. The analysis can be made more general 
by introducing risk aversion. One way to think about this is in terms of 
certainty equivalents. Define the plaintiff’s certainty equivalent to trial as vp,
i.e. Up{vp) — ppUp(Lp — Cp) +  (1 — Pp)Up(—Cp), where Up(') is the plaintiff’s 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Thus, the maximum tha t the
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plaintiff will pay to avoid trial is v*  =  ( p PL p — cp ) —  v p . Similarly, define 
v*d = Vd~  (pd^d +  Cd). Thus, the necessary condition for settlement becomes:
P p L p cp Vp <c P d L d  A  Cd Vd
Rearranging this condition yields
P p L p  — P d Ld  <  (cp +  Cd) +  (v*  +  v d ) .
Hence, risk aversion makes the necessary condition for trial harder to fulfill so 
th a t settlement becomes more likely. Note also tha t as either party becomes 
more risk averse an increase v \  is implied, making settlement still more likely. 
Gravelle (1989) shows tha t, in the context of imperfect information, an increase 
in one party’s risk aversion makes the settlement terms more favourable to the 
other party: effectively, the widening of the “settlement range” which makes 
settlement more likely under risk aversion is accomplished by a weakening 
in the risk averter’s bargaining position. The effects on the settlement rate 
of switching between different cost allocation rules can be seen by recognising 
tha t these alter the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s objective functions and thus 
alter the settlement condition.
2.2.2 “O ne-shot” strategic m odels
Beginning with P ’ng (1983), a number of models have sought to model explic­
itly the process of pre-trial negotiation, and to take account of the fact that 
such activity often takes place under conditions of asymmetric information. 
Of course, these considerations immediately raise questions about the appro­
priate extensive form to describe the negotiations. One issue here involves 
the number of pre-trial periods T  available for bargaining: in this section, we 
simplify by assuming th a t T  — 1 and defer more explicit dynamics to the 
next section. Another key issue involves who has private information and who 
makes settlement offers. Both the plaintiff and the defendant can plausibly 
be thought to have private information about the strength of their case: e.g. 
the plaintiff may be expected to know more than the defendant about the ex­
tent of the loss he has suffered (L), while the defendant may be expected to 
know more about his liability for the damages in question (p ). Alternatively, 
there may be asymmetric information about risk preferences (see Farmer & 
Pecorino (1994) and Heyes, Rickman & Tzavara (2004)). Assumptions vary 
as to whether one or both parties have private information. Thus, Bebchuk 
(1984) assumes a one-sided information asymmetry with the uninformed party 
making the one-shot settlement offer. In contrast, Reinganum & Wilde (1986) 
assumes a one-sided asymmetry but, now, with the informed party making the 
single offer. The former is the problem of screening and the latter is the prob­
lem of signaling. In this subsection, we focus on these two problems. Finally, 
Schweizer (1989) and Daughety & Reinganum (1995) assume tha t both sides 
have private information. Given the familiar problems surrounding multiple 
equilibria in signaling games, the latter papers employ equilibrium refinements 
to ensure uniqueness.
2.2.2.1 Screening
We use a one-sided information model which is similar to Bebchuk (1984) to 
show screening in pre-trial negotiation. Assume tha t the plaintiff has suffered 
an accident loss L  but tha t the defendant can not accurately observe it. In­
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stead, his priors are given by the cumulative distribution F {L ) on [L, L], with 
associated density function f(L ) .  For convenience, assume pL > cp. The de­
fendant makes a single settlement offer S  to the plaintiff, acceptance ends the 
game while rejection induces trial. At trial, the court hands the correct level of 
loss to the plaintiff with probability p, and otherwise finds in favour of the de­
fendant. This model is formally equivalent to  the model of Bebchuk (1984). In 
the original model, the defendant is privately informed about liability but the 
plaintiff makes the settlement offer. Therefore, differences between this model 
and Bebchuk’s are the source of private information and the party makes settle­
ment offer. However, there are no substantive differences between the analysis.
Analysis begins with the plaintiff’s decision to  accept or reject a given settle­
ment offer. The settlement offer S  is accepted if and only if S  ^  pL  —  C p . This 
defines the plaintiff’s marginal acceptance level:
Lis) = LtS:
p
Thus, the defendant’s choice of S  will determine the plaintiff’s acceptance level 
and, hence, the probability of settlement F1 [£(/?)]. the defendant chooses S  to 
solve __
m inF [L(S)]S  + { l - F [ L ( S ) } }  +  CA
The first order condition is given by
f[L (S )]L '(S )S  + F[L(S)}-  p L (S )L ‘(S)f[L (S)} -  =  0
To minimise expected costs, the defendant trades off the expected costs of
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settlement with the expected costs of trial. Substituting the plaintiff’s accep­
tance level L (S ) =  into the first order condition, the defendant’s optimal 
decision becomes
msy(
f[L(3)]~ i p + d) { )
If the form of F (L) is given, the optimal settlement offer S* can be solved from 
the above condition. It is clear now the type of the plaintiff is represented by 
the acceptance level L '(S). Thus, the plaintiff has been screened. This condi­
tion can be used to perform a variety of comparative statics and to consider 
a variety of policy issues within the legal system. For example, assuming tha t 
F (L) is uniform distributed and L '(S )  =  1/p, we have
£• =  £ + .k ± * )
P
S* = p L  + cd
Hence, settlement offers rise with the defendant’s liability, expected damages 
and expected costs. However, the probability of settlement falls as p  increases 
(although the defendant is weaker, the plaintiff knows this when liability is 
common knowledge) but rises with aggregate trial costs (as in non-strategic 
model). Another significant result is th a t trial cannot be ruled out. The 
presence of asymmetric information makes it difficult for uninformed parties 
to  make an appropriate offer or to select a sufficiently generous acceptance 
probability. Thus, the presence of strategic behaviour means th a t the necessary 
conditions for settlement derived earlier are not sufficient.
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2.2 .2 .2  Signaling
Reinganum & Wilde (1986) assume th a t the plaintiff has private information 
about the true level of accident loss L. The defendant can only estimate the 
loss on the interval [L, L]. Different from the screening model, here the plain­
tiff makes his settlement offer/demand and the defendant chooses to  accept 
or reject it. The plaintiff’s optimal settlement offer S' is a function of his in­
formation S' =  s(L). The defendant’s strategy consists of a function linking 
the probability of rejecting the settlement offer to the offer itself, a — a(S), 
and a belief uniquely linking the accident loss and the settlement, L = b(S). 
The probability of the plaintiff prevailing at trial p is exogenous and common 
knowledge. As in most signalling models, the informed agent has a costly move 
to illustrate his type to the uninformed agent. In the litigation context, since 
for the high loss plaintiff the cost of a breakdown in pre-trial negotiations is 
lower than for the low loss plaintiff, signalling becomes a possible choice for 
the plaintiff. The authors focus on a separating equilibrium, which is defined 
as: a triple (b*,cr*,s*) satisfying: (1) given b*(•), <r*(-) maximises the defen­
dan t’s expected wealth; (2) given u*(-), s*(-) maximises the plaintiff’s expected 
wealth; and (3) b(S) G [L, L] for all 5 , with b*(s*(L)) = x  for all L  G [L, L\.
Reinganum & Wilde (1986) prove tha t the game has a unique separating se­
quential equilibrium for the out-of-equilibrium beliefs they specify. These be­
liefs simply assert tha t the defendant assumes any settlement offer above the 
equilibrium one from the plaintiff with loss L  to have come from this type, and 
any offer below the equilibrium one made by the plaintiff with loss L  to have 
come from this type. The problem of adverse selection is here. The plaintiff
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has incentives to misrepresent his settlement offer since the defendant does not 
know the real loss. Therefore, the probability of rejecting the settlement offer 
must increase with S  to  prevent low loss plaintiffs from emulating high loss 
plaintiffs. The discontinuity in u*(-) a t S  prevents any plaintiff from demand­
ing s*(L) >  S  since the defendant knows no such high loss exists. In separating 
equilibrium, the incentive compatibility of cr*(>) induces each plaintiff to sig­
nal his type, therefore s*(-) is monotonically increasing. The outcome is the 
asymmetric information creates a non-zero equilibrium probability of trial.
The intuition behind the analysis is profound. Asymmetric information will 
generally result in some degree of inefficiency in the bargaining process. The 
extent of inefficiency is related to  the nature of the distribution of the informa­
tion. Because the plaintiff’s private information can not be credibly passed to 
the defendant without a cost being incurred by the plaintiff via the signaling 
of the information, this model demonstrates tha t even an informed party can 
be harmed by asymmetric information.
2.2.3 Dynam ic strategic m odels
Since in one-shot models pre-trial negotiation only has one period, questions 
of settlement timing and deadline effect can not be answered by this setting. 
Models with multiple bargaining periods are introduced into the research. Bar­
gaining models have traditionally focused on situations where a buyer and seller 
are haggling over the price of a product (see Sobel & Takahashi (1983) and Fu- 
denberg & Tirole (1991)). Private information can be incorporated by allowing 
either or both of the players to  keep their true valuations of the good form the
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other. One can reinterpret this environment as a settlement negotiation by, 
for example, supposing th a t the defendant is the seller with the plaintiff acting 
as the buyer. In this context, what would have been selling price offers in the 
buyer-seller game become settlement offers from the defendant with the plain­
tiff deciding whether to buy the good (settle the case) at the requested amount.
Ordover & Rubinfeld (1986) view the parties as being engaged in a war of 
attrition. Bargaining takes place over a finite horizon and there are two pos­
sible outcomes, a  and (3, preferred differently by the players. One player has 
information about which of these will occur should agreement not take place 
by the end of the game. One interpretation of this is tha t the plaintiff has 
private information about the extent of his loss; if these are high, he receives 
/3, and if low, then a. the defendant perpetually offers a  (i.e. an exogenous 
settlement offer) but if he concedes, he settles at (3. Thus, the game is decided 
when a player “drops out” . Ordover & Rubinfeld (1986) show tha t the unique 
sequential equilibrium outcome depends on whether the defendant is initially 
optimistic or pessimistic about the type of plaintiff he faces.
Cheung (1988) allows the plaintiff to  initiate trial by exercising an outside 
option to break off negotiations. It is not surprising th a t instant settlement 
generally occurs in any subgame perfect equilibrium at an amount equal to 
the plaintiff’s expected net trial recovery.
Spier (1992) incorporates the model of Cheung (1988) into a more complete 
analysis of pre-trial dynamics. The model is also a dynamic extension of Be- 
bchuk (1984). The defendant is assumed to  have private information about
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his liability L. The plaintiff only knows the distribution F(L). The dynamics 
are introduced by allowing bargaining to take place over multiple periods. The 
plaintiff’s rejection of offer St in Period t  simply leads to Period t +  1, and a 
new offer from the defendant. However, if Period T  < oo is reached, rejection 
of St  leads to trial.
We illustrate this model for T  = 2. To emphasise the fact tha t time is now 
a key feature of the analysis, we assume th a t the defendant has an incentive 
to settle early because he incurs pre-trial costs Cd in each period t  — 1,2, and 
we also introduce the common discount factor 6. Here, the costs of trial are 
separated from the pre-trial costs and defined as A^ , i — p,d. For simplicity, 
we assume th a t Cp =  kp = 0. Period 2 of the model is exactly the one-shot 
game analysed earlier. Thus, letting [Lt,L \ stand for the support of the loss 
distribution perceived by the defendant at the start of Period t , the solution 
of the screening model gives us that:
S2 — fi(pL>2 + kd)
£3 =  L  +  — v
Now consider Period 1. The settlement offer here will just leave the plaintiff- 
type L2 indifferent between acceptance and rejection. Since the plaintiff bears 
no costs, this implies Si =  5S2- Therefore the plaintiff’s second stage accep­
tance level is
f _ S 1/ 5 1 +  k i
L>2 — ---------------•
P
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The defendant solves
min *■(£,)& +  cd +  [1 -  F (L 2)}6 (  +  *
Sl I1 -  F iL 2)\
f j L f ( L ) d L
p — 2-------------x h /Cd
1 — F (L S)[1 -
Using of the Envelope Theorem, the first-order condition for Si is
F {U ) cd
f { h )  sp '
Employing the uniform distribution gives
z 8p
Substituting this optimal acceptance level into the settlement conditions before 
yields
£ ; = £ +  — +  -?1
kd . Cd 
p 8p
$2 = $(pL. +  kd) +  Cd
so th a t Si ~  8S 2 produces
S i =  S2(pL +  kd) +  Scd
These results characterise the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the model. If 
costs are so large as to make S* > 82L  then the defendant offers Sf =  82L  and 
settles the case immediately. W hen LI 6 [L, L\t there is a positive probability
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of settlement in each pre-trial period. In the uniform case, the probability 
of settlement in Period t  is given by Pr(t) =  (Z£+1 — L'l)/(L  — L). Thus, 
P r(l)  =  cd/5 (L  — L) and Pr(2) =  kd/(L  — L). These probabilities are de­
termined by the costs faced by the litigants as they dictate the size of the 
settlement offers. It is clear th a t the higher are the defendant’s costs, the 
higher will be his settlement offers and the higher will be the probability of an 
early resolution to the dispute.
Using a larger value of T, Spier (1992) demonstrates tha t the uniform distri­
bution exhibits a “U-shaped” unconditional probability of settlement across 
time, while Fenn & Rickman (1999) show tha t the conditional probability is 
monotonic (up or down). In Spier (1992) the gradually declining portion of 
the “U” is generated by discounting while the final rise is due to the fact tha t 
kd may be much larger than cd: the defendant avoids settling a t unnecessar­
ily generous terms until the “doors of the court” force a deadline effect. The 
presence of such an effect is an im portant product of using dynamic analysis. 
In one-shot models, the whole notion of delay and deadline effects is missing 
because failure to  settle in one period simply leads to  trial, not settlement in 
a later one. Dynamic models can solve questions about delay and the timing 
of settlement.
Just as bargaining theory extends past finite horizon models with one-sided 
information asymmetries so does litigation literature. However, it is probably 
fair to say tha t the full range of possibilities has yet to be applied. Wang, 
Kim & Yi (1994) analyse an infinite horizon model where the parties make 
alternating settlement offers (starting with the defendant), the plaintiff has
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private information and, also, can exercise an outside option to go to trial 
whenever he rejects an offer form the defendant. Their sequential equilibrium 
is, interestingly, unique but of limited predictive power: the defendant’s first 
offer is either accepted by the plaintiff or rejected in favour of trial. Thus, 
although a potentially infinite number of periods is available, a game lasts 
a maximum of two and alternative offers are not observed in equilibrium. 
The empirical evidence in Fenn & Rickman (1999) suggests tha t two-sided 
information asymmetries may be needed to improve the predictive power of 
these dynamic models.
2.3 T he E nglish  versus A m erican R ule
In England and Wales and most European legal systems, a party who prevails 
in litigation is entitled to indemnification from the losing party for his costs of 
prosecuting the lawsuit. However, in the United States, the prevailing party is 
entitled to filing fees, court fees but not to recover his expenditures on lawyers’ 
fees. The advocates of the English rule claim th a t the costs it imposes on losers 
will discourage plaintiffs from filing meritless claims and the risk associated 
with trial will increase the likelihood of settlement. People also argue tha t the 
English cost rule increases total legal expenditures.
2.3.1 Effects on legal expenditures
The economic theory of litigation models litigants as rational players who seek 
to maximise their returns from the litigation. Prom this perspective, we can 
compare the plaintiff’s expected value of trial under the two rules. Under the
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English rule, the expected value of trial is given by
EUe  =  pL -  (1 -  p)(cp +  cd).
Under the American rule, since each party pays own lawyer’s fees the expected 
value of trial becomes
EUa = pL  — cp.
It is clear EUe  < EUa if and only if p < Cd/(cp +  cd). Therefore, if litigants’ 
legal fees are fixed, plaintiffs with low probabilities of prevailing will find their 
cases less valuable under English rule and vice versa. Donohue (1991) chal­
lenges the Posner/Shavell litigation model but claims th a t the English cost 
rule tends to discourage low merit cases and encourage high merit cases.
However, in reality the probability of prevailing can be a function of litigants’ 
expenditure. If so, we can rewrite litigants’ expected values of trial as
EUe  =  p{cp, cd)L -  [1 -  p(cp, cd)\{cp +  cd),
EUa pippt c-d)L cp.
If the litigants can choose their legal expenditures, their optimal choices are 
given by maximising the expected values of trial with respect to  their legal 
expenditures. For the plaintiff, it gives
PcpE + P + Pcp • (cp + cd) -  1 =  0,
PcpL  -  1 -  0.
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Since the defendant’s legal expenditure plays an im portant role in the above 
functions, it is unreasonable to expect litigants to make their expenditure 
decisions without considering the other side’s expenditure. Naturally, now the 
effects of cost rules can be modelled in a two-person’s game. Breautigam, 
Owen & Panzar (1984) first introduce Nash equilibrium in the analysis of cost 
rules. They find tha t in Nash equilibrium the sum of parties’ expenditures 
must increase under the English cost rule. Katz (1987) subsequently confirms 
tha t fee shifting encourages greater expenditure. P lott (1987) uses a game 
model to illustrate the effects of the cost rules on legal expenditures. His 
results show tha t legal expenditures depend on the exact formulation of the 
“legal production function” . If the case outcome depends on litigants’ legal 
effort, the English rule will cause unlimited increases in legal expenditures. If 
the case outcome is isolated from litigants’ effort, the English rule has no effect 
on expenditure.
2.3.2 Effects on settlem ent
Since settlement reduces social legal expenditure and the vast majority of civil 
cases are settled rather than tried, effects on settlement are an im portant factor 
in the comparison of the English and American rules. As a result, literature 
develops two methods to illustrate the nature of fee shifting.
In the context of the optimism model (Landes (1971) and Gould (1973)), the 
defendant’s expected cost of trial under the English rule is
E C e — (1 — p)(L  +  Cp +  cf).
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Thus, if he loses he pays the accident loss L  and both parties’ litigation costs, 
but if he wins, he incurs no costs. While under the American rule, his expected 
value of trial is
E C  a  =  (1 — p)L  +  Cd-
As we argued above, settlement is feasible if the maximum amount the de­
fendant will pay to avoid trial exceeds the minimum amount the plaintiff will 
accept. Therefore, under the English cost rule, the settlement condition be­
comes
( 2 p  1 ) ( L  T  Cp T  Cd) ^  Cp -f- Cd-
Under the American cost rule, this condition is
(2p  -  1 )L <  cp +  cd-
The comparison of them shows tha t under the English rule the settlement range 
is smaller, which implies the English rule makes settlement harder. Hence, 
fee shifting stimulates litigants’ optimism, making them less likely to settle. 
Shavell (1982) explains this intuitively. The stakes of the case are higher un­
der the English cost rule since the outcome of the trial reallocates legal costs. 
Thus, the effect of moving from the American rule to the English rule is the 
same as an increase in L. It is reasonable to predict more trials under the 
English rule.
However, other studies claim th a t trials are not caused by optimism but by 
uncertainty over the opponent party’s reservation settlement value. The set­
tlement decision depends on a numbers of factors, including the stakes, the
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costs of litigation and the extent of uncertainty between parties. More uncer­
tainty means less settlement. Asymmetric information models of settlement 
(Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum & Wilde (1986)) confirm the conclusion tha t 
the English cost rule encourages trial rather than settlement in disputes re­
volving around liability. Fee shifting actually leads parties to toughen their 
overall bargaining position, lowering the probability of settlement. Polinsky 
& Rubinfeld (1998) indicate th a t the English rule lowers the average quality 
of trial cases because the marginal parties in trial have less favourable private 
information than under the American rule.
2.3.3 Evidence on the effects of fee shifting
Ideally, the effects of fee shifting should be tested by litigation and settlement 
data  from the United State and England. However this is not possible in prac­
tice because it would be unable to control all the inter-jurisdictional factors 
th a t may influence the settlement decision. Stanley & Coursey (1988) test 
the effects of fee shifting within an experimental setting. They find tha t the 
English rule increases the settlement rate. An explanation of this result is tha t 
the litigants are risk averse.
There is some more convincing empirical evidence from the data  of the State 
of Florida, where the English rule was used for medical malpractice cases 
between 1980 and 1985. In two studies (Snyder & Hughes (1990) and Snyder 
& Hughes (1995)), Snyder and Hughes use data from more than 10000 cases 
to  test the effects of fee shifting. They find, firstly, the English rule increases 
the likelihood of trial; secondly, the English rule discourages weak claims;
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thirdly, the English rule increases the prevailing rate of plaintiffs as well as the 
judgement at trial and amount of compensation in settlement. These findings 
are consistent with theoretical predictions and provide further evidence tha t 
the English rule encourages plaintiffs to pursue higher quality claims.
2.4 P rincipal-agent issues and legal fee arrange­
m ents
In the previous sections, we assume an identity between the interests of the 
client and his lawyer. However, this may be not true. Since many clients are 
“one-shot” users of the legal system, as demonstrated by Genn (1987), lawyers 
often act for poorly informed clients with high monitoring costs. Consequently, 
the general problems of principals and agents may arise in the context of litiga­
tion. Merits of the cases, clients’ legal expertise knowledge, fee arrangements 
and their links to outcomes of lawsuits may independently or jointly motivate 
or mitigate principal-agent problems.
In this section, we review the literature on principal-agent problems between 
lawyers and clients. Two sets of questions are interesting to us. First, which 
factors will affect the lawyer’s effort decision and what is the role of fee ar­
rangements in the lawyer’s legal effort? Second, what are the effects of fee 
arrangements on the client’s and the lawyer’s settlement decisions? Therefore, 
in addition to the general principal-agent settings in litigation, in this section 
our vision mainly focuses on the studies giving comparisons among hourly fees, 
contingent fees and conditional fees.
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2.4.1 The lawyer’s effort decision
Early principal-agent models in litigation normally examined lawyers’ legal ef­
forts by comparing them  under contingent fees and under hourly fees. They 
assume a judicial production function which maps the plaintiff’s lawyer’s hours 
on the case into an amount which this will recover for the plaintiff. The relevant 
question is whether hourly or contingent fees can induce effort to maximise the 
plaintiff’s net benefits from litigation.
Schwartz &; Mitchell (1970) is the first to analyse lawyer’s agent problems by 
comparing fee arrangements. They suppose the plaintiff and his lawyer are risk 
neutral profit maximisers, and th a t the market for legal services is perfectly 
competitive. Under both fee arrangements there is a judicial production func­
tion S  specifying the gross recovery as an increasing, concave, deterministic, 
function of the lawyer’s hours h. It is implicitly assumed tha t the lawyer puts 
the same effort into each hour worked.
Now consider two cases. In the first, the plaintiff can observe S(h)  and can 
therefore specify the hours tha t the lawyer should work. The authors assume 
this to mean th a t he chooses hourly fees. In the second case, the plaintiff cannot 
observe S(h). This setting introduces asymmetric information on lawyer’s 
effort. Therefore, the model can focus on whether the financial incentive of 
contingent fees can overcome the information asymmetry. The two cases can be 
compared as follows: with observable S(h)  and hourly fees, the plaintiff chooses 
h to maximise S (h ) — wh, where w  is the lawyer’s competitively determined
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wage rate. The first-order condition is:
dS(h)
—  ^ =  w  
dh
Therefore, the lawyer’s gross marginal product should equal his marginal cost. 
Turning to the second case, assume tha t the contingent fee percentage is @ G 
(0,1). the lawyer chooses h to maximise (3S(h) — wh. Here wh  represents her 
opportunity cost. The first-order condition is:
.dS{h)
/3~ d i r = w
Since S(h ) is concave and (3 < 1 , it is clear th a t under hourly fees the lawyer’s 
effort is higher than it under contingent fees. This also implies th a t both the 
plaintiff’s recovery and the lawyer’s fee are lower with a contingent fee. In 
addition, w can observe tha t if and only if (3 =  1, these two fee arrangements 
reach the same effort level. Actually, these results are analogous to the tradi­
tional views tha t shared contracts in general are inefficient since they induce 
suboptimal inputs.
Johnson (1981) considers the lawyer’s expertise problem: if the plaintiff is ill- 
informed about the case’ merit, how will fee arrangements affect the lawyer’s 
effort? Under this situation, the lawyer can use her information advantage 
to maximise her expected income regardless of the plaintiff’s interest. Under 
hourly fees, the lawyer chooses h to maximise her fee w h , while under contin­
gent fees the lawyer chooses h to maximise S (h ) — wh. The result suggests 
th a t the lawyer may over-invest her time under hourly fees. This implies that 
the ill-informed plaintiff may be better off if he chooses contingent fees.
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Danzon (1983) adopts the model of Schwartz & Mitchell (1970) but assumes 
tha t contingent fees contracted lawyers compete on the basis of the recovery 
they gain for their clients, rather than the share of recovery. In addition, 
the author assumes the probability of the plaintiff prevailing p  and the gross 
recovery A  are associated with both parties’ legal effort. Therefore, the judical 
production function becomes:
S  = p { L ,H )A (L ,H )
where L  is the plaintiff lawyer’s hours on the case and H  is the defendant 
lawyer’s hours. The relationships between hours and production are given by 
&  =  i  +  m  > 0. i  =  i  +  H l  >  0 < 0. Now under
contingent fees, given the defendant’s optimal input H , the plaintiff’s lawyer 
selects L  and (3 to maximise her profit function
f  — pA(  1 — /3) +  A ({3pA — wL)
where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the lawyer’s opportunity 
cost constraint. Differentiating with respect to L, (3 and A, and substituting 
the results, we can get:
This result is identical to the hourly fees condition of Schwartz k  Mitchell 
(1970). Therefore, the author concludes th a t with risk neutral plaintiffs and 
lawyers, contingent fees induce the amount of legal effort tha t would be chosen 
by a fully informed hourly fees contracted plaintiff.
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Halpern & Turnbull (1983) introduce uncertainty into the principal-agent frame­
work. Assuming the judical production function S  is associated with a ran­
dom factor e, the study concludes th a t contingent fees dominate hourly fees, 
in terms of maximising the plaintiff’s expected utility, when he is unable to 
monitor effort or observe the uncertainty ex post given he is not risk neutral 
when his lawyer is risk averse. Hourly fees are only optimal when there is 
no uncertainty and the case is sufficiently simple tha t monitoring is feasible. 
Halpern & Turnbull (1983) also look at the effects of uncertainty as exoge­
nous parameters change. They show th a t neither the plaintiff nor the lawyer 
will put more effort into the case under uncertainty than under certainty, but 
tha t both will invest more time as the probability of winning in court rises. 
Wealthy risk averse lawyers devote more time to a contingent fee case than 
less wealthy ones, while the effects of the plaintiff’s wealth on his preferred 
choice of effort depends also on his risk aversion. For both the plaintiff and 
the lawyer, the effects of a mean preserving spread of the settlement function 
on their investments depend on their risk aversion.
Dana & Spier (1993) and Emons (2000) also focus on the lawyer’s expertise 
problems. They both assume the plaintiff is ignorant but in different ways. 
Following Schwartz & Mitchell (1970), they use the lawyer’s service hours to 
represent her legal effort. Dana Sz Spier (1993) assume the plaintiff does not 
know the merit of his case. The lawyer as the expert finds out about the merit 
and then recommends whether to pursue or drop the case. They find th a t con­
tingent fees provide sufficient effort but hourly fees do not. Two implications 
are also highlighted. First, under conditional fees since the lawyer has a finan-
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cial stake in the case she is willing to drop suits with a low expected return. 
Therefore, contingent fees may reduce the proportion of frivolous lawsuits. 
Second, in a world without contingent fees, injured parties have good reason 
to distrust lawyers and may be deterred from seeking legal services. Emons 
(2000), in contrast, assumes th a t the plaintiff knows the merit of the case and 
can observe how much effort the lawyer puts into his case. But the plaintiff 
does not know how much effort he needs. The effort decision is actually made 
by the lawyer not by the plaintiff. However, since the effort is verifiable, the 
lawyer can not cheat by collecting fees for services she did not provide. The 
author concludes tha t paying the lawyer hourly fees provides better incentives 
in this expertise problems than paying contingent fees. In summary, these 
two papers imply tha t if the lawyer decides whether to proceed or drop the 
case, contingent fees are more efficient, while if the lawyer decides how much 
effort to input, hourly fees are more efficient. In addition, both papers imply 
tha t in expertise problems neither contingent fees nor hourly fees are generally 
optimal.
Rubinfeld & Scotchmer (1993) introduce a two-type asymmetric information 
model. They assume th a t the plaintiff has better information about the quali­
ties (merits) of the case and th a t the lawyer has better information about her 
quality (ability). The authors observe th a t plaintiffs with high-quality case 
will be willing to pay a high fixed fee and a low contingency percentage, while 
the plaintiff with low-quality case will be willing to pay a low fixed fee and a 
high contingency percentage. While a high-quality lawyer will signal her abil­
ity by working for a high contingency percentage. However, since high-quality 
cases are more likely to be won than low-quality cases and since a high-quality
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lawyer is more likely to win the same case than a low-quality lawyer, the paper 
does not given a firm conclusion on which of these asymmetric information is 
more important.
Empirically, Kritzer, Felstiner, Sarat & TYubek (1985) use the data  collected 
by the US Civil Litigation Research Project to compare lawyers’ behaviours 
between hourly fees and contingent fees. They find tha t fee arrangements 
do influence the amount of effort lawyers devote to a given case. For small 
stake cases, compared to contingent fees, hourly fees encourage higher effort. 
However, the paper also suggests th a t there is no significant fee effect on high 
stake cases.
2.4.2 A gency problems associated w ith conditional fees
Gravelle & Waterson (1993) uses a one-shot model to analyse legal fees’ effects 
on settlement, accident and welfare. In this asymmetric information model, 
the plaintiff has private information about the level of damages. Specifically, 
in the model all the participants (plaintiff, defendant and lawyer) are risk neu­
tral. The accident probability ir is endogenous which depends on defendant’s 
pre-accident care level x. Since both litigation and care are costly to the de­
fendant, he chooses an optimal care level to minimise his expected total costs. 
If an accident occurs, the damage to the plaintiff is L  6 [Lo, Iq], but the de­
fendant only knows the distribution of the damage Q(L). The plaintiff can be 
ignorant but his lawyer is not altruistic. When the lawyer makes decisions, she 
attaches a weight A on the plaintiff’s income and 1 — A on her own income. A 
therefore represents the lawyer’s degree of altruism/selfishness. The lawyer’s
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fees are given by f s  if the case is settled and f w ( /° ) if it is won (lost) at court. 
The defendant makes a single settlement offer S.
W ithin this framework, the plaintiff will accept the defendant’s settlement of 
if and only if
s - f s > P( L - n - ( i - p ) f ° + t ,
where p  is his probability of prevailing at trial and t — k\pcp — (1 — p )c j is the 
expected cost transfer where k = 1 (k =  0) represents the English (American) 
cost rule. It is clear tha t the settlement offer has a marginal level of acceptance, 
which is
ep = r  + ■s' - / g - f  +  ( 1 - p ) / 0 ^  L
p
ep(s, •) is defined as the plaintiff’s acceptance level.
The plaintiff’s lawyer, if selfish, would accept the settlement offer if
f s - c 0 ^  p f w +  (1 -  p ) f°  -  cp,
where Co is his cost of settlement and Cp is his total cost. When f s  — c0 = 
pfw  _ j_  ^  —p ) f Q —  cp, the lawyer’s acceptance level t A can be solved. There is a 
potential conflict of interest over settlement because i p ^  i A. The probability 
tha t there is an actual conflict of interest is Q((p ) — Q{fA). Combine the 
plaintiff and his lawyer’s settlement conditions together, it becomes
X ( S - f )  + ( l - A ) ( / s - c o ) >  
\ ( p ( L - n - ( l - p ) f  + t) + ( l - \ ) ( p r  + (1 - p ) f - Cp-) .
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Under hourly fees, f s =  c0, f w — / °  =  Cp. Under conditional fees, f s  =  
(1 +  (j) cq, f w =  (1 +  p)cp, and f °  = 0. Under contingent fee, f s  = aS,  
f w = a L , and f °  =  0. Substitution of these specified fee values into the com­
bined settlement condition functions enables the comparison of acceptance 
level across different fee arrangements. Also, the conflict of interest which fee 
arrangements might create can be examined. Under hourly fees, the lawyer 
receives a non-contingent fee which just covers her costs whatever the outcome 
of the litigation. Therefore she has no financial incentive to offer biased advice 
to  the plaintiff. Hence, the plaintiff’s acceptance level under hourly fee i n  is 
not affected by the lawyer’s degree of selfishness (A). While under a contin­
gent fee, the degree of selfishness does affect the acceptance level. Under the 
English cost rule, since the costs can be shifted in both direction, it is possible 
tha t the expected net transfer is t  <  0. The combined effect of fee shifting and 
contingent fee makes a well informed plaintiff less willing and a selfish lawyer 
more willing to settle. The acceptance level £a is less than under the hourly 
fee if and only if the lawyer is comparatively altruistic A > 1/2. If the lawyer 
is selfish A =  0, since the lawyer has shared risk at trial he is keener to settle, 
which gives £a > £h -
Compared with the hourly fee, the conditional fee increases the plaintiff’s costs 
by pc0 if the settlement offer is accepted and by [p(l + p) — l]cp if it is rejected. 
Accordingly, the lawyer makes a profit of fico if the offer is accepted with prob­
ability Q , which implies that, if the lawyer makes an expected profit of zero, 
she must make an expected loss if the offer is rejected. Hence, compared with 
the hourly fee the conditional fee makes a well informed plaintiff (A =  1 ) less 
willing to accept any given settlement offer and makes the lawyer better off
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if the offer is accepted than if it is rejected. This situation is similar to the 
contingent fee, the acceptance level depends on the selfishness of the lawyer. 
When the lawyer is relatively selfish A <  1/2, > in ,  and when the lawyer is
relatively altruistic A > 1 / 2 , t p <  i H.
The defendant chooses his settlement offer against the costs incurred by dif­
ferent fee arrangements. Of course, the value of the settlement offer depends 
on the acceptance level. To capture more features of fee arrangements, in the 
model the probability of accident is set as endogenous. The authors show 
tha t since increases in the plaintiff’s acceptance level lower the defendant’s 
settlement offer and so lower the defendant’s expected post-accident costs, a 
higher acceptance level cause more accidents. In contrast to early views2 tha t 
the conditional fee and the contingent fee will lead to an increase in litigation 
because plaintiffs will be more likely to sue and less likely to settle, Gravelle 
Sz Waterson (1993) argues th a t the effects of fee changes on the number of 
potential suits and the likelihood th a t a suit will go to  trial work in offsetting 
directions. The authors point out two implications. First, it is impossible to 
predict whether there will be more or fewer trials. Second, the welfare con­
sequences of changes in the number of trials are ambiguous. An increase in 
the number of trials could be compatible with an increase in welfare if it is 
achieved by a reduction in the number of accidents more than offsetting the 
plaintiff’s reduced willingness to settle. Therefore, for any fee arrangement, it 
may be impossible to achieve both a reduction in the volume of litigation and 
in the number of accidents.
2eg see Contingency fees, Lord Chancellor’s Department, CM. 571, LCD (1989) for ref­
erence.
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Emons & Garoupa (2006) compare conditional fees and contingent fees in a 
principal-agent framework where the lawyer chooses unobservable effort after 
she learns the realization of accident loss. Unlike Gravelle & Waterson (1993), 
Emons & Garoupa (2006) do not consider the interactions between plaintiff 
and defendant and consequently there is no settlement stage in their model. 
The model has two stages. In stage 1, the plaintiff and the lawyer sign the 
contract. Neither lawyer nor plaintiff knows the realization of the accident loss 
L. After the lawyer has accepted the contract, she learns the realization L. 
In stage 2, the lawyer decides her legal effort and payoffs are realized with the 
outcome of the case. Both players are risk neutral. In the model, the prob­
ability of prevailing at trial (p) depends on the lawyer’s unobservable costly 
effort e 6 [0, 1].
W ithin this framework, the contingent fee contract S  and the conditional fee 
contract K  are described alteratively by
S  =
K  =
w  +  a L  if the case is won; 
w  if the case is lost.
w  +  d, if the case is won; 
w if the case is lost.
where w is a fixed component, a  is the lawyer’s share of judgement and d is 
the uplift fee which is not related to the judgement.
In the asymmetric information setting, the lawyer knows L  at the time of choos-
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ing effort but the plaintiff does not. Under contingent fees, the lawyer max­
imises p{e)aL — e + w  with respect to e. The choice of effort satisfies pea L  = 1. 
Under conditional fees, the lawyer maximises p(e)d — e -f w\ then the optimal 
effort is ped — 1. It is clear th a t under contingent fees the lawyer’s effort e is a 
function of L, but under conditional fees the effort is independent of L. If we let 
p(e) =  e7, these two efforts become eg =  (7 cxL)1^ 1^  and ex  =  (7 d)1^ 1-7 .^ 
The plaintiff maximises his expected utility E(Us) — E(p(  1 — a)L)  — w or 
E{Uk ) =  E(p(L  — d) — w subject to  the lawyer’s effort. If w  ^  0, under 
contingent fees his expected utility E(Us) =  (1 — 7 )727/(1_7)JEl(L1/(1_7)) and 
under conditional fees E (U x ) =  (1 — 7 )7 27/(1- 7)j5 (L)1/(1_7). Using Jensen’s in­
equality, E(Us) > E{Uk )- Hence, the plaintiff and the lawyer do better under 
contingent fees than under conditional fees. Similar analysis for the scenario 
where constraint w  <  0 is also given. The paper concludes tha t contingent 
fees provide better incentives than conditional fees. In addition, conditional 
fees do better than hourly fees and flat fees. However, it is arguable tha t in 
the paper’s setting, the conditional fee uplift d is a fixed amount. Actually, d 
should be a function of the lawyer’s service hours (effort). Moreover, the paper 
puts the UK style conditional fees into an American cost rule environment. In 
the next subsection, we provide an amended version of the model.
Emons (2007) changes the assumption of tha t the client is uninformed (in 
Emons & Garoupa (2006)) to one where the lawyer is uninformed, which means 
the accident loss L  is known to the client bu t not to the lawyer. The loss here 
is a function of two factors, the distribution/level of the loss and the risk of 
the case. Therefore, asymmetric information can either be the expected level 
of loss or the risk of the case. There are three stages in the game. In the
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first stage the lawyer offers a contract: either a conditional fee or a contingent 
fee contract. In the second stage the client chooses either one contract from 
the two on offer or no contract at all. In the third stage the lawyer picks her 
effort. The client maximises the expected difference between judgement and 
payments to the lawyer. The lawyer maximises her expected income minus ef­
fort cost. In conclusion, if there is asymmetric information about the expected 
level of loss, in equilibrium the lawyer will offer only conditional fees, while if 
there is asymmetric information about the risk of cases, only contingent fee 
contracts are offered in equilibrium.
Emons (2006) compares conditional and contingent fees in a framework where 
lawyers choose between a safe and a risky litigation strategy. Two results are 
highlighted in the paper. First, conditional fees give the lawyer an incentive 
to maximise the probability of winning the case. Under contingent fees the 
lawyer maximises the expected judgement. Second, if the plaintiff is risk averse, 
there may be a conflict of interest between the plaintiff and his lawyer. If the 
cost of hiring a lawyer is low, the plaintiff seeks insurance through conditional 
fees which induce the safe bet. Accordingly if the legal fees are high, the 
plaintiff prefers contingent fees shifting most of the judgement risk to  the 
lawyer. For the jurisdiction where conditional fees are allowed but contingent 
fees are forbidden, the author predicts inefficient contracting for high costs of 
legal service.
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Emons and Garoupa (2006) give a comparison between US-style contingent 
fees and UK-style conditional fees on an unobservable legal effort basis. In 
this subsection, we focus on two extensions of their analysis. First, we con­
sider the situation when English cost rule apply to the UK-style conditional 
fees arrangement. Second, we assume the conditional fee is a function of the 
lawyer’s legal effort, which tends to be true.
2.4.3.1 E nglish cost rule
A plaintiff is involved in an accident. He retains a lawyer to sue the defen­
dant to demand damages L. The probability of winning (p) depends on the 
lawyer’s legal effort e 6 [0,1]. Following Emons and Garoupa (2006), we de­
fine p(e) — e7, 7  € (0 ,1 ). The effort e is unobservable. W hen the case is 
won, the plaintiff gets L  from the defendant whereas he gets nothing when 
the case is lost. The amount of adjudication L  is the realization of a random 
variable with support [0, 1], cumulative density function G , and expected value 
E(L) €  (0,1).
The timing of events is as follows. In the first stage, the plaintiff and the 
lawyer sign the contract. In this stage, neither of them knows the realization 
L. In the second stage, the lawyer learns the realization L. In the third stage, 
the lawyer chooses her legal effort e.
The contingent fee and the conditional fee are defined as:
2.4.3 Extensions to Emons and Garoupa (2006)
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D efin ition  2-4-1: A contingent fee contract S  is described by a fixed 
component w plus a percentage a  of the adjudicated amount L  if the case is 
won. Formally,
w  +  olL if the ease is won; 
w  if the case is lost.
S
D efin ition  2-4-2: A conditional fee contract K  is given by a fixed com­
ponent w plus a upscale fee d not related to the adjudicated amount L  if the 
case is won. Formally,
{w +  d if the case is won;w  if the case is lost.
Assume the defendant’s legal cost is a fixed value f D. We apply the English
cost rule to the conditional fee. Here the plaintiff’s expected utility becomes 
Uk  — P(L — d) — w-\-k\pd — (1 — p ) f D], where k is proportion of costs shifted 
from loser to winner. Since the payment contract to the lawyer does not 
change, the effort incentive of the conditional fees does not change either. The 
ex post efficient level of effort satisfies pe(L  +  k f D H- kd) — 1 or in a closed 
form e* =  [y(L +  k f D +  kd)}1^ 1^ .  Compared with the contingent fee where 
e — (7 L)1A1_'>')j (3^  ex post efficient effort level of the conditional fee is higher.
Now we consider the scenario where a  constraint w  ^  0 exists. W ithout this 
constraint we have to  solve the problem by finding a fixed salary tha t solves 
the participation constraint with equality when a  =  1 and d = E(L)  for con­
tingent and conditional fee contracts respectively. Therefore, the fixed salary
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is negative. We now solve the problem for the plaintiff by set w — 0 so that 
both contingent and conditional fee contracts only have variable components.
We consider w =  0. The the plaintiff maximises E{Uk ) subject to ped = 1. 
The solution is d =  l] ^ .  When k =  1, d goes to infinite. This
happens because in the model setting, the probability of winning (p) is actually 
a increasing function of the upscale fee d. The higher the d, the higher the 
chance to  win. So the plaintiff does not need to consider the risk of losing 
in trial under the English cost rule. This result implies a limitation in the 
assumption: there is no upper bound on the effort. In reality, it is unreasonable 
th a t a lawyer inputs infinite effort into a single case. Hence, the function of the 
probability of wining p(e) — e 1 needs to be changed. In addition, this result 
also suggests th a t the probability of winning p should contain input variables 
from both the plaintiff and the defendant. These issues can be an interesting 
topic for future research.
2.4.3.2 Effort-related conditional fees
In this subsection, we go back to the assumption of Emons Sz Garoupa (2006) 
tha t American cost rule is applied to the both fee arrangements. Unlike the 
setting in Emons and Garoupa (2006), here we assume the effort e can be ob­
served since the lawyer’s payment may rely on it. More precisely, we assume 
the lawyer’s legal effort is the time she spends on the case. In the final stage, 
the trial finishes and the financial terms of the contract are settled.
Therefore, the definition of the conditional fee becomes:
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D efin itio n  2-4-3: A conditional fee contract K  is given by a fixed com­
ponent w plus a upscale fee de not related to the adjudicated amount L  if the 
case is won. Formally,
K  =
w +  de if the case is won; 
w  if the case is lost.
Under contingent fees, the expected utility of the risk neutral lawyer given L  
is Vs = p{e)aL  — e +  w and the expected utility of the risk neutral plaintiff 
is Us =  p (e)(l — a)L  — w. Under conditional fees, the expected utility of the 
risk neutral lawyer given L  is VK — p(e)de -  e +  w  and the expected utility of 
the risk neutral plaintiff is Uk  — p{p){E — de) — w.
We go to the situation where the lawyer knows L  at the time of choosing effort 
but the plaintiff does not. Under contingent fees, the lawyer maximises Vs 
with respect to e. The choice of effort will satisfy pea L  =  1 or in closed form 
es  =  (7 cx.L)1Al~x) w Under conditional fees , the lawyer maximizes V/c with 
respect to e. The choice of effort will satisfy pede +  pd =  1 or in closed form 
eK =  [(7 +  l)d]“ 1/7.
Again, we consider the situation th a t the lawyer cannot buy the case from the 
plaintiff where w ^  0, which is the second scenario of Emons and Garoupa’s 
paper. Assume w = 0, it the case of “no win, no fee” . Under contingent fees, 
the plaintiff maximises E(Us) subject to pea L  =  1 . The expected payoff for
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the plaintiff is
E(US) =  (1 - 7)7 (2 .1)
whereas the lawyer gets E(Vs) = jE (U s) .
Under conditional fees, the plaintiff maximizes E(Uk ) subject to pede-\-pd — 1 . 
The optimal solution is d =  [£,(L)7 ]7^ 7- 1)(7 + 1 )1A t-1) anci the expected payoff 
for the plaintiff is
E(Uk ) =  (1 -  7)7t/(1"7>(1 +  7 )7/(1- 7)£ (L )1/(i- 1'). (2.2)
whereas the lawyer gets E{VK) = j E(Uk ) since de = yE (L).
This result is slightly different from the Proposition 1 of Emons and Garoupa. 
Since £ ,(L1^ 1-7 )^ >  E (L )1^ 1-7  ^ the welfare comparison is actually ambiguous. 
However, when 7  is small enough there is a regime where both the plaintiff and 
the lawyer are better off under conditional fees than under contingent fees.
2.5 T he role o f legal exp en ses insurance
Compared to the American cost rule, the English cost rule imposes more risk 
on litigants. As a market response, the majority of European jurisdictions 
have well-developed insurance markets where protection against the risk of le­
gal expense can be purchased. In England and Wales, although the market for
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such legal expenses insurance has developed slowly3, this position is changing 
as policy makers look to  substitute private insurance for the increasingly ex­
pensive social insurance against legal expense provided by legal aid. Although 
Europe institutionally emphasizes legal expenses insurance, very few papers 
study it. The majority of literature still focuses on contingent fees.
van Velthoven & van Wijck (2001) analyse legal expenses insurance in a juris­
diction where the English cost rule is applied. In their setting, both the plaintiff 
and the defendant are risk neutral and information is complete. The paper fo­
cuses on whether insurance will change litigants’ decisions, and whether profit- 
seeking companies will make the insurance available. It finally discusses the 
implications for social welfare. The analysis starts from the standard litigation 
model. For an un-insured plaintiff, the expected value of trial is
EUp — ppL  (1 Pp)(.Cp -j- Qj).
Given the plaintiff knows the probability of prevailing p, if and only if p  ^  
(cp + Cd)/(cp +  cd -I- L), will he litigate. For the defendant, the expected cost 
of litigation is
EUd — (1 — Pd){L> +  CP +  Cd).
He will pay the plaintiff by way of settlement an amount S  — (1 —Pd)(L+cp+Cd) 
if the plaintiff has all the bargaining power. If the transaction costs associated 
with a settlement are zero, the only acceptable settlement offer for the plaintiff 
is S  ^  ppL  -  (1 -  pp){cp -I- cd) i.e 1 +  (cp +  cd)/(cp + cd Jr L ) ' ^ p p + pd.
3see Rickman & Gray (19956) and Prais (1995) for early reviews.
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If the plaintiff is insured, his expected value of trial becomes
EUp — ppL.
Accordingly, the condition for the plaintiff to litigate becomes pp ^  0. Now the 
acceptable settlement offer for the plaintiff becomes S  ^  ppL  and the condition 
for the defendant to opt for a settlement becomes (1 — Pd){cp + Cd + L) ^  S  (i.e 
pd +PpL/(cp 4- Cd 4- L) ^  1 ). It is clear th a t the effects of the legal expenses 
insurance are: first, to encourage litigation, and second, to decrease the prob­
ability of settlement. The paper also suggests that, in the insured case, the 
defendant will more often avoid the accident since he faces higher expenses 
following from this accident (i.e. the insurance deters). In welfare discussions, 
the authors point out the insurance increases social welfare if and only if the 
welfare gain stemming from increased deterrence outweighs the welfare loss 
due to an increase in the number of trials.
van Velthoven & van Wijck (2001) is the first research to look into the re­
lationship between legal expenses insurance and social welfare. The results 
also unveil some im portant features of legal expenses insurance. However, it 
neither looks the legal expenses insurance in a “strategic” way nor discusses 
pre-trial negotiations in detail. This may limit applications of their results.
Kirstein (2000) starts a strategic analysis to capture some of these features of 
legal expenses insurance. The litigation game is divided into three stages. The 
first stage is the insurance stage. In this stage the plaintiff and the defendant 
simultaneously decide whether to buy legal expenses insurance or not. The
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parameters in the insurance contract are treated as exogenous. The second 
stage is the accident stage. Since the probability of accident 7r is exogenous, 
“nature” decides the plaintiff’s accident loss L. The third stage is the litigation 
stage. In this stage the parties seek to negotiate a settlement. If no settlement 
is reached, the plaintiff has to decide whether to proceed to trial or not. In the 
case of trial, the judge decides with probability p = pp =  pd in favour of the 
plaintiff. From the first stage, there are four subgames: both parties insure, 
no party insures and only one party insures (two subgames). Following back­
ward induction, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is solved. The findings 
show th a t if the plaintiff is not insured, the threat to sue is non-credible and 
thus the defendant is not motivated to make a positive settlement offer. In 
this case, legal expenses insurance provides a credible threat for the plaintiff 
and thereby induces a settlement. If the plaintiff is insured, the parameters 
(insurance premium and legal fee deductible) can be such th a t the insurance 
is attractive for litigants in order to improve their settlement position. It also 
implicitly suggests th a t insurance institutions do not only serve to solve prob­
lems of risk-allocation, but also serve strategic goals, such as improving one’s 
position in settlement negotiations.
Inspired by Kirstein (2000), Kirstein & Rickman (2004) examines a contingency- 
style insurance arrangement with risk neutral litigants in an English cost rule 
jurisdiction. In this complete information strategic model, only the plaintiff 
can access the insurance. The model consists of three stages. In stage 1, 
the plaintiff and the insurer bargain over an insurance policy. Here, the in­
surance premium is exogenous. In stage 2, the plaintiff and the defendant 
negotiate over a settlement. In stage 3, if no settlement has occurred, the
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plaintiff decides whether to  proceed to trial or not. Unlike Kirstein (2000) but 
like van Velthoven & van Wijck (2001), here the probabilities of prevailing at 
the trial are not identical across litigants (pp y  pd). Obviously, from stage 2 
there are two subgames: insured plaintiff and un-insured plaintiff. Since the 
analysis focuses on the incentive effects of the insurance on litigating, settle­
ment and going to trial, a comparison between these two subgames is given. 
In the un-insured subgame, (1) the plaintiff refuses to settle and proceeds 
to court if and only if pp > pd -f [cp +  cd)/{cp +  cd +  L )} (2) the plaintiff 
and the defendant agree upon a settlement out of court for S  if and only if 
(cp +  cd) j (cp + cd + L) < p p < p d +  (cp +  cd)/(cp +  Cd +  L), and (3) the plaintiff 
drops the case if and only if (cp -j- cd)/{cp +  cd +  L )  >  pp. In the insured sub­
game, (1) the plaintiff proceeds to court if and only if pp > pd{cp -1- cd +  L )/L ,  
(2) the plaintiff and the defendant agree upon a settlement out of court for 
S t  if and only if pp < pd(cp -f- cd + L ) /L ,  and (3) if settlement occurs, then 
S t  > S.  In addition, settlement before insurance (after-the-event insurance), 
predetermined shares between the insurer and the plaintiff (exogenous insur­
ance premium), and optimism of the litigants are discussed.
Kirstein & Rickman (2004) emphasize th a t legal expenses insurance is neces­
sary to provide protection against the extra cost risk imposed by the English 
cost rule. The findings highlight two points. First, legal expenses insurance 
adds credibility to the threat to sue, since it becomes profitable for a plaintiff 
to threaten trial. Second, by protecting the plaintiff against cost, the insurance 
increases settlements in the event of a negotiated settlement of the case. The 
authors also point out tha t the insurance does not increase the likelihood of 
going to trial since it is only of mutual benefit to the plaintiff and the insurer
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when the case settles out of court. Like Kirstein (2000), the model assumes 
tha t litigants have no means to influence the probability of accident, so the 
result excludes any precautionary effect on the insurance decision.
Heyes et al. (2004) introduce risk aversion to  modeling pre-trial behaviour 
with legal expenses insurance. The analysis focuses on settlement behaviour, 
care decisions, the number of accidents, the volume of trials and the plaintiff’s 
insurance purchase decision. The model is similar to Gravelle & Waterson 
(1993), but here the defendant makes a settlement offer when uninformed 
about the plaintiff’s degree of risk aversion. The paper confirms tha t legal 
expenses insurance hardens the plaintiff’s negotiating stance and increases the 
defendant’s level of care but finds other variables such as settlement probability, 
the probability of an accident, and the probability of trial will depend on the 
level of the plaintiff’s risk aversion. Like in other litigation models, the effects 
of insurance on welfare are still ambiguous. This ambiguity is enhanced by the 
potentially delicate relationship between the plaintiff’s risk aversion and the 
activities comprising the litigation process.
2.6 Studies on health  care insurance
In Chapter 1, we identified the interactions between the insurer, the client and 
the service provider in a legal expenses insurance system. In fact, the issues 
are often analogous to  those appearing in insurance-based health care contexts. 
In both situations, a three-way relationship emerges between principal, agent 
and insurer. The agent (client/patient) buys insurance to protect against a 
risky loss (legal/health costs) and engages a principal (lawyer/physician) to
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supply expertise in terms of hours worked and effort. While the former can 
be observed, and monitored by the agent; the latter cannot be. Thus, there 
is an incentive problem between principal and agent, and also a monitoring 
problem for the ultimate payer, the insurer. Ma & McGuire (1997) consider 
appropriate contracting arrangements under these conditions for US health 
care and Bowles & Rickman (1998) note the potential for analogous work 
in the legal context. In this section, we will first illustrate similarities and 
differences between health care insurance and legal expenses insurance. Then, 
we will review some studies on health case insurance.
2.6.1 H ealth care insurance and legal expenses insur­
ance
In Chapter 1 , we discussed the three-way relationship in the legal insurance 
system (see Figure 1 .2). A similar situation actually exists in many health care 
systems, where the doctor (the service provider), the patient (the client), and 
the insurer4 interact in a framework of a three-way relationship. The similari­
ties between legal insurance and health care are as follows. First, status-based 
insurance is missing in both systems. In health care markets, it is clear tha t if 
the insurance premium can be contingent on the individual’s state of health, 
the insurance policy will be (first-best) efficient (Arrow 1963). Then, this 
policy can protect the individual from the risk of illness ex ante and retains 
incentives for the patient to utilise health care efficiently ex post. However, 
since health status is too costly to verify, this policy actually does not exist 
in the market. Similarly, in the legal expenses insurance market, the status
4More generally, in health care a third party payer may fund the treatm ent. For exam ple, 
the NHS in UK and the social insurer in som e European countries.
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of a client is also difficult to verify. Even in the after-the-event (ATE) insur­
ance market5, since the litigant may still have some private information (e.g. 
the merit of the case), the insurance premium can not entirely be based on 
the status of the client. Second, the lack of status-based policy further rules 
out any policy th a t commits certain amounts of service contingent on sta­
tus. In the health care market, the quantity of treatm ent is not contractible 
even ex post. In the legal insurance market, insurance coverage of legal fees 
depends on the amount of lawyers’s hours which can not be specified in an 
insurance policy. Third, in both insurance markets, verifying the quantity of 
the provider’s service is costly and difficult to  the insurer. Thus the payment 
contracts are based on the provider’s reported quantities which may be differ­
ent from the actual quantity. Distinguishing between a reported and actual 
quantity reveals an incentive problem. If the client (patient or plaintiff) bears 
some cost, he has an incentive to ask the provider (doctor or lawyer) to un­
der report the quantity. Truthful reporting thus translates into restrictions on 
insurance-payment system in both insurance markets. Fourth, effectiveness of 
the service provider’s input is non-contractible. In both health care and legal 
insurance markets, payment contracts based on effectiveness of quantity are 
missing. Therefore, when designing an optimal system, there must be certain 
incentives to mitigate this market failure.
Of course, the legal expenses insurance market has some unique features. The 
differences between legal expenses insurance and health care are mainly due
5There are two kinds of legal expenses insurances in market: before-the-event insurance 
(B T E ) and after-the-event insurance (A TE). T he difference between them  is the tim ing of 
purchasing the insurance policy. If purchasing before the accident, it is B T E , otherwise it 
is ATE.
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to three aspects. First, the legal system is more strategic than the health care 
system. The outcome of a medical treatm ent only depends on the patient’s 
health status and the doctor’s inputs, while the outcome of a lawsuit is affected 
by many factors. In addition to the lawyer’s inputs, both the plaintiff’s and the 
defendant’s strategic decisions in the litigation process play im portant roles in 
the outcome of the case. This may imply th a t the model of legal expenses in­
surance has to contain some features of litigation strategies. Second, although 
legal insurance and health care insurance are analogous systems, fee regula­
tions of a legal system distinguish the payment system of legal insurance from 
health care insurance. In principle, fixed fees, hourly fees and conditional fees 
are the only methods tha t lawyers can charge in England and Wales. These 
specific fee arrangements reflect the particularity of the legal insurance system. 
Moreover, the payment to the lawyer can be based on the outcome of the law­
suit. For example, under conditional fees, the lawyer is paid only if the case 
is won. This may provide certain incentives to the lawyer to  input more into 
the case. However, in health care, since the health status is difficult to  verify, 
the payment to the doctor can not be based on the outcome of the treatment. 
Third, the English cost rule complicates the legal expenses insurance market. 
According to the English cost rule, the loser has to pay the winner’s legal costs. 
This makes the insurance contract liable to cover the client’s own costs and 
also potential payments to the rival of the litigation. These risks are related 
with the outcome of the lawyer’s inputs. However, health care insurance only 
needs to  cover treatm ent costs of a potential sickness. There are no other risks 
to the insurer. These aspects illustrate the differences between legal expenses 
insurance and health care insurance. The unique features of legal expenses in­
surance distinguish modelling of optimal insurance-payment system from those
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current models of health insurance. Nevertheless, the studies of health care 
systems can still inspire modelling and analysis of legal expenses insurance.
2.6.2 Optimal health care insurance system
Arrow (1963) first observed th a t an efficient health insurance policy would 
specify payment contingent on the (potential) patient’s state of health. He 
found tha t the state-contingent payment scheme would protect the patient 
from the financial risk of illness ex ante and retain incentives for the patient 
to consume health care efficiently ex post.
However, since health status is too costly to verify, insurance policies contin­
gent on health status do not exist in market. Therefore, economists started to 
analyse the optimal health care insurance under the assumption th a t insurance 
coverage based on the patients’ choice of treatm ent quantity. Pauly (1968) and 
Zeckhauser (1970) characterise the trade-off between risk sharing and moral 
hazard. They concluded th a t the patient must pay for each unit of treatm ent 
exposes him to some risk ex ante but also partly remedies his incentives to 
consume an excessive amount of health care ex post.
Ma & McGuire (1997) was the first paper to solve the “three-way relationship” 
in health care insurance. In their settings, health care, which is a strictly con­
cave function / ,  is produced by a patient-controlled input (number of visits) 
r  and a doctor-controlled input (effort) e, neither of which is directly con­
tractible. Given the insurance and payment parameters, the physician chooses 
her effort level, and upon observing the effort, the patient decides on the quan­
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tity  to purchase. Then, the doctor can induce different quantity demands by 
offering different effort. This is the typical environment of supplier-induced 
demand (Phelps 1986). The physician can report any number of visits r R to 
the insurance company tha t they wish regardless of the actual number of visits 
r  tha t they complete and which are recorded in the medical records. Health 
is measured in cash equivalent units. Patient gets utility from income and 
health. The physician is profit maximisers, but receives less utility the more 
effort they put forth.
In the paper, the extensive from of the health care insurance game consists of 
five stages:
1. The insurer chooses the elements of the insurance and payment systems;
2 . “Nature” decides whether the patient is ill with probability tt. If not, the 
game ends; otherwise, the patient seeks health care from the physician;
3. The physician chooses her effort, e;
4. After observing the doctor’s choice of effort, the patient chooses the 
quantity of treatm ent, r;
5. The doctor and the patient play a billing subgame. Subsequently, the 
insurer pays the resulting bill.
Ma & McGuire (1997) highlights three conclusions. First, in order to induce 
tru th  telling the physician must receive a positive payment for her services and 
the patient must have a positive co-payment. Second, if effort and treatm ent 
are substitutes, the doctor will reduce e to the minimum level to maximise
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r. If effort and treatm ent are complements, the doctor will put an high level 
of effort. Third, if the physician has ethical notion of a minimal level of care 
th a t / ( r ,  e) >  F1, In this case, the doctor’s effort may increase from its lower 
bound (in the substitute case). Also, in the general equilibrium, the patient’s 
co-payment may need to increase.
2.7 Sum m ary and conclusions
The previous studies have developed a sound theoretical approach to study lit­
igation processes. This approach focuses on the litigants’ financial incentives. 
W ithin the research of settlement, economists focus on the costs tradeoff be­
tween settlement and trial. W ithin the research of principal-agent problems, 
costs-related conflicts of interests between clients and lawyers become the main 
objective. In addition to this, early research enables us to compare legal insti­
tutions between jurisdictions. For example, studies on fee shifting rules have 
examined the situation when contingent fees are adopted in an English cost 
rule jurisdiction.
However, we also observe some limitations of existing studies. W ithin the lit­
erature of legal insurance, there are seldom studies which combine specified 
fee arrangements with legal expenses insurance, especially the after-the-event 
legal expenses insurance and the conditional fees. There are actually only four 
papers explicitly addressing legal expenses insurance (van Velthoven & van 
Wijck (2001), Kirstein (2000), Kirstein & Rickman (2004) and Heyes et al. 
(2004)). None of these papers consider, however, the combination effects of 
conditional fees and insurance in an English cost rule jurisdiction. For exam-
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pie, early studies show tha t the litigant may be less willing to settle the case 
under conditional fees, since compared to hourly fees conditional fees increase 
his settlement costs. But, will the situation change if the litigant does not bear 
any legal cost directly, as in the case of legal expenses insurance?
In addition, we observe th a t most of the early literature on principal-agent 
problems assume the lawyer’s legal effort is her time to spend in the case but 
no one looks into the case where the lawyer inputs different effort in her service 
time or when the marginal productivity of her hour is endogenous. Including 
this missing market into consideration may change existing results of principal- 
agent problems analysis in litigation context. Another particularly interesting 
question is if there is an optimal legal expenses insurance system for both in­
surance purchasing and legal fees payment. Existing literature fails to answer 
this question. The reason of this may be because the legal expenses insurance 
market is not fully mature.
Finally, another limitation in the previous studies is also related to the legal 
expenses insurance market. The current business structure of legal services 
is dominated by a partnership structure. Actually, this business structure is 
regulated by law but not derived from the market. If, as Clementi (2004) 
suggests, constraints on the business structure of legal services are broken and 
outside capital is allowed into legal services, will be there any effect on lawyers’ 
legal effort? This question has not yet been examined by economists.
The remaining chapters of this thesis seek to begin the process of studying 
there issues.
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Chapter 3
Settlement in the presence of 
insurance
69
3.1 In troduction
The question of how to assure access to justice is a fundamental one in all 
jurisdictions. It involves making available suitable institutions and expertise 
to help access these, at an affordable price and in ways th a t help share the 
risk of what may be very uncertain negotiations. In England and Wales, al­
though the market for legal expenses insurance has developed slowly, policy 
makers have been looking to  substitute private insurance for the increasingly 
expensive social insurance against legal expense provided by legal aid. One 
mechanism for achieving this is the conditional fee arrangements (which in­
volves legal expenses insurance). The interesting feature of this new policy 
is tha t the insurance is bought “after-the-event” (ATE), as opposed to more 
traditional “before-the-event” (BTE) legal insurance. The overall effect of this 
development is to introduce elements of US-style contingency payment and 
European-style insurance into UK litigation so this is a topic with potentially 
broad appeal. Furthermore, “access to justice” is not the only purpose of 
the new institutions. Minimising to tal social (legal) cost is another im portant 
goal (Gravelle & Waterson 1993). It may be fulfilled by encouraging settle­
ment and reducing accidents.1 However, the combined effect of insurance and 
fee arrangements on social cost is still unclear.
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the effects of legal insurance and fee 
arrangements on the decision to  settle or take a case to trial. Thus, we now 
take the insurance arrangement as given and also introduce a pre-trial litiga­
1If the effort of avoiding the accident is very costly, there is a possibility that (at a certain  
level) total social cost w ill increase by reducing accidents. This is the issue of how to  design  
the negligence rule. In th is thesis we do not focus on the negligence rule, but we will discuss 
the cost of care and its welfare im plications in Section 3.2.6.
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tion phase. A number of other authors have looked at various aspects of the 
problem we study. Thus, the role of fees in litigation has been considered, as 
has the role of conditional fees (without the added insurance dimension), while 
legal expenses insurance has also been analysed (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, 
empirical work has established several im portant effects of conditional fees in 
this respect.2 However, none of this work looks at the combined effects of in­
surance and conditional fees. In itself, this means tha t there is a gap in terms 
of the institutional detail tha t has been researched. More im portant, it means 
tha t the after-the-event innovation has received no attention.
The present chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 sets out our basic 
model of accidents and litigation under legal insurance but without specifying 
the payment contract between the insurer and the lawyer. We show how the 
insurance influences all the endogenous variables in the model. In Section 
3.3, we use the general framework of Section 3.2 to analyse the implications 
of the before-the-event hourly fee contract and the after-the-event conditional 
fee contract3. In Section 3.4, we discuss uniform distribution, risk aversion, 
unrecoverable insurance premium and success fee. In addition, we extend our 
basic model to a dynamic one to analyse the timing of settlement. Section 3.5 
concludes.
2See Yarrow & Abrams (2000): Nothing to Lose? C lients’ Experiences of Using Con­
ditional Fees and Society of Advanced Legal Studies (2001): Ethics of Conditional Fee 
Arrangement.
3Fenn, Gray, Rickman & M ansur (2006) confirms the increasing dom inance of these two 
funding m echanism s in U K  litigation.
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3.2 T he m odel and th e  effects o f legal expenses  
insurance
3.2.1 Sequence of events
Based on the model of Gravelle & Waterson (1993), we use a litigation model 
to illustrate the effects of legal expenses insurance on litigants’ behaviours and 
welfare. The notation is summarised in Table 3.1. A risk neutral potential 
defendant (D ) is engaged in an activity which has the probability 7r of im­
posing a random loss L  on a risk neutral plaintiff (P). The value of loss is 
private information of the plaintiff, the defendant only knows the distribution 
function of the loss Q(L) and its density q(L). This is in common with much 
of the literature in Chapter 2. The defendant can reduce the probability of 
the accident 7r by an expenditure x  on care, where ir'(x) < 0 and 7r"(x) >  0. 
If the accident occurs the plaintiff retains a lawyer who is assumed to  be risk 
neutral. The defendant then makes a single “take it or leave it” settlement 
offer S  to the plaintiff. If the case is settled, the lawyer charges a fee f 3. 
If the offer is rejected by the plaintiff, the case goes to trial. The plaintiff’s 
probability of winning at trial is p. If he does win, he is awarded his loss L4. 
The litigation costs are public information for both parties since they are less 
likely to be victim specific.5 The lawyer charges f w if the case wins at trial or 
f °  if it loses. Since cost shifting rules exist, the loser has to pay the winner 
a proportion k of the to tal legal fees. Thus, the expected legal fees transfer
4T o  keep the analysis m a n a g e a b l e  w e  ignore the possibilities of over-compensation a n d  
under-compensation f r o m  the judgement.
5However, the litigation costs may be loss specific. One explanation for this is that high 
loss cases have longer pre-trial negotiation periods. Our dynamic model in the discussion 
section will provide a reasonable illustration to this assumption.
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Table 3.1: Notation
P  plaintiff
D defendant
A  plaintiff’s lawyer/advocate
Co pre-trial legal costs incurred for P  by A
ci trial legal costs incurred for P  by A
cp P ’s total legal costs (c0 +  Ci)
f D P ’s to tal legal fees if trial
f s  fee paid by P  to  A  if case settled
f w fee paid by P  to A  if case tried and won
f °  fee paid by P  to A  if case tried and lost
A E [0,1] relative weight A  places on P ’s income 
k proportion of costs shifted from loser to winner
p probability th a t P  wins at trial
t expected cost transfer k \p fw — (1 — p ) f D] to P
from D after trial 
L  P ’s random loss if accident, L  E [PoXi]
Q(P), q(L) distribution, density function of L  
I  acceptance level
Q{t) settlement probability, Q' > 0
S  P ’s settlement offer to  P
H  P ’s expected post-accident cost
x  P ’s expenditure on care
7r(x ) accident probability, P  <  0, P'  >  0
Up P ’s income if no accident
yn  P ’s income if no accident
W0 P ’s ex ante welfare
W F P ’s ex post welfare
W A P ’s ex ante welfare
cx-a  ATE insurance premium paid by the plaintiff to the insurer
Oip BTE insurance premium paid by the plaintiff to the insurer
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from the defendant to the plaintiff is t = k \p fw — (1 — p ) f D] where f D is the 
defendant’s total legal fees. The plaintiff’s litigation costs can be funded either 
by himself or by BTE insurance or by ATE insurance. The interaction takes 
place in four stages :
•  The insurance stage: The plaintiff decides whether to purchase legal 
expenses insurance.
•  The accident stage: An accident occurs with probability 7r. The plaintiff 
incurs a loss L  in the event of the accident.
• The settlement stage: The defendant makes a settlement offer S.  If the 
plaintiff accepts the offer, the game ends; if he does not, the case goes to 
trial.
•  The trial stage: The plaintiff wins with probability p. If he does win, he 
is awarded a compensation L  plus his legal costs.6
We distinguish the plaintiff’s funding methods by the timing of the above 
stages. If the insurance stage happens prior to the accident stage, we have 
a case of BTE insurance. If the insurance stage happens after the accident 
stage, we have a case of ATE insurance. If there is no the insurance stage, 
the plaintiff is self-funded. For simplification, we assume tha t the defendant is 
self-funded, which is common knowledge in our game.
For legal fees, by definition we have f °  ^  f w and f s < f w. In this section, we 
focus on the effects of insurance. The implications of specified fee arrangements 
and funding methods will be discussed in Section 3.3.
6We divide the entire litigation game by its subgames. If we combine the last two stages 
together as a litigation stage, our description becomes consistent with the one in Kirstein 
(2000). This will not affect the analysis.
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3.2.2 The willingness to settle
The law yer, if selfish, would accept settlement if and only if
f S ~  c0 ^  p f w +  (1 -  p) f °  -  cP , (3.1)
where the left hand side is her net receipts if the case is settled and the right 
hand side is the expected net proceeds from a trial. Thus, her expected gain 
from settlement compared with trial is
Ga = f 3 ~ p f w -  (1 - p ) / °  +  C i.
It is clear th a t in this general model the plaintiff’s loss from the accident has 
no direct impacts on her expected gain from settlement. Also, her gain does 
not rely on whether the plaintiff purchases insurance or not.
A well informed se lf-funded  p la in tiff  would accept the settlement offer S  if
S - f s > p ( L - n - ( l - p ) f  + t,(3.2) 
the expected gain from acceptance compared with trial for him is:
GPS = S - p L  + p r  + ( l
The self-funded plaintiff would accept an offer S  if and only if Gps  >  0. Since 
GPS is decreasing in L, if there exists £ e  [L0, L J  : G — 0 then £ is the unique 
acceptance level.7 Equivalently, when S  is given, he would accept an offer
7There are also another two cases to consider. First, if there exists i  6 [Lq,L\ ]  : G  > 0
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whenever Zp s (S , •) ^  L  where ZPS is the self-funded plaintiff’s acceptance level 
defined by Gps — 0.
Now we consider a well informed in su re d  p la in tiff .8 The settlement offer 
normally includes two parts: the compensation of loss and the reimbursement 
of legal costs. We assume the plaintiff’s legal costs have to be paid by him­
self if accepting settlement. Therefore, the plaintiff’s net receipt is only the 
compensation of the loss. He would accept the settlement offer S  if
S - f ^ p L ,  (3.3)
So his expected gain from settlement is
GPI = S  — pL — f s .
As in the self-funded situation, we define this acceptance level as CPI(S, ■).
Now, we assume tha t the plaintiff’s legal knowledge is such tha t he always
accepts his lawyer’s advice on accepting or rejecting a settlement offer. Since
there may be potential conflicts of interest over settlement between the plaintiff
and the lawyer if their acceptance levels are different, we introduce the weight
then all the offers are accepted. Second, if there exists Z E  [Lq,Li] : G < 0 then  all the offers 
are rejected. We assum e these two cases do not arise since in these cases the acceptance 
level is independent from the settlem ent offer.
8Since the insurance stage happens before th e  settlem ent stage, we do not need to  dis­
tinguish B T E  and A TE insurance until analysing th e plaintiff’s ex ante welfare. Also, in 
th is section, we assum e the insurance premium is unrecoverable by the losing party. The 
recoverable premium is discussed along w ith specified contracts in Section 3.3.
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param eter A E [0,1], so tha t the to tal gain from settlement is given by
G = \ G P +  (1 -  A)Ga . (3.4)
Therefore, the se lf-funded  p la in tiff  will accept the settlement ofFer whenever:
A ( 5 - / s ) + ( l - A ) ( / s -co) »  \ \ p ( L - n - ( l - p ) f + t ] + ( l - \ ) \ p r + ( l - p ) f ° - c p ]
(3.5)
When the above inequation holds as an equality, the acceptance level of the 
self-funded plaintiff t ps  can be solved as
A[g -  F + v r  +  (1 ~  P)f°  - t ]  +  ( l -  A ) [ f s -  Pr  -  (1 -  p) f °  +  Cl]
A p
Similarly, the in su red  p la in tiff  will accept the settlement offer whenever
H S  -  f ) +  (1 -  A ) ( f s-  c0) >  A pL  +  (1 -  A +  (1 -  -  cp] (3.6)
For the situations above, if (3.5) and (3.6) hold as an equality separately, each 
of them has zero gain from settlement G =  0. Note that, the plaintiff’s proba­
bility of winning actually reflects the difficulty of the case, e.g. a low p  means 
it is a difficult case to win. We can note some results:
R e su lt 3.1. The acceptance level Z(S^ A,p, •) (1) increases with the settle­
ment offer at the rate dZ jdS  =  l j p  whether the plaintiff is insured or not; 
(2) increases with the difficulty of the case and is more sensitive i f  the plain­
tiff is self-funded under the English cost rule; (3) varies with fee arrangements.
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P ro o f. (1 ) Since the lawyer’s gain from settlement is given by GA — f s — 
p f w — (1 — p) f °  4- Ci, we note tha t G$ — 0, GA — 0 and GA = f °  — f w ^  0. 
First, for the self-funded plaintiff GgS =  1, Gps = —p  and Gps — — L  4- (1 — 
k ) f w — f °  — k f D. We find th a t dZ/dS  = l / p  and dZ/dp = {—AL4- (1 — A)(/° — 
f w) 4* A[(l — k ) f w — f °  — k f D]}/Xp. Then, for the insured plaintiff, using the 
same method we have dZ/dS  = 1/p  and dZ/dp — [—AL +  (1 — A)(/° — f w)]/Xp. 
(2) From (1) we have dZ/dp < 0. Note th a t f °  — f w < 0. Under the English 
cost rule (1 — k ) f w — f °  — k f D < 0, therefore the self-funded plaintiff has a 
steeper dZ/dp. (3) In both situations, G always contains /° ,  f w and f D what­
ever weight and cost shifting rules.
Since the lawyer’s gain from settlement is independent from the plaintiff’s 
insurance status, the difference in gains from settlement for the self-funded 
and insured plaintiff is:
AG =  A(Gps -  Gp t) =  A[pf" +  (1 -  p ) f  -  t].
Equivalently, the difference in acceptance levels is:
A< =  i ps -  l PI =  A P f  + Q - P W - * .
V
Substituting t = k \p fw — (1 — p ) f D] into the above equation, yields
AZ =  A ^  — k ^ W +  ^  ~  P^ °  +  M l ~  p} f D (3 7)
P
Since 0 ^  k <  1 and p < 1, A Z is always positive.
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R esu lt 3.2. Given the defendant’s settlement offer, i f  the plaintiff purchases
insurance, his acceptance level becomes lower.
By the definition of acceptance level £, the probability of a given offer S  being 
accepted is Q (£), where q(£) > 0. The higher the acceptance level, the higher 
the probability of settlement, and vice versa. Thus, if we do not consider 
the reaction of the defendant, given a settlement offer, insurance induces trial 
rather than settlement. This is consistent with Heyes et al. (2004)’s results.
3.2.3 The defendant’s settlem ent offer
The defendant chooses the settlement offer S  to minimise his expected post­
accident costs H  given th a t acceptance level is a function of S  and the distri­
bution function of loss Q:
H  = Q(£)S  +  [1 — Q{£)](fD A t )  -\-p J LdQ. (3-8)
The first order condition defining optimal settlement offer S* is:
I E  =  Q(t) + M ( S ' - p i - f D - t )  = 0. (3.9)
Obviously, the corner solution of the settlement offer is S* — f D + 1. This 
implies th a t the defendant increases the settlement offer if and only if the trial 
is more costly than settlement and the increase in the settlement offer reduces 
the probability of the trial (qd£/dS  =  q/p). Rearranging equation (3.9), the
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settlement offer S* becomes:
S- = S(£,-)=pt + fD + t-p2Lj-.
Since the defendant’s offer is a function of acceptance level £, we have
Then, the effect of insurance on the defendant’s settlement offer is given by:
*eps
A S  = S s  -  S
I = L  (31l)
R e su lt 3.3. The defendant will make a lower (higher) settlement offer to the 
insured plaintiff than to the self-funded plaintiff i f  the loss distribution is con­
vex (concave).
This is a very interesting result. Note th a t q' is determined by the distribution 
of accident loss. One might plausibly assume th a t most plaintiffs suffer small 
losses while few suffer large losses, so th a t the distribution of accident losses 
is skewed to the right and q' < 0 over the relevant range. In this case, the 
defendant will make a higher settlement offer to  the insured compared with 
the self-funded plaintiff (A S  <  0). If the loss distribution is uniform (qr = 0), 
insurance has no effect on the defendant’s settlement offer.
3.2.4 Settlem ent probability
Since insurance influences the settlement offer, it affects the plaintiff’s accep­
tance level as well. Substituting S s  and S 1 into (3.2) and (3.3), the acceptance
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level between self-funded and insured becomes:
A r  -  ePS* -  i p u  =  A +  A t  (3.12)
V
It is clear tha t the settlement probability Q[£*(S*, •), •] is affected by the ac­
ceptance level directly and settlement offer indirectly. From (3.7) we know 
A£ > 0, therefore we have
R e su lt 3.4. The effect of insurance on the settlement probability is ambigu­
ous. I f  insurance reduces the settlement offer (A S  > 0), this decreases the 
settlement probability ( A t  >D).
The above result illustrates tha t if most plaintiffs suffer large losses whilst a few 
suffer small losses (q' >  0), insurance will reduce the settlement probability. 
However, if most plaintiffs suffer small losses whilst a few suffer large losses 
(q' <  0), the result is ambiguous. W hen \q'\ is big enough, there exists a 
regime where the the insurance’s effects on settlement offer A S  offsets its 
effects on acceptance level A£, therefore A t  <  0. If so, insurance does increase 
settlement probability. Comparing this result with Result 3.2, we conclude 
th a t when considering reactions of the defendant the assertion of insurance 
reducing settlement probability is not sufficient. These also imply th a t welfare 
comparisons, which will be conducted in Section 3.2.6, may be ambiguous 
because, depending on the distribution of the accident loss, the defendant can 
either increase or decrease his settlement offer. Therefor, in the discussion 
section of this chapter, we will examine the uniform distributed loss as an 
example.
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3.2.5 Accident probability
Before we move to the defendant’s care decision, it is instructive to investigate 
the efficient level of care.9 In the context of litigation, the efficient level of 
care is defined as the care level which maximises the net welfare of both the 
plaintiff and the defendant. We assume the litigans are equally weighted in 
the social welfare, therefore the net social welfare function is:10
U = yP + yD - x -  *{x){L  + f D + Q{ i ) f s  +  [1 -  Q(<?)][rP +  (1 -  p ) f } }
To maximise the social welfare, the social efficient care level x s is given by
v ' £ + / D+Q(<)f + [l-QWIW» + ( l - p ) / “]
From the above equation, we can find tha t the litigants’ initial incomes yp and 
yo  do not have impacts on x 3. This implies th a t rich or poor does not affect 
the social efficient level of care. Moreover, since 0 < Q(t) <  1, 0 < p <  1 and 
jo  ^  jw^ sign of t { x s) is always negative, which means accidents can be 
reduced by increasing care level. Again, the value of the efficient care level can 
be solved only when both the specific fee arrangement ( /°  and f w) and the 
accident probability function (7r) are given.
Now, we consider the defendant’s care decision and its effect on accident prob­
9T he formal definition of the efficient level o f care can be found in Calabresi (1970). 
Calabresi points out that, to  calculate the efficient level of care, the cost of care, the cost 
of inefficient risk allocation and the cost of litigation need to be considered. We do not 
consider the cost of inefficient risk allocation in this chapter since we assum e all players are 
risk neutral.
10B y assum ing the market is com petitive, the roles o f the insurer and the lawyers are 
ruled out in the social welfare function (their incom es equal their costs).
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ability. The defendant chooses his expenditure on care x  to maximise his ex 
ante welfare, which is given by:
WD = [ 1 -  Tr(x)\{yD -  x) +  7r{x)(yD -  x  -  H*)
where H* is the defendant’s minimised post-accident cost: H * =  Q(Z)S + [1 —
Q m f D + t ) + p j eLi LdQ.
Assume his optimal care x* is positive, it satisfies
- 1  -  -  0
and is obviously increasing in H*. In addition, the relationship between the 
defendant’s ex post cost H* and the plaintiff’s acceptance level is given by:
d H*—  = q(e)(s--Pe - f D-t).
Prom (3.9), in equilibrium since Q(Z) >  0 we know th a t S* — pZ — f D — t <  0, 
therefore < 0 .  Now it is clear tha t x  is decreasing in Z. Since the insured 
plaintiff and self-funded plaintiff may have different settlement offers and dif­
ferent acceptance levels, we have:
R e su lt 3.5. The defendant’s care level increases i f  and only i f  the insurance 
reduces the plaintiff’s acceptance level. Furthermore, i f  insurance reduces the 
settlement offer, this reduces accident probability.
Combining the above result with Result 3.2, we find tha t given the defendant’s
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settlement offer, insurance increases the care level and therefore reduces acci­
dent probability.
As is in other litigation models (see Gravelle & Waterson (1993), van Velthoven 
& van Wijck (2001) and Heyes et al. (2004)), the defendant’s ex post welfare 
is increased when a given settlement offer is more likely to be accepted and 
this is the same for his ex ante welfare. Therefore, the defendant is better off 
if and only if A£* <  0. If the distribution q' <  0, as we mentioned in the last 
subsection, there is a regime where the defendant is better off if the plaintiff 
is insured.
3.2.6 Welfare: BTE, ATE and Self-funded
Assume the insurance premiums are actuarially fair. The insurance premiums 
are equal to the insurer’s payment a t trial:
a A = [ l -  Q(eFI,)]\pfw +  (1 -  p ) f  - 1],
aB =  t t [ i  -  Q(ePI*)]\pfw +  ( i  -  p ) / °  -  <]■
The ex post welfare of an ATE insured plaintiff is:
W fA — yP — L  — oca + Q(ZPI*)(S 1 - f s ) + p  [  LdQ ,
J tpi*
where yP is the plaintiff’s income if no accident. The ex post welfare of BTE
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insured plaintiff is:
W?B = y P - L - a B + Q{£PI*){SJ - f s ) + p [  LdQ ,
J ipi*
The ex post welfare change between these two is:
WfA - WfB =  aB - aA =  - (1  -7 r )[l -  +  (1 -  - *]
Substituting t  = k[pfw — (1 — p ) f D] into the above equation and rearranging, 
gives
WfA -  =  - ( 1  -  tt)(1 -  Q M l  -  k ) r  +  (1 ~ p ) ( f 0 +  k f D)] < 0. (3.13)
Compared with ATE, the risk neutral plaintiff has higher ex post welfare if he 
purchases BTE. The reason for this is th a t BTE has a lower insurance pre­
mium.
The ATE plaintiff’s ex ante welfare is given by:
W?A = ( l - T r ) yP + 7rW?A.
As we have shown tha t the plaintiff’s acceptance levels are the same under 
ATE and BTE, the accident probability 7r is the same for BTE and ATE as 
well. We can write the BTE plaintiff’s ex ante welfare as:
W jB = (1 -  7T)(yp -  a B) +  7rWfB.
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The change of ex ante welfare is:
W l A  -  W ? B = (1  -  7T ) y p  - ( 1  -  7 -  a B) +  t t  -  WrpB)
Since W fA — W fB — a s  — a  a , we have
W j A ~  W j B  =  olb  -  'kola  =  0 (3.14)
For the defendant, his welfare only changes with the plaintiff’s acceptance level. 
Since the acceptance levels keep the same whatever the type of insurance, the 
defendant’s welfare is the same across ATE and BTE. Therefore, the change 
of social welfare is only affected by the plaintiff’s welfare change. We conclude:
R e su lt 3.6. In a competitive insurance market, the plaintiff’s ex ante welfare 
and the defendant’s ex ante and ex post welfare does not change across A T E  
and BTE. However, the plaintiff has higher ex post welfare under BTE.
When the insurance is unavailable, the plaintiff’s ex post welfare is:
W*ps  = yp -  L + ) LdQ
Jips
Comparing this with ATE, we get:
WfA -  wps = Q i^ y s 1 -  f s) -  Q(ep$)(Ss - f s) -p  LdQ
+ m e PI*) -  Q(ePS)]\pfw +  ( i  -  P) f  - 1}.
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The first two terms above are insurance’s effect on settlement. As we showed 
before, the difference between the settlement offers (S s  — S 1) depends on the 
distribution of accident loss. The difference between the acceptance levels 
(£PI* — i p s ) partly depends on (S s  — S 1). The integral term reflects the effect 
of insurance on the trial compensation. The last term is the risk of trial: re­
fusing to reach a settlement may incur higher legal cost.
Clearly, much depends on the loss distribution. If q' > 0, which means most 
plaintiffs suffer large losses whilst a few suffer small losses, since S s > S 1 and 
t PS  > epr.t we have Q(ePIt){SI-  f s) -  Q{ePS){Ss -  f s ) < 0, p//pT LdQ < 0
and [Q{£PI*]-  Q(£p s )]\pfw +  (1 -  p) f °  -  < 0. The sign of W?A -  W ?ps  is
ambiguous. Insurance imposes a positive gain from the trial compensations, 
but reduces the probability of settlement and increases the risk of costly legal 
fees at trial. Only when its gain offsets these negative effects, does ATE pro­
duce higher ex post welfare. If the loss distribution is uniform, q' = 0, where 
S s = S 1 and ZPS > i PI*, we get the same result. If q' <  0, where S s < S 1, 
there are three regimes: £PS > £PI*, £PS — £PI* and £PS < £PI*. Only in the 
regime of £ps — £PI*, is W fA — WPS >  0. In other regimes, the results are still 
ambiguous.
The intuition behind the analysis is interesting. Asymmetric information will 
generally result in some degree of inefficiency in the bargaining process. The 
extent of inefficiency is related to  the nature of the distribution of the informa­
tion. As suggested by literature ,11 because the plaintiff’s private information 
can not be credibly passed to the defendant without a cost being incurred by
11 see signaling m odels in Chapter 2 for detail.
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the plaintiff via the signaling of the information, the plaintiff can be harmed 
by asymmetric information. Moreover, since the strategic role of insurance 
encourages the plaintiff’s rant seeking, an insured plaintiff has a higher accep­
tance level than a self-funded plaintiff.
The self-funded plaintiff’s ex ante welfare is:
Wf.s  =  [1 -  t t ( 0 ]  Vp  + A e PSW PS.
Then, the ex ante welfare change between ATE and self-funded is given by:
WfA-  waPS = w PS) - ■K{iPI*)}yP + 7 - 7T
The comparison is ambiguous. If insurance reduces the acceptance level, 
so the accident probability is reduced. A positive gain in ex ante income 
comes from the comparison: [tt(£p s) — ir{£PI*)]yp >  0. But the sign of 
7r(£PI*)W fA — 7T(£PS) W pS is not clear. Only in the regime £PS — £PI* : (q' < 0), 
do we have W jA — WPS > 0.
Using Result 3.6, we find th a t the comparisons between BTE and self-funded 
will have the similar results. The welfare comparisons are ambiguous as well. 
Only in the regime £PS = £PI* : (cf < 0), does BTE have obviously higher 
welfare both ex ante and ex post for the plaintiff.
3.3 B T E  hourly fee contract vs A TE condi­
tional fee contract
3.3.1 Specification of the contracts and funding m eth­
ods
In addition to the funding methods th a t we discussed in the previous section, 
the payment contracts between the plaintiff and his lawyer affect litigants’ 
behaviour and welfare as well.12 Empirically, there are two contracts of in­
terest: the hourly fee contract and the conditional fee contract.13 We make a 
breakeven assumption for all contracts th a t competition or regulation ensure 
th a t the lawyer makes an expected profit of zero. In an hourly fee contract 
the lawyer is paid a fee equal to her costs whatever the result of the case. We 
note th a t f s = c0 and f w =  / °  =  cp. In a conditional fee contract the lawyer 
is paid a fee equal to her costs plus a success fee which is a proportionate 
mark-up of fi if the plaintiff wins or settles. If the plaintiff loses, the lawyer 
gets nothing. We note th a t f s  =  (1 +  (j,)cq, f w — (1 + p)cp and / °  =  0. Under 
the English cost shifting rule the losing party has to pay the winning party’s 
legal fee, therefore for the hourly fee tH — pcp — (1 —p ) f D, for the conditional 
fee tG =  p{ 1 +  fj)cp -  (1 -  p ) f D.
If the plaintiff purchased legal expenses insurance before the accident (BTE in­
surance) , all his legal expenses are covered by the insurance policy whatever fee 
agreement he signed with his lawyer. If the plaintiff was not insured “before-
12If com bining insurances w ith  fee arrangements, there are at least four com binations. 
However, in th is section, we only discuss the m ost policy relevant com binations.
13Fenn et al. (2006) confirms the increasing dom inance of these two funding mechanism s 
in U K  litigation.
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the-event” , he can choose to pay all legal expenses by himself or purchase an 
“after-the-event” insurance (ATE) before the lawsuit starts. The la tter aims 
to reduce the litigant’s finance risk especially when he loses. We assume both 
insurance premiums are actuarially fair. Under BTE insurance, the plaintiff 
pays a premium a s  to the insurer. Under ATE insurance, the plaintiff pays a 
premium a A to the insurer, but it may be recovered by the losing party if he 
wins.
For the lawyer, we assume both contracts are breakeven which gives Q ( f s — 
c0) -f (1 — Q) \pfw +  (1 —p) f °  — Cp] =  0. Under the hourly contract since f s  =  co 
and f w = f °  — Cp the lawyer has no difference between settlement and trial. 
Under the conditional contract, since f s  =  (1 +  p)co > c0, according to the 
breakeven condition it is clear th a t p( 1 -f- p)Cp — Cp <  0. The lawyer is better off 
if the settlement offer is accepted than if it is rejected. Under conditional fee 
contract, the plaintiff and the lawyer may have different interests at settlement. 
This also implies th a t the lawyer may give biased advice to the plaintiff. For 
simplification, we assume the lawyer is altruistic (A =  1), which means she has 
no impacts on the plaintiff’s decision.
3.3.2 A cceptance levels
Given a settlement offer provided by the defendant, by substituting the speci­
fied fees settings into (3.2) and (3.3), we can compare the plaintiff’s acceptance 
levels. A well informed BTE insured plaintiff, under the hourly fee contract, 
would accept the defendant’s settlement offer S  if
-S' -  c0 J  pL,
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So the expected gain from acceptance compared with trial for him is:
GBh =  S  — Cq — pL.
The plaintiff would accept the offer S  if only if GBh ^  0. Hence, his acceptance 
level is
eBh =  1 (5  -  co). (3.15)
For a well informed ATE insured plaintiff, under the conditional fee contract,
when the insurance premium is recoverable, he would accept the defendant’s 
settlement offer S  if
S  — (1 +  fjb)c0 ^ p L - V  pa.A,
his expected gain from settlement is
GAfi = S  -  (1 +  n)co -  p L -  pccA-
Similarly, his acceptance level is
t * *  =  - [ 5  —  ( 1  +  f i ) c o  — p <x a ] . (3.16)
P
Rearranging the acceptance levels from the above two situations, we find
eA“ =  eBh -  a ,  (3.i7)
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where
A =  -(fjbco + p a A). (3.18)
P
Compared with the BTE hourly fee contract, the ATE conditional fee contract 
increases the plaintiff’s costs by (icq if the offer is accepted and revenue by pa a 
if it is rejected. Since A >  0, the plaintiff is less willing to accept the offer S  
under ATE conditional fee contract. We have established:
R e su lt 3.7. Given the defendant’s settlement offer, compared with the B T E  
hourly fee contract, the A T E  conditional fee contract lowers the plaintiff’s ac­
ceptance level.
3.3.3 The settlem ent offers
The defendant chooses the settlement offer S  to minimise his expected post­
accident cost H. For the BTE hourly fee contract, this cost is given by
H Bh =  Q(£Bh)S  +  [1 -  Q(£BhM f D + cP) + p  LdQ.
J £Bh
The first order condition defining optimal settlement offer S Bh is: 
d j ^  =  g(<Bk) +  O ^ ^ B H  _  p t BH _ p f B  _  p c p )  0.
Therefore, the defendant’s settlement offer S Bh becomes:
S Bk =  S{£,•) =  p tBh +  p ( f D + -  p 2 P L . (3.19)
1
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Similarly, for the ATE conditional fee contract, the defendant’s expected post­
accident cost H Afl becomes:
H Ap = Q(eA»)S +  [1 - Q{eApM fD +  (I +  p)cP + aA] + p LdQ.
Note tha t ^  =  p — p q 17 J =  the difference between the
Since l Bh — t A» =  A > 0, we can conclude:
R e su lt 3.8. The A T E  conditional fee contract increases the defendant’s set­
tlement offer compared with the B T E  hourly fee contract ifq'(£) is non-positive.
There are two terms in the right hand side of equation (3.21). The first term, 
—p{ficp +  a  a ) reflects the direct effect of fee contracts on the defendant’s 
settlement offer decision. Since under the ATE conditional fee contract if the 
defendant loses he has to pay more (i.e. insurance premium), this term is 
always negative. The second term f j Alt q'(£)p^fyd£  is the indirect influence 
of the plaintiff’s acceptance level given a settlement offer. It is clear this 
is based on the understanding of the accident loss. If most plaintiffs suffer 
small losses while few suffer large losses (q'(£) < 0) or the loss is uniform
Then, the defendant’s optimal settlement offer is:
S A“ =  p fA“ +  p U D +  (1 + 1 +  a A] -  P ^ j f p j - (3.20)
settlement offers is given by:
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distributed (q' = 0), the defendant will increase his settlement offer to the 
ATE conditional fee plaintiff compared with the BTE hourly fee plaintiff. The 
overall effects of the two terms increase his settlement offer. Conversely, if the 
loss distribution changes as few suffer small losses (q'(Z) > 0), the effect of the 
acceptance level causes a reduction in the settlement offer, but it is still not 
clear if this reduction can offset the effect of the fee contracts which increases 
the settlement offer.
3.3.4 Settlem ent and accident probability
As we concluded in the previous section, changes in the defendant’s settle­
ment offer directly affect the plaintiff’s acceptance level. Substituting the 
defendant’s reactions (settlement offers) into the acceptance level functions, 
we obtain:
gBh ._  =  - l ( S Bh. _  +  A  =  _ C p )  ( 3 . 2 2 )
v  q(Z)  p
The first term  in (3.22) is the indirect effect of the acceptance levels for a given 
settlement offer. We focus on the second term  /r (^  — cP). The sign of this 
term depends on the balance of co/p and cP. The negative cP reflects the effect 
of the defendant increasing the settlement offer under the ATE conditional fee 
contract, which increases the possibility of settlement. The positive c0 comes 
from the reduction in the acceptance level caused by the ATE contract. Note 
th a t cP =  c0 +  ci, where c0 is the defendant’s pre-trial cost and c3 is the cost 
of trial. Rearrange the second term, the condition becomes (1 — p)c0 =  pc\. 
It is clear tha t if c0 increases, the plaintiff is more likely to  settle the case 
under BTE hourly fee contract. This is because the conditional fee increases
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the marginal pre-trial cost by p and therefore lowers the plaintiff’s willingness 
to settle. Given a winning probability p, if the marginal increase in settlement 
offer, which is caused by the increase in ci, does not exceed the marginal in­
crease in pre-trial cost, the plaintiff does not have enough incentive to settle 
the case under an ATE conditional fee contract. If the probability of winning 
p increases, the defendant’s expected costs increase, especially when there is 
a mark-up fee p. In this case since the marginal cost of trial is positive, the 
defendant will increases his settlement offer, and therefore increases the accep­
tance level. So under ATE conditional fee the plaintiff is more likely to settle 
the case when the winning probability increases.
From Result 3.5, we know th a t the defendant’s expenditure on care x  is de­
creasing in L  So, when £Bh* — £A(X* > 0, the BTE hourly fee contract increases 
the accident probability compared with the ATE conditional fee contract. Ac­
cordingly, when £Bh* — £AfX* < 0, the ATE conditional fee contract increases 
the accident probability. There is another situation, £Bh* — £Afx* (i.e Co =  pcP 
and q' =  0), and here under the two contracts the accident probabilities are 
the same.
3.3.5 Welfare analysis
We start with the defendant. The defendant’s ex post welfare is
W VD =  yD ~  x -  H.
Since dH/d£ < 0, it is clear th a t the defendant’s ex post welfare is increased if 
a given settlement offer is accepted. We conclude tha t the defendant is better
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off ex post if and only if the acceptance level increases.
The defendant’s ex ante welfare is:
W D — [1 -  n(x)}(yD — x)  H- ir(x)(yD - x -  H*) = y D - x -  tt(x )H*.
Since the accident probability 7r is affected by the acceptance level I  through 
x , the defendant’s ex ante welfare can either increase or decrease when the 
acceptance level increases. This depends on the specific accident probability 
function n. Therefore, the comparison between the defendant’s ex ante welfare 
is ambiguous.
Next, consider the welfare of the plaintiff. The ex post welfare of the ATE 
insured conditional fee plaintiff is:
=  VP -  L  -  a A + Q{tAp-)[SAp - (1 +
=  y p  -  L -  (1  -  p ) a A  +  Q { l A ^ ) \ S A p  -  Co]
And, the ex post welfare of the BTE insured hourly fee plaintiff is:
W%H. = y p - L - a B + Q(eBh*)(SBh -  c„) + p f  LdQ,
J  g B h *
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The ex post welfare change between these two situations is:
jgi/J*
W Bh* -  W An* = (1 ~  P)a A ~~ ot-B +  P /  LdQ  +  Q(£A»*)pA
J  gBh*
+Q(eBI")[S Bh -  Co] -  Q (iA“*)[SAli -  Co].
Three factors contribute to the welfare change. They are shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: B T E  hourly fee vs  ATE conditional fee
Settlement offer Acceptance level Settlement Trial Premium
SBh > SAfX gBh* gAy* > 0 < 0 Not clear
g B h  _  g A y gBh* gAy* > 0 < 0 Not clear
SBh < SAfx gBh* gA y* > 0 < 0 Not clear
SBh < SA gBh*  __ gAy* =  0 =  0 Not clear
SBh < SAlx gB h* ^  gAy* < 0 > 0 Not clear
The first is the gain from settlement: Q(£Bh*)[SBh — Co] — Q(£Afl*)[SAti — Co] +  
Q(£Ati*)pA; the second is the gain from trial: p J B^I£ LdQ; and the last is the 
gain from the difference in the insurance premium: (1 —p)aA — a B. (The last 
three columns in Table 3.2 relate to the sign of each of the effects we have 
identified on the welfare change.) Since the ex ante welfares are functions of 
ex post welfare, if the distribution of loss is not given, the comparison between 
the ex ante welfare is ambiguous as well.
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3.4 D iscussions
3.4.1 Uniform distribution
Given the ambiguous welfare effects summarised in Table 3.2, we now consider 
the effects a specific loss distribution: the uniform distribution. If the loss 
distribution is uniform, assuming L0 =  0 we can write the probability function 
of settlement Q and its density function q as:
Since now q' — 0, (3.21) becomes:
Accordingly, the difference between the acceptance levels (3.22) is given by
Note tha t ZBh* — (S Bh — Co)/p. Substitute Q into the welfare functions to
There are two terms in the welfare comparison. The first term (1 ~ p )ola — olb 
reflects the welfare change caused by insurance premium differences. The sec­
g B h  _  S A „ =  _ p ^ C p  +  a A y
obtain:
Wbh. -«%,, =  ( i  -p)<xA - a B + p  LdQ + Q(LAnpiX 
+Q(lBh,)[SBh -  Co] -  Q(eAf‘*)[SA,‘ -  c0]
=  (1 -  p )a A - a B + M(C° +
2Li
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ond term n(co-pcP){ZBh*+Zav-*)/2Li is the income difference from the lawsuit. 
The income difference is directly affected by the difference in the acceptance 
levels, which is shown in (3.22). As we discussed in the previous section, the 
second term is more likely to be positive when the cost of trial C\ is compara­
tively small or the probability of winning p is small.
To gain further insight into this expression, assume tha t the insurance premi­
ums are actuarially fair:
o u = [i -  - p ) f D
a B =  ir{lBh')[l-  Q {iBh-){\~p)(cP + f D)]
and substitute these into (1 — p)ola — <4e- This is non-negative when
v  <  CX'A ~  aB — i  7r(£Bh*) ^L l ~  ^ Bk*).(Cp +  ^  (3 23)
a A 1 ' ( U  fD  • [ )
Substituting ZBh* =  (SBh — c0)/p  and ZBh* — ZA(X* = (jl{ ^  -  cP) into above 
inequality, the condition becomes:
IBh*\ (pLi — S Bh +  c0)(cP 4- f D)
\pL\ -  S Bh 4- c0 4- M co -  pcP) \ fD '
Now use S Bh — c0 — pL  to obtain:
p <  1 -  7T(<»»*)-  {Ly  L)f f :  + f \ tD . (3.24)[Li -  L  +  /a(c0/p  -  cP)] fD
We now analyse the ex post welfare change W ph  ^ — in three scenarios.
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Scenario 1, Cq = pcP. In this scenario the effect of an increase in the set­
tlement offer offsets the effect of the reduction in acceptance level, therefore 
gBh* _  gAn*' The welfare change is only caused by the difference in insurance 
premium: — (1 — p)oiA ~  ®b - The condition (3.24) becomes
p  ^  1 — 7r(cp +  f D) / f D. We use Z\ to denote the right hand side of this in­
equality. The effects of two exogenous parameters are given by 8 Z i / d f D >  0 
and d Z i/d cp  <  0. Given a winning probability p if the defendant’s legal cost 
increases, the insurer’s risk increases. Accordingly, the insurance premium in­
creases. Since under the ATE conditional fee contract the insurance premium 
is only recoverable when the case wins, the marginal increase in premium un­
der ATE is higher than under BTE. Therefore, if f D increases, the plaintiff 
is more likely to  be better off post-accident under BTE hourly fee contract 
rather than ATE conditional fee contract. Similarly, if the plaintiff’s legal cost 
increases, since this cost is recoverable when the case wins, the marginal in­
crease in premium under ATE is lower than it under BTE. Therefore, if cp 
increases the plaintiff is more likely to be better off post-accident under the 
ATE conditional fee contract.
Scenario 2, Co >  pcP. Here, the second term  in the welfare change is pos­
itive. Use Z 2 to  denote the right hand side of the condition (3.24), since 
Li-L+ifa/p-c7) > ° ’ we §et: 9 Z 2/ d f D > 0 and dZ 2ld cP <  0. This gives the 
same results as Scenario 1 for the effect of the insurance premium.
Scenario 3, c0 <  pcP. Now, the second term  in the welfare change is negative, 
which means th a t under the ATE conditional fee contract the plaintiff’s gain 
from the lawsuit (ignoring premium) is greater than under BTE. Since we as-
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sume a a >  0, L\ — L  +  p(co/p — cp) > 0. Because now ATE has a higher 
acceptance level, its insurance premium is reduced. Therefore the difference 
in the insurance premiums, (1 — p)aA — cep, shrinks.
There are another three factors in (3.24), L i — L, p and 7r. The effect of p 
is to increase the weight of cq — pcP in the premium change. By contrast, 
the increase in L\ — L  reduces the weight of Co — pcP. Since dir/di > 0 the 
condition (3.22) is more likely to hold when tv is more inelastic with respect to t.
The ex ante welfare functions of the BTE hourly fee contract and the ATE 
conditional fee contract are given by:
W lv. =  [1 -  ■*{tBh')]{yp-  a B) + *
=  [i -  ACAn \ y p  +
Hence, the welfare change between BTE hourly fee and ATE conditional fee 
is:
=  W An  -  * ( iBh [1 -  7T(*B**)]aB
-H r {CBh~
=  -  ■K(eBh,)]L - [ 1  -  ■K(£Bh-)\aB
-Hr{tBk') \W pBh, -  [yP -  L)\ -  -  (yP -  L)\.
The sign of the above equation is ambiguous. There are three terms in the
equation. The second section [1 — 7v(£Bh*)\oiB is positive. Since d'xfdi >  0 and 
£Bh* > £A^ , the first section (k(£Ai1*) — 7x{£Bh*j\L is negative. And if WPh  ^ >
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W An*>the last section n{£Bh* ) [ W ^  -  {yP -  L)] -  tc(£a^ ) [ W ^  -  (yP -  L)] is 
positive.
3.4.2 Risk aversion
Until now we have assumed a risk neutral plaintiff, one example of this is the 
strategic purchaser of insurance (Kirstein 2000).14 We now indicate how the 
model can be amended to allow for plaintiff risk aversion. Under BTE hourly 
fee and ATE conditional fee, the certainty equivalents of the risky prospects 
of trials are:
V t L =  % > - ( ! - p)L  -  (1 - p ) a \  -  rAfX 
Vt H =  Vp ~  (1  -  P ) L  ~ a B ~  rBh
where rBh and rAl1 are the risk premiums for BTE and ATE respectively and 
and a B both recognise th a t actuarially fair insurance premiums may be sensi­
tive to any changes in acceptance levels brought about by insurance. Note that 
the expected judgements depend on the realised accident loss. The acceptance 
levels are given by:
yp -e?>‘ - a 1A + S - { l  + p)c0 = y p
yp -  i f ' h -  4  +  S  -  c0 =  yBk
14More precisely, risk-neutrality im plies th at insurance is bought only for strategic reasons. 
However, there m ight be other reasons for a risk neutral person to  purchase insurance, 
e.g. m andatory insurance, insurer as delegates in settlem ent negotiations or as security 
consultant, etc.
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therefore,
ZBh — ZApi — ~ (rBh — rAfX) +  -(/rc0 +  p a \)  = ~ (rBh — rAlx) +  A 1 (3.25)
p p P
where A 1 reflects the role of risk aversion in setting insurance premiums. Since 
trial generally reflects a riskier prospect under the ATE conditional fee con­
tract, we know tha t rBh < rA,t. We also know from Heyes et al. (2004) tha t 
acceptance levels are higher under risk aversion so a \  < a  a, so th a t A 1 < A. 
As a result (3.25) tells us tha t risk aversion reduces the gap between accep­
tance levels under BTE and ATE and, indeed, could cause their signs to  be 
reversed. Welfare effects are still ambiguous.
3.4.3 Unrecoverable ATE prem ium  and success fee
Now we return to risk neutrality and move to a situation where neither the 
ATE premium ( a j )  nor the plaintiff’s success fee (fi) are recoverable by the 
defendant if the plaintiff wins. In this case, the plaintiff has to pay them him­
self. This was the position in England and Wales prior to 2000.
The plaintiff will accept the defendant’s settlement offer only when:
S  -  (1 +  ft)Co >  p(L  -  (XCp).
His acceptance level becomes
eA = ^ ( S - c v) + % c P - c 0). (3.26)
Comparing this with the acceptance level under the BTE hourly fee contract
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(3.15), we have:
£Bh -  i A — ~(co -  pcF). 
V
(3.27)
Compared with the BTE hourly fee contract, the unrecoverable ATE condi­
tional fee contract imposes more costs on the plaintiff, especially when the 
case is more likely to go to trial. Since t A — t Bh — *J(pcP — c0), the plaintiff is 
more likely to accept a given settlement offer S  under the unrecoverable ATE 
conditional fee contract when p  is higher or cQ/c P is lower.
Since in these two cases the defendant has the same expected post-accident 
cost, substituting i A into (3.10), we establish:
The sign of S Bh—S A depends on the loss distribution q' and the sign of cq— pcP. 
Only if the loss distribution is uniform, are these two settlement offers the same.
As we concluded in previous sections, changes in the defendant’s settlement of­
fer directly affect the plaintiff’s acceptance level. Substituting the defendant’s 
settlement offer into the acceptance level, we obtain:
(3.28)
f B h .  _  p .  =  l ^ g B h  _  g A ]  +  _  p c A
P V
(3.29)
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The sign of the above equation is still ambiguous. However, if ^(c0 — pcP) is 
positive, when q'(t) ^  0, the BTE hourly fee contract increases the settlement 
probability compared with the unrecoverable ATE conditional fee contract; 
when q'(t) <  0, compared with the BTE hourly fee contract only if the plain­
tiff’s net gain from settlement S Bh — S A is greater than his expected net cost 
p (cq — pcp) the unrecoverable ATE conditional fee contract increases the set­
tlement probability.
There are some interesting results for the uniform distribution. When q' — 0 
the comparison between (3.29) and (3.22) gives £Afl* — £A* = 0, we therefore 
establish:
R e su lt 3.9. I f  the accident loss is uniformly distributed, the plaintiff has the 
same equilibrium acceptance level whether the A T E  conditional fee contract re­
covers his premium and success fee or not.
The defendant’s ex ante welfare is:
W D =  [1 — n{x)}(yD - x )  + n (x)(yD -  x  -  H*) =  yD ~  x  -
Since the accident probability ir is affected by the acceptance level i  through 
x , the defendant’s ex ante welfare can either increase or decrease when the 
acceptance level increases. This depends on the specific accident probability 
function 7r. Therefore, the comparison between the defendant’s ex ante welfare 
is ambiguous.
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We now go to the plaintiff’s welfare. Since the sign of £Bh* — i A* remains 
ambiguous, we have to analyze the plaintiff’s welfare under some special situ­
ations. W ith a uniform loss distribution, S Bh =  S A. The difference between 
the acceptance levels become £Bh* — £A* = ^(c0 — pep). The ex post welfare 
difference becomes:
W Bh* "  W a* = otA - a B + p/acp +  Q(£A*)(/ic0 -  p/icp)
rZA*
+p /  LdQ  +  [Q(eBk*) -  Q(eA,)](S  -  Co)
J  gBh*
p(eBh* -  i A") „A,= a A -  a B +  pptcp +
ntpBh* _  pA*\ pBh* _  pA*\
Pyr L ) {oBh* , oA*\  , P\c 1 J nBh*
2q  {£ + £  , +  u  e
= a A - a B + ppcP + -PPC p ) ((Bh.  + gM)
The comparison of ex post welfare shows th a t when p  is small enough ( cq ^  
pep), since the ATE premium is higher than the BTE premium, the plaintiff 
is better off post-accident under the BTE hourly fee contract than under the 
unrecoverable ATE conditional fee. But if the winning probability is large 
(co < pep) the situation is still not clear.
Compare this welfare change with the one under the recoverable policy, note 
tha t £AfX* =  £A* (Result 3.9), we have:
WJL -  ws, = wBh.-  wj. -  (WL. -  = p(«a + pcP).
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The comparison of ex ante welfare between these two contracts is
-  W%. =  W A*) -  7T(tAn \ y p  +  < i Ap' W pAlt.  -
Substituting ZAfJ* = ZA* and = v{a A +  Mdp), we have
W ^ ~ W Z ^ 7 r ( £ A*)p(aA + fj,cP)
R e su lt 3.10. Under a uniform loss distribution, the plaintiff is better off ex 
post and ex ante under the recoverable A T E  contract compared with the unre­
coverable A T E  contract.
The ex ante welfare change between the BTE hourly fee and the unrecoverable 
ATE conditional fee is:
W%h, -  W ^ ,  = W A')  -  7T {zBh'  [1 -  7 T (O W
+n(eBh*)W?m , -  7r(***)W3.
=  -  [1 -  it{HBh,)\aB
+ 7T(eBht)[Wph, -  {yp -  L)] -  7T{eM )[W l. -  {yp -  L)].
Since the ex post welfare comparison does not derive a clear result, the com­
parison of the ex ante welfare is also ambiguous.
3.4.4 Dynam ic extension
We now extend onr ATE vs BTE model (Section 3.3) to a dynamic setting. 
Our interest is in the effects of BTE and ATE on the terms and timing of settle-
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ment. Following Spier (1992) and Fenn, Gray, Rickman & Carrier (2002), we 
examine the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of a finite horizon screening model. 
In this equilibrium, both plaintiff and defendant choose strategies to maximise 
expected utility subject to the plaintiff being made indifferent between accept­
ing and rejecting offers between period t  and t  +  1 .
Now, pre-trial bargaining can take place over T  periods, in each of which the 
defendant can make a settlement offer St- Acceptance of any of these ends the 
game while rejection of every offer brings the case to trial, in period T  -1-1. 
Each period of pre-trial bargaining costs the defendant and the plaintiff Cq and 
Cq respectively; trial costs them c f  and C \ .  The discount factor 5 is common 
knowledge for both parties. For simplification, we assume the accident loss is 
uniform distributed L  G [Lq, Li].
We start from BTE hourly fee arrangement. The plaintiff’s current value payoff 
at trial:
UpB(T  +  1) =  pL.(3.30)
The defendant’s trial payoff is:
U \ T  +  1 ) =  -p E { L \T  +  1) -  p ( f °  + f p ) (3.31)
where E (L \T  +  1) is the expected loss conditional on reaching trial, is the
defendant’s total legal costs — c f  +  0  5~lcB. Similarly, is the plaintiff’s
to tal legal costs f p = C\ +  ]T) 6~zco-
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The derivation of this model is documented in Appendix of this chapter in full 
detail. The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the BTE hourly fee game 
with 2 <  T  ^  oo is:
i?  = Lo (3.32)
4 = 4 - 1  + ^ ^ ,  (3.33)
T  T  T
S B = St p(L0 +  Cl +  c f ) +  8Tp (Y 2  J _ic0) +  Y 2  ^ co (3-34)
i=l i=1 i=l
t
5 f  =  <51- ‘5 f  + J 2 ^ c o ,t =  2 , . . , T  (3.35)
i—2
Now we turn to the ATE conditional fee arrangement. Here, the plaintiff’s legal 
costs become f p = (1 +  /x)ci +  ^“*(1 +  M)co- When the litigants make the
settlement decision, they have to consider the recoverable insurance premium 
a  a - This is also reflected in the plaintiff’s current value payoff UpA(T  +  1) =  
p(L  + a A)- Following the same method as before, we can write the PBE of the 
ATE conditional fee litigation game:
i f  =  L 0 (3.36)
4 - i  +
D(1 +  n ) c Q +  Cq 
§ T - t + l p t  =  2, ...,T (3.37)
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TS A = 5TpLo +  5Tp[cB +  (1 +  n)cx +  a A] +  <S*c£
i -1
T  T
+ 6Tp [ E 5"ic?  +  E r i (1 +  / ')co] (3-3S)
i =  1 i = 1
t
StA =  51- ‘S'(‘ +  X ; 5 2- i ( l  +  K)co, t  = 2 ,.. . ,T  (3.39)
i —2
To note tha t when setting T  — 1, (3.34) and (3.38) return to our one-shot game 
results of Section 3.3. Comparing the BTE hourly fee with the ATE condi­
tional fee, given a A > 0 and p  ^  0, it is clear tha t S A > S B and S A > S B.
This result is consistent with Result 3.8. We conclude:
R e su lt 3.11. In  the dynamic model, the A T E  conditional fee contract in­
creases the defendant’s settlement offer compared with the B T E  hourly fee 
contract.
Next, consider the timing of the settlement, which requires us to examine the 
probability of settling in each period. Following Fenn & Rickman (1999), the 
conditional probability of settling is given by a hazard function:
= (1 -  $)/?(<) -  S~T (6 -  8*) 3^’4°)
where f f z\ i  = A, B  is a fee specific function defined as follows: for the BTE 
hourly fee contract (3B — p(L i — L0)/(c 0 +  cff) and for the ATE conditional
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fee contract (3A — p(L i — L0)/[( l  +  p)co -I- cB]. Since (3A < (3B , we have:
R e su lt 3.12. In the dynamic model, the A T E  conditional fee contract leads 
to a faster settlement compared with the B T E  hourly fee contract.
In our one-shot model (Section 3.3), there is no certain conclusion on the 
settlement probability. The difference here reflects the property of the dynamic 
model. When there are T  periods of pre-trial bargaining, as shown in (3.35) and 
(3.39), the plaintiff’s pre-trial legal costs (the second term in each equation) 
become a main concern in the defendant’s settlement offer decision. Therefore, 
in the dynamic model, the settlement offer is always higher than in the one- 
shot model. The reason for this is the plaintiff’s pre-trial legal costs (f s). This 
would be substituted into the one-shot model (e.g equation (3.22)), the similar 
result would emerge.
3.5 Sum m ary and conclusions
In this chapter, we initiated the research of combined effects of legal expenses 
insurance and conditional fees. We first set up a general one-shot model to 
analyse the effects of legal insurance on settlement. We found th a t given the 
defendant’s settlement offer, the insured plaintiff has a lower settlement prob­
ability. This confirmed the results of early literature (e.g. Heyes et al. (2004)). 
However, when considering the defendant’s interaction, the effects of insurance 
on the settlement probability is ambiguous. This is because the distribution of 
the accident loss plays an im portant role in the defendant’s settlement offer. 
When the distribution of the accident loss is convex (concave), the defendant
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will make a lower (higher) settlement offer to the insured plaintiff than to the 
self-funded plaintiff. Also, insurance increases the defendant’s care level if and 
only if it reduces the plaintiff’s acceptance level. Thus, when insurance reduces 
the settlement offer, it reduces care and increases the accident probability.
We then focused on combinations of legal expenses insurance and fee arrange­
ments. We specified two combinations, the BTE hourly fee and the ATE 
conditional fee, and compared their effects on litigation. We concluded tha t 
given the defendant’s settlement offer, compared with the BTE hourly fee con­
tract, the ATE conditional fee contract lowers the plaintiff’s acceptance level. 
However, the defendant’s settlement offer still depends on the accident loss 
distribution.
To remove some ambiguities, we examined the uniform distribution. In this 
case, we found tha t the BTE plaintiff has a higher acceptance level. After 
discussions of risk aversion and unrecoverable success fees, we extended the 
one-shot model to  a dynamic one to examine the combined effects of insurance 
and fee arrangement on the timing of settlement. We found th a t the ATE 
conditional fee contract increases the defendant’s settlement offer compared 
with the BTE hourly fee contract.
However, as in other research on fees and litigation, a number of our results 
imply ambiguity in the comparisons, especially these welfare results. This re­
flects a fundamental complexity in the underlying relationship we model but, 
for this reason, such ambiguity should not be ignored: policy needs to be care­
fully considered, with suitable opportunities or empirical evaluation. These
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issues will be discussed in Chapter 5.
113
D erivation o f th e  dynam ic m odel
Consider a T  = 1 game. The plaintiff accepts a given settlement offer S  if and 
only if
S  -  c0 ^  5p£2, 
which define the acceptance level
e* =  I(S-Co), (3.41)
The defendant chooses the settlement offer S  to minimise his expected post­
accident cost H . For the BTE hourly fee contract, this cost is given by
H Bh =  Q(e2) s  + [ i - Q (4 )M i?  +  f i )  +  sP f  LdQ■
Je2
The First Order Condition defining the optimal settlement offer S  is:
0(4) +  ^ - [ s -  sPe2 -  Sp(ff  + ff ) ]  = o.
Since L  is uniform distribution, Q(£) = and q{£) — Therefore
S B = 6pL0 + 5 p ( f f +  f [ )  (3.42)
A ppendix:
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Substituting for S  from (3.41) and rearranging gives:
£b  = L 0 -j- (3.43)
Now consider the T  — 2 game. In t — 2, based on (3.43) we have:
4  = 4  + / ?  + / ? - ^ - ^ - (3-44)
Also, in the second period we have
S2 - c 0 - ~  = 8p£3. (3.45)
The plaintiff’s indifference between period 1 and 2 requires Si — cq — <5(S2 —
Co) — Co, which gives
S2 =  —  +  Co. (3.46)
Substituting this into (3.45), we obtain:
e° = w P - w { 3 ' 4 7 )
Hence, (3.44) becomes
e°  = w P + rP - f ? - f ’P- ^
Now the defendant chooses the settlement offer Si to minimise his expected
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H  = Q(£2)S 1 +  c? +  [0(4) -  0 ( 4 )]«S2 +  [1 -  O(4)]<5c0D +  [1 -  Q(£3)]62Ud(3).
Using the Envelope theorem, the First Order Condition is:
D ( P  \  I Q ^ ( ^ 2 )  r / ^ l  | . D\    r\
^ 21 ~Pp 1 ~  ~ ¥ p ' x  0 0 ) ”
Given tha t L is uniformly distributed, the above equation becomes:
t f  =  L0 +  S > ± £  (3.49)
Using (3.49) in (3.44) gives
^  = La + f P + f f  + f ' - ^ p - (3-50)
Substituting this into (3.47) yields
S f  = S2pL0 + 62p ( f?  + ) +  (3.51)
so th a t (3.46) gives
S B = 8pLo +  8 p (f^  +  f p ) +  cB +  Co (3.52)
We now assume there are T  periods pre-trial. Letting Si for the T  +  1 period 
game be S 2 for the T  +  1 period game, we have
f —1
S2 = 6t - !l(p4  +  / £  +  /£ )  +  £  (3.53)
post-accident cost H , which is given by
i=l
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Since S2 — S i / 5 +  cq, the above equation can be changed to:
C „ yVT- 1  ri D
_ _ L  4.  ^ * = 1  °  C0 _  f P  _  f P  (o  e 4 \
5Tp SF-'p ST-'p Jt Jt [ }
The defendant minimises
Q (4 )S i +  c0D +  [Q (4) -  Q (k)\S S 2 +  [1 -  Q (t2)]S<$ +
-  + { i - Q ( e T +i)]s2u d(T  + i).
and the First Order Condition is
.  _ T s ,  S t + eg
Z 2  —  0 —  ~pz 1 ZLf, z— .
oxp  o p
Using S 2 ~  S i/5  + cq this yields
e2 = L'i + Cn + C\
0 5 p
Substitution in (3.54) gives
S f  =  STpL 0 +  5Tp { j f  4- f [ )  +  ^ 2  5i°o
i~  1
In summary, we can write the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the BTE 
hourly fee game with 2 <  T  ^  00 as:
oB =  L 0 (3.55)
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p B  — p B  i C0 ^ 0  j-   9 rp
H H -i +  ^p-t+i ’ 1 A •••>■*
T  T  T
D$i — $Tp (L o +  cj +  c f ) +  5Tp ( ^  5 1Cq +  5 tcq) +  S1Cq
i—1 i=l i=l
s f  =  ^ - ‘s f  +  J ]  <52-icb, 4 =  2 r
i=2
(3.56)
(3.57)
(3.58)
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Chapter 4
Legal effort and organisational 
structures of the law firm
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4.1 In troduction
As discussed in previous chapters, market responses to litigation risk vary 
across countries. In the US, it is common for plaintiffs to retain lawyers on a 
contingent basis thereby shifting some risk on costs to their agent. Alterna­
tively, the majority of European jurisdictions have well developed insurance 
markets where protection against the risk of legal expense can be purchased. In 
England and Wales, there are two implementations to protect litigants. Legal 
expenses insurance can be purchased in the market and conditional fee con­
tracts can be signed with the legal service provider. However, within current 
regulatory framework, the insurance provider normally cannot be the legal ser­
vice provider.1 Policy makers are considering removing this restriction. This 
proposal is welcomed by some big law firms. Reform enables the possibility of 
adopting an alternative organisational structure which may allow law firms to 
integrate with financial service providers (Clementi 2004). However, a critical 
question arises: how does the alternative organisational structure affect the 
incentives of lawyers to act in the best interests of clients?
To answer this question the functioning of relevant firms should be carefully 
examined. The modern approach to  the theory of the firm emphasizes the 
firms’ three roles2: first, a nexus of contracts (Jensen & Meckling (1976));
1 A ccording to  V idal, Jew itt & Leaver (2005), in England and W ales a little  under a 
quarter of the solicitors w ith  practising certificates are “in-house” . T hey are employed in 
com m erce/industry, government or the prosecution service. T he primary difference between  
employed solicitors and those in private practice is that the former can only provide services 
for their employer and not for third party clients. In the case of insurance, m ost insurers 
send all claim s to  external solicitors for claim s handling. Very few of them  operate in-house 
claim s handling functions, lim ited to  non-personal injury motor claims or low value claims 
below  the sm all claim s lim it (Abram s 2 0 0 2 ).
2See Hart (1995) for the previous review.
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second, a property right over a set of assets (Grossman & Hart (1986), Tirole 
(1988) and Hart & Moore (1990)); and third, an incentive system (Holmstrom 
& Milgrom (1994) and Holmstrom (1999)). In the case of a law firm, since 
partnership is the prevailing organisational structure3, its assets are special. 
As pointed out by Grout (2005), the asset of a law firm is mainly its human 
capital. If an alternative organisational structure is allowed, financial capital 
from outside ownership may change the former effects of human capital. Prob­
lems like moral hazard and adverse selection may arise. Based on the property 
right model, several studies (see Brealey & Franks (2005), Davies (2005), Dow 
& Lapuerta (2005) and Grout (2005)) illustrate the possible risks and benefits 
of introducing an alternative organisational structure. Nevertheless, there is 
no study tha t looks at the incentive effects of the law firm’s organisational 
structures in detail. Currently in the UK, law firms work with insurance com­
panies mainly in two ways: practise independently or join the insurer’s panel 
(Abrams 2002). If the partnership restriction is relaxed, it is possible that 
an integrated firm which provides both financial and legal services will come 
into being.4 The implications of these arrangements are first examined in this 
chapter.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we set out the basic model of 
legal effort. As adopted by Rickman & Tzavara (2005), we use the contest 
success function to illustrate the competitive choice of effort by lawyers. We
3 The law firm is an arrangement in which a group o f lawyers form a joint venture. 
M embers share assets and liabilities, receipts are paid to the firm, and after th e  paym ents of 
expenses w hich include lawyers’ salaries, the mem bers of the firm distribute the net incom e 
am ongst them selves according to a formula previously agreed on. If the law firm is organised  
as an equal partnership, ail partners w ill share th e  net incom e equally.
4C lim enti (2004) stopped short of recom m ending such integration, though he did not rule 
out such “m ulti-disciplinary partnership” in future.
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will show how organisational structure and ownership influences the law firm’s 
effort decisions in detail in Section 4.3. After that, we examine the welfare 
effects of the change to organisational structures. Using the conclusions of 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we compare litigants’ ex post and ex ante welfare under 
different organisational structures. In Section 4.5, we draw conclusions and 
suggest some further studies.
4.2 T he m odel
4.2.1 The basic m odel
Our basic model describes an agency relationship between a law firm and an 
insurance company. When a legal expenses insurance policyholder (potential 
plaintiff) is involved in an accident, he may retain a law firm to start a lawsuit. 
We assume this law firm is organised by equal partnership, which means all 
the lawyers in the firm share risk and benefit equally.5 In this basic model, we 
define the law firm as independent from the insurer. In the next section, we 
will discuss the situations when the law firm integrates with the insurer.
We start from assumptions and model settings. The plaintiff and the defen­
dant are assumed to be ignorant about legal matters: they can observe their 
lawyers’ legal effort but because of lacking professional knowledge they do not 
know how much effort their respective cases need.6 This is the typical expertise 
problem introduced by Dana & Spier (1993) and Emons (2000). The outcome
5B y th is setting, we can treat th e  firm as a whole and avoid the com plexity of hierarchical 
structure and free riding.
6Under th is assum ption, legal service is a  credence good, see Emons (2001).
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of the lawsuit is a function of the law firm’s legal effort. For legal effort, fol­
lowing Schwartz & Mitchell (1970), we define the lawyer’s hourly input into 
the case. We assume the lawyer puts the same “effort” into each hour worked. 
Hence, the quality of each hour’s work is the same (though its marginal pro­
ductivity is assumed to be declining). According to current laws, regulations 
and restrictions, the insurer can not directly affect the law firm’s effort deci­
sion. If the plaintiff wins the lawsuit, he will receive a judgement which can 
be different from his claimed loss. However, since in an English cost rule ju­
risdiction the losing party needs to pay the winning party’s legal costs, if the 
insured plaintiff loses the lawsuit, his insurer has to pay the defendant’s costs. 
In England and Wales, there are strict restrictions on the law firm’s available 
fee arrangements. Currently, law firms will typically charge either on an hourly 
basis or on a conditional fee basis. However, Peysner (2001) notes tha t insurers 
will often lead firms to  charge on an “eat what you kill” basis where firms are 
paid a fixed fee plus an hourly fee if the case is won and only a fixed fee if the 
case is lost. We therefore allow for this as well. We assume tha t the insurer, 
instead of the law firm, decides the fee arrangement. Moreover, for simplifi­
cation, we assume the hourly rate of the lawyer (w) is an exogenous parameter.
The extensive form of our game consists of three stages (see Figure 4.1):
1 . “Nature” determines whether the potential plaintiff is involved in an 
accident with probability 7r.7 If not, the game ends. Otherwise, the 
plaintiff reports to the insurer and retains a law firm;
2. The insurer chooses the payment contract (fee arrangement) tha t deter-
7In the welfare analysis section we relax th is assum ption and consider an endogenous 7r.
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Figure 4.1: Stages of the game
mines what the law firm is paid;
3. The plaintiff’s law firm and the defendant’s lawyer play a litigation sub­
game by choosing their effort r  and rD respectively.8
It is instructive to compare this model to the one in Chapter 3. The model 
here is a combination of two games: the litigation game between the plaintiff 
and defendant lawyers and the contracting game between the insurer and the 
law firm. However, in Chapter 3, we only focus on the litigation game between 
the plaintiff and the defendant. In the current model, the plaintiff, who can 
observe the law firm’s legal effort, but is assumed to be ignorant how much is 
actually required by the case, does not participate in the litigation subgame. 
In Chapter 3, we look into the combined effects of legal expenses insurance and
8We assum e that th e English cost rule is applied in th e litigation.
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fee arrangement. While in this chapter, we focus on the lawyer’s legal effort 
provision and the effects of the law firm’s organisational structures.
We now define the litigation subgame. In this subgame, the plaintiff’s law 
firm and the defendant’s lawyer make their effort decisions simultaneously. 
Following Rickman & Tzavara (2005), we define the plaintiff’s probability of 
winning the lawsuit as a contest success function:9
p(r) =  V(41)
where r  is the plaintiff’s law firm’s legal effort, is the defendant’s lawyer’s 
legal effort and 9 represents the difficulty of the case for the plaintiff.10 A 
more difficult case reduces the plaintiff’s probability of winning p(r) if the 
defendant’s legal effort does not change. The legal effort decisions are made 
by the lawyers solely, neither the ignorant litigants nor the insurer can directly 
affect them. We also assume the plaintiff’s law firm and the defendant’s lawyer 
make their effort decisions simultaneously.
4.2.2 The law firm
Worker-cooperative ownership, i.e. partnership, is a typical organisational
structure in most skilled service industries (e.g. law, accounting, consultancy).
Unlike other industries, while firms in these skilled service industries have
9In econom ic literature, contest success functions are firstly defined by Tullock (1975) 
and developed by Hirshleifer (1989) and Skaperdas (1996). The function in our m odel is 
similar to  th e one in Skaperdas (1996).
10In the m odel of Chapter 3, the plaintiff’s probability of winning is an exogenous pa­
rameter, while in the current m odel it is an endogenous variable. Therefore, in these two 
chapters, we use different variables to  represent the difficulty of the case.
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physical assets, their most im portant assets are the human capital of their 
workers. Law firms’ human capital can be separated into two parts: reputation 
and business-specific human capital. Reputation is one of the legal service 
industry’s key assets, offering attractive returns when cultivated properly, but 
threatening considerable damage if lost. Obviously, more wins in lawsuits 
raises this reputation. Hence, we assume the firm’s reputation is an increasing 
function of the probability of winning the lawsuit. The business-specific human 
capital is the human capital th a t can increase the law firm’s market value, e.g. 
lawyers’ training experiences and professional certifications. Investment in 
the business-specific human capital can increase the firm’s value but does not 
change the firm’s outpu t.11 The law firm’s income is mainly from its legal fees. 
The firm also needs to bear the cost/disutility of its legal effort and costs. A 
risk neutral law firm’s utility function is given by:
UL =  /  + v r  +  j/ b  — <j>i — (f>B — C l  (4-2)
where /  is the legal fee income, vr is the reputation asset, vB is the business- 
specific human capital, fa  is the disutility of legal effort, is the cost of 
investment in the business-specific human capital, and Cl is the firm’s running 
cost which is assumed to be a constant. We define legal fee income as follows:
/ = v r  +  a  -  v ) f  = w  +  >(r)
where f w is the fee to the law firm if the case is won and f °  is the fee if the 
case is lost. Both of these are functions of legal effort r .  For convenience, we
11  Effectively, this is a “strong” version o f the Spence (1973) signaling m odel. It allows us 
to ignore the effects of human capital on th e  current litigation itself.
126
let the disutility of effort is 4>\ =  | r 2. We assume the reputation asset is
T
Vr  — V\ P  =  v y T +  6td
where v\ is the reputation return to the probability of winning.
The business-specific asset is given by
where e is the firm’s input to the business-specific human capital and u2 is its 
return rate. Similar as f i ,  we assume the cost of this investment is (p2 =  |e 2 
for convenience.
W ith the above assumptions, if the law firm owns all the assets its utility 
function becomes
4.2.3 N ash equilibrium of the litigation subgame
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, in the litigation subgame the plaintiff retains the 
law firm (PL) while the defendant retains a lawyer (DL). We assume DL is 
risk neutral and charges hourly fees. His utility function therefore is given by:
V L =  w t d  -  i f f ,  -  CD. (4.4)
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where w is his hourly rate, \ tb  is the disutility/cost function of legal effort, 
and Cd is his fixed running cost.
a function of the probability of winning. If DL charges hourly fees, his income 
is independent from the outcome of the lawsuit. Therefore PL ’s legal effort 
has no effect on DL’s effort decision. DL’s reaction function (against the law 
firm) is obtained by maximizing his utility function V L with respect to his 
legal effort T£>, which is given by:
This reaction function confirms tha t PL ’s effort decision does not affect DL’s 
effort choice. In Nash equilibrium, the defendant lawyer’s optimal legal effort 
equals his hourly rate, which is a constant.
Now we move to the plaintiff’s law firm. Two variables contribute to PL’s 
utility function: legal effort r  and human capital input e. In Nash equilibrium, 
the firm chooses the optimal values of r  and e to maximize its utility function 
(4.3). The firm’s reaction functions (against the defendant) are:
P L ’s legal effort will affect DL’s effort decision only when the la tte r’s utility is
w — td =  0. (4.5)
(4.6)
v2 -  e =  0; (4-7)
(4.8)
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Since the human capital input e does not affect the outcome of the case, in 
equilibrium it is equal to its marginal return:
e* =  v2. (4.9)
Substituting DL’s equilibrium effort choice r f  = w  into PL’s reaction function 
(4.8), we have:
6vJ f wl r ) Sw f oM. T fw'(r)  u /0'( r )
J O T - r —T Z 3 5  J \T) + — ,a . . .  +  _ , a . . .  +  , - r  = 0.(r  +  9w)2 ( r  +  Ow)2 r  +  9w r  + 9w (r  +  9w)2
(4.10)
The Nash equilibrium of the litigation subgame therefore is the solution of 
equation (4.10): r*, e* =  v2 and Tp =  w.
Prom equation (4.10), we can find th a t the law firm’s optimal effort choice is 
decided by the difficulty of the case 9, the return to the reputational asset iq, 
and the fee arrangement f w and f° .  Since f w and /°  are functions of r ,  only 
when the fee arrangement is specified, the optimal effort r* can be solved. We 
will discuss hourly fees, conditional fees and their effect on the firm’s effort 
provision in Section 4.3.
Moreover, two implications can be gained from (4.10). First, when 9 — 0, 
which means the plaintiff wins at trial, the optimal effort is given by r  =  f w>. 
In this case, only the winning fee f w will affect the effort decision. Second, 
when 9 - a - + o o ,  which means the defendant wins at trial, the optimal effort is 
r  = f 0' . For conditional fees, since / °  =  0, we can find tha t the firm will not 
provide any effort.
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4.2.4 Litigants’ best interests
We now define the plaintiff’s utility. Since the plaintiff is insured, he does not 
need to pay any legal fee.12 His ex post welfare is:
Up =  yp -  L  4- pA
where yP is his initial wealth, L  is the accident loss and A  is the judgement. 
Note tha t the plaintiff’s legal costs are covered by insurance. Substituting the 
Nash solution into this welfare function gives:
UF = yp — L + ,■A =  -  +  (4.11)
T *  +  V T p  T* +  d w
As shown in Section 4.2.4, in the above function, the law firm’s optimal legal 
effort r* is decided by 6, 17, f w and f° .  The effect of the law firm’s effort on 
the plaintiff’s welfare is given by
dUp _  Ow
dr* (r* +  6w)2 ^
It is clear th a t the plaintiff’s ex post welfare is increasing with the law firm’s 
legal effort.
The defendant has an ex post welfare function given by
V D =  yD -  p(A  +  f D +  / )  =  yD -  p[A + f D + p f w +  (1 -  p ) f%  (4.12)
12Notice that, we assume that the plaintiff does not pay a co-payment to the insurer. The 
reason for this is that the plaintiff does not choose the lawyer’s effort in the current model 
so this source of moral hazard does not arise.
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where yo  is the defendant’s initial wealth and f D is the defendant’s legal 
fee. Substituting the Nash solution into the defendant’s welfare function, in 
equilibrium the defendant’s welfare becomes:
V D =  Vd
t * +  Ow A -\-w 2 jr r* +  0t *d
fjq-*
■fw(r*) -j-
r* -T Ot •/V)D
(4.13)
The effect of the law firm’s effort on the defendant’s welfare is therefore ob­
tained by:
dV D 
d r*
9w
_(t* +  Ow)2(A + w +  / )  H— -nr*
df
r * +  Ow dr*
Note tha t /  =  given Ss f ,  since =  J ^ s p T V ) -
p ^ j i / 1^* ) +  TtA L zD  ^ defendant’s ex post welfare is
decreasing with the law firm’s legal effort.
It is clear tha t litigants’ welfare is affected by the law firm’s legal effort. There­
fore, if changes to the law firm’s organisational structure and ownership affect 
its legal effort provision, they will also affect litigants’ welfare. To summarise:
R e su lt 4.1: Changes to the legal service provider’s organisational structure 
and ownership will affect litigants’ welfare only i f  they have effects on the 
provider’s legal effort Increases in the p la in tiff’s legal effort will result in an 
increase in the pla in tiff’s ex post welfare but a decrease in the defendant’s ex 
post welfare.
In this section, we set up our basic model and obtained solutions for the
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litigation subgame. However, comparison of the effects of fee arrangements 
and organisational structures requires us to specify them in detail. We now 
turn to  this, taking organisational structures first.
4.3 O rganisational effects
In this section, we extend our basic model in two dimensions. First, to high­
light lawyers’ effort reactions under different legal fees, we specify three fee 
arrangements: hourly fees, conditional fees and an “eat what you kill” scheme 
(defined below). Second, in addition to  the independent law firm we allow 
two types of integration to examine the effects of organisational structure and 
ownership changes. We now define the three types of law firm.
In d e p e n d e n t firm  is the typical law firm in private practice where lawyers 
are partners of the firm. The firm is operated independently from the 
insurer. All assets of the firm are controlled by its partners.
T y p e  I  in te g ra tio n  is the situation where the insurer merges with the law 
firm. In this case, the former assets of the law firm and the benefits of 
these assets move to  the insurer, while the law firm provides legal service 
but receives only legal fees which are paid by a losing defendant via the 
insurer, or by the insurer if the case is lost (under hourly fees). In Type 
I integration, lawyers lose the control of their former assets.
T y p e  I I  in te g ra tio n  is the situation where the law firm merges with the 
insurer and controls the insurer’s assets. This, of course, would be the 
situation where the law firm  provides legal expenses insurance services13.
13This setting is to accommodate one possible form of multi-disciplinary practices in
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In this case the ownership of the former law firm assets moves to the new 
firm and the new firm has to bear the (insured) risk.
The Independent firm reflects the typical situation in the UK at present, while 
Type I and Type II integration are more hypothetical. We introduce them to 
capture effects of the possible legal reform. Thus, both share multi-disciplinary 
elements (through outside capital/ownership), with the the former resembling 
an in-house set-up in a liberalised market where such businesses can offer legal 
services. The key difference between them relates to whether lawyers own their 
firms’ assets (Type II) or not (Type I). Also, these two types of integration 
can be seen as downstream (of the insurer) and upstream (of the law firm). 
The following table shows the structure of this section.
TA BLE 4-1: ST R U C T U R E  OF SECTION 4.3
| H ourly fees C onditional fees “Eat w hat you kill”
Independent firm Section 4.3.1.1 Section 4.3.1.2 Section 4.3.1.3
T ype I firm Section 4.3.2.1 Section 4.3.2.2 Section 4.3.2,3
T ype II firm Section 4.3.3
4.3.1 Independent law firm
We first study the situation where the plaintiff’s law firm is independent of 
the insurance company. We use three specified fee settings to examine the fee 
effects on the law firm’s effort choice.
d e m e n t i’s report. W e do not exam ine the possibility that law firms may have the capital 
to  provide insurance services.
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For the case of an independent law firm, since it owns its assets, the insurer
has the utility function:
U1 = a -  tt(1 - p ) { f D + f )  -  C/
where a  is the plaintiff’s (BTE) legal expenses insurance premium, tt is the 
probability of the accident and Cj is the insurance company’s running cost. 
Using the Nash solution for the defendant’s legal effort r£, =  w, we have 
f D — wTp =  w2. Substituting this into U1 yields:
ttI 0WU = a  — 7r-
T  +  9w
4.3 .1 .1  H ourly fee
If the law firm charges hourly fees, the specified fee setting becomes f w = f °  = 
w t . Therefore the law firm has the utility function:
ULl — w t  T  v i—  V v2e -  “ T2 -  - e 2 -  CL. (4.15)
t  +  9td 2 2
Clearly, the optimal human capital input e* always satisfies (4.9) because e 
is independent from t .  From (4.10) we find th a t in Nash equilibrium the law 
firm’s optimal legal effort level is given by the solution to
w + 1V + m 2 ~ t * = 0 - ( 4 1 6 )
Figure 4.2 shows the independent law firm’s optimal legal effort against the
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Figure 4.2: Legal effort of the independent firm under hourly fee
difficulty of the case.14 15 From the figure we find tha t the law firm’s legal ef­
fort first increases with the difficulty of the case to its maximum then decreases 
against the difficulty. This is because a low level of difficulty makes effort pro­
ductive in terms of the probability of winning so tha t effort also yields a high 
reputation return. As difficulty rises, this effect diminishes and, eventually, 
there is insufficient reputation benefit to justify high effort.
14For convenience, all numerical calculations assum e th at the return to  reputation and 
the wage rate are unity: zj =  w ~  1 .
15 T he value of the effort is given by
Ti =  (1 /6 ) [ 2 4 ^ 3 +  2492w 3 +  893w 3 +  1O80«> +  8w3 +  12(81 d2w 2 +  3692w 4 +  3693w 4 +  120w4 
+ 1 2 0 4 ™ 4 ) 1 / 2 ] 1 / 3  +  6 [(2 /9  )9w2 +  ( l /9 ) 0 2w 2 +  ( l / 9 ) w 2}/[249w3 +  2492w 3 +  893w 3 +  1089w 
+ 8 w 3 +  12(8102u>2 +  3692w 4 +  369sw 4 +  129w4 +  1204 ™ 4 ) 1 / 2 ] 1 / 3  +  ( l /3 ) iu  -  (2 /3 )9w.
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U = a — Ci — it — (w + r i). (4.17)
T\ -f* Ow
4.3 .1 .2  C onditional fee
If the independent law firm charges a conditional fee, the only risk left to  the 
insurer is the defendant’s legal fees when the case is lost since the conditional 
fee contract is “no win, no fee” and the English cost rule shifts the winner’s 
legal costs to the loser. Given the proportional fee mark-up 1 ^  5 >  0, the law 
firm and the insurer’s utility functions are specified as follows:16
UL2 =  ——^ — (1 +  S)wr +  i/i T +  v2e -  ~ t 2 -  i e 2 -  CL (4.18) 
r  +  6td t  T  Ow 2 2
U12 =  a  — Ci — 7r— ®~ w2. (4.19)
r 2 +  Ow K J
As in the hourly fee case, here the optimal human capital input e* continues
to satisfy (4.9). Since the defendant’s legal effort is r £ =  w } the law firm’s
optimal legal effort is derived by maximizing UL2 with respect to r .  The
reaction function is given by:
Ow 2 r ( l JrS )w  t 2(1A-8)w .
 + 1 . J .  -  /_ . a. .L  ~ r  =  0. (4.20)
Note, for later, th a t if the independent firm charges an hourly fee, the insurer
has the specific utility function
( t  + Ow)2 t  +  Ow ( t  +  Ow)2
Figure 4.3 illustrates the firm’s legal effort against the fee mark-up 5 and the
16N ote that the expression for U 12 below assum es that the success fee is ‘recoverable’, in 
the language of Chapter 3.
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Legal effort of the independent firm under conditional fee
Figure 4.3: Legal effort of the independent firm under conditional fee
difficulty level 9.17 We find tha t the law firm's legal effort is increasing with
17T he solution of the reaction function (4.20) is given by
r2* =  (1 /6 )[48w 30S +  24w 30 -  84w 302 +  24w 3S20 -  84w 3S()2 +  8 ()3w 3 +  1080™ +  8 w 3S3 
+ 2 4 w 3S2 +  24w3S +  8 w 3 +  12 (-lO 8re 6 03<5 -  72w 692S2 +  8192w 2 +  72w492S 
+ 3 6 w 4982 +  36w 495 +  36tv48292 -  126w4S93 +  12w4S39 +  36w492 -  126tv493 
+12w 49 +  1294w 4 -  36w693 +  45w 604 -  12w 602 -  12w 605 -  48w 602d 
- 1 0 8 w 60352 +  90we94S -  48w 692S3 -  3Gw6S393 +  45w 6S294 -  12w 6S492 
- 1 2 w 6695)1' 2}1/ 3 +  6 [(2 /9  )w29 +  (2 /9 )w 2S9 +  ( l /9 ) 0 2 u; 2 +  (1 /9  )w2S2 +  {2 /9)w 2S 
+ ( l / 9 ) w 2]/[48w396 +  24w 39 -  84tv392 +  24w3626 -  84w 3602 +  803w 3 +  1089w 
+ 8 w 3S3 +  24w3S2 +  24w 3S +  8w3 +  1 2 (- lO 8 w 6 03ri -  72w 692S2 +  8102w 2 
+ 7 2 w 492S +  36w49S2 +  36w49S +  36w4S292 -  126tu4S93 +  12w 4639 +  36w402 
-1 2 6 w 403 +  12tu40 +  \204w 4 -  36w603 +  45w604 -  \2 w 602 -  12w 605 -  48w 602S 
- 1 0 8 w 69362 +  90w 6946 -  48w 692S3 -  36w6S393 +  45w 68294 -  12w 6S492 
- 1 2 w 6 6 9 5 ) 1/ 2 ] 1' 3  +  (i/3)«;<$ +  ( l /3 )tn  -  (2/3)0w.
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the proportional mark-up <5 because here 6 has a positive incentive effect on 
the firm’s income.18
Compare this with the independent law firm’s effort under hourly fees t\ (which 
is represented by the front edge of the surface in Figure 4.3—i.e. th a t where 
5 =  0) . We find that, for the same difficulty level, only when 5 is compar­
atively high do conditional fees generate sufficient incentive for higher legal 
effort. We also see the tradeoff between fee mark-up and difficulty under the 
conditional fee. The mark-up provides incentives to the law firm to invest in 
the case. Given a 0, an increase in 5 increases the firm’s expected marginal 
profit. Moreover, the difficulty of the case exacerbates the no win, no fee risk 
faced by the law firm, thereby deterring potential effort investment.
R e su lt 4.2: For an independent firm, only when the fee mark-up £ is high 
enough, do conditional fees motivate more effort than hourly fees.
The law firm makes its legal effort decision by trading off incentives and risks. 
Given a risk level 9 , only when the conditional fee mark-up 5 is high enough 
will the law firm input more effort into the case than under hourly fees. The 
higher the risk, the higher the fee mark-up needed.
18This is also s h o w n  in the comparative statics w h e r e  <  0 (from the second-order
necessary condition) a n d  J ^  =  (r +  2 0 w ) r w  >  0, accordingly >  0.
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4.3 .1 .3  “Eat w hat you  kill”
The payment contract between the insurer and the firm can become an “eat 
what you kill” scheme,19 under which the insurer pays the firm a fixed fee F  
plus an hourly fee if the case is won and only the fixed fee if the case is lost.20 
Under this scheme, the law firm’s utility function becomes:
UL3 =  - J - W T  + F +  " I - T a -  +  ~  (4-21)r  +  0rD r  -\-9w 2 2
The law firm’s optimal investment in human capital satisfies (4.9). Its optimal 
legal effort is given by maximizing UL3 w ith respect to r . Given the defendant’s 
Nash solution tb  = w, the reaction function is given by
9w 2 rw  t 2w  „  . ,  .
F I +  — rs z  -  7 7 7 * 3 5 -  r  °  °- (4-22)(r  +  9w)2 r  +  9w ( r  +  9w)2
It is clear th a t in the above reaction function the fixed fee F  does not affect 
the law firm’s effort decision; it only causes a level change to the firm’s total 
utility. Compared with conditional fees, the reaction function for “eat what 
you kill” is exactly the same format as if 6 — 0 in the conditional fee case. 
Since the legal effort under the conditional fee is increasing with <5, we can 
conclude tha t if the independent firm is under an “eat what you kill” scheme 
its legal effort is less than under a conditional fee.
19This setting attem pts to  capture som e features of unofficial paym ent contracts between  
insurance companies and their panel law firms (Abram s 2 0 0 2 ).
20The fixed fee is paid by the insurer but the hourly fee is actually paid by the defendant. If
the plaintiff wins, according to  the English cost rule, the defendant has to pay the plaintiff’s
legal fees. In our case, the defendant pays the fee to  the insurer first, then the insurer 
transfers it to  the law firm.
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Legal effort of independent firm under "eat what you kill"
0
Figure 4.4: Legal effort of the independent firm under “eat what you kill”
Figure 4.4 illustrates the independent firm’s legal effort under the “eat what 
you kill” scheme.21 The firm’s legal effort is higher than the defendant’s legal 
effort when 9 <  1. W hen 9 > 1, it is lower than the defendant’s legal effort 
and decreasing in the difficulty of the case.
Comparing this legal effort r3* with th a t under hourly fees r / ,  it is clear tha t
21  T he legal effort is given by
7*3 =  ( l /6 ) [ —84to3#2 +  24w39 +  893w 3 +  1089w +  8w3 +  1 2 ( - 3 6w693 +  45w&94 -  1 2 w 682 -  12w 695 
+ 8  192w 2 +  36w492 -  126w‘l93 +  12w A9 +  1204 tn4 ) 1 / 2 ] 1 / 3  +  6 [(2 /9 )w29 +  (1 /9 )62w 2 
+ ( l / $ ) w 2] / [ - 8 4 w 392 +  24w 38 +  893w 3 +  1O80W +  8w3 +  1 2 (-3 6 n ;6^3 +  45w 694 -  12w682 
- 1 2 w 685 +  8192w 2 +  3Qw482 -  126w 493 +  12w 49 +  I284w 4) l/2)1/3 -  (2 /3 )8w +  (1 /3 )w.
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hourly fees induce higher effort. Therefore we state:
R e su lt 4.3: Compared with conditional fees and hourly fees, the independent 
law firm has the lowest legal effort when it is contracted on an “eat what you 
kill” scheme.
At first sight, this may seem surprising because insurers appear to choose such 
arrangements and we might expect this to imply some revealed preference for 
them. Thus, Result 4.3 leads us to reflect upon their decision. One possibility 
is tha t this choice may be the results of other factors like the administrative 
benefits of having firms internalise the costs of collecting fees.
Under this scheme, the insurer’s utility function becomes:
In Stage 1 of our basic game, the insurer chooses the fee arrangement tha t can 
maximize its utility. Since F  ^  0 and r% ^  7-3 , the insurer prefers conditional 
fees to “eat what you kill” . However, if the insurer does not have a conditional 
fee contract in place, the situation becomes ambiguous. Under hourly fees the 
insurer has to pay the law firm if the case is lost and, hence, the higher effort 
level in Result 4.3 may bring a higher risk to the insurer. By contrast, under 
“eat what you kill” , if the case is lost, the insurer does not need to pay the law 
firm, and this gives a reason for the insurer to  welcome the “eat what you kill” 
scheme. Not surprisingly, the insurer’s decision now depends on the difficulty 
of the case 6 and the value of the fixed payment F.
(4.23)
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4.3.2 Type I integrated firm
In the case of the Type I integrated firm, the insurer acquires the law firm’s 
assets. Therefore, when the law firm makes its effort decision, it will no longer 
consider the reputation asset vr and the human capital asset vB. However, 
the law firm still makes its legal effort decision independently while the insurer 
benefits from the asset ownership. The utility function of the insurer can now 
be written as:
Substituting the defendant’s Nash equilibrium legal fee f D = w 2 into U1, we
4 .3 .2 . 1  H ourly fee
If the law firm charges an hourly fee, using the specified setting th a t f w — f °  = 
w r, the law firm and the insurer have the the utility functions respectively as 
follows:
u 1 — a  +  7T\vR Ar VB -  (1 ~  p ) ( fD + /)]  -  CT
have
+  t/2e  —— (w2 + f )  (4.24)
t + vw
ULi =  /  -  <Ai -  4>B -  C l  =  W T  -  I t 2 -  -  CL (4.25)
+  ---------——(w2 +  wr)
r  +  Bw
Ow
In Nash equilibrium, the law firm’s optimal legal effort level and the human 
capital input are
Both of them  are constants and do not change with the difficulty of the case. 
Therefore in equilibrium the utility functions become:
UL4 =  \ w 2 -  CL 
2
(4.27)
(4.28)
Many literatures argue th a t hourly fees can eliminate the (financial) conflict 
of interest between clients and lawyers effectively.22 One, previously unre­
searched, dimension along which conflict could arise relates to the difficulty 
of the case. As we saw in Figure 4.2, effort levels under hourly fees can be 
sensitive to case difficulty, and this might be thought as ‘conflict’. As (4.26) 
shows, this issue is removed by the Type I firm since the lawyer no longer has 
a reputational interest in the firm and, so, does not let this influence her choice 
of hours.
4 .3 .2 . 2  C onditional fee
If the law firm charges a conditional fee, the only risk left to the insurer is the 
opponent’s legal fee when the case is lost. Given the proportional fee mark-up 
S > 0, the law firm and the insurer’s utility functions are specified as follows:
22For exam ple, Gravelle & W aterson (1993) point out that since under hourly fees the  
law yer’s incom e is independent from the outcom e o f the case, she has no financial incentive 
to offer biased advice to  the plaintiff. D ana & Spier (1993) and Em ons (2000) claim  that 
when the lawyer chooses her effort, hourly fees are efficient given that the plaintiff is ignorant.
ULB = Pr  -  <t> -  Ct  =  — 4 —  (1 +  S)w t  -  k 2 -  L 2 -  CL (4.29)
T  -f- UT£) A A
U15 =  a  — Ci +  7T ( Vi  — b v2e
t  +  Ow t  +  6w
Ow r, 
— 7—w (4.30)
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Since the defendant’s optimal legal effort is r B — w } the law firm’s optimal 
legal effort is derived by maximizing UL5 with respect to r . The reaction 
function is given by:
2 t ( 1  +  6 ) w  t 2 ( 1 - \ - S ) w
r  +  dw ( r  +  6w)2
Making the natural assumption th a t r  >  0, the only real number solution for 
the above cubic equation is:
r6* =  ^  (1 +  6 +  V l +  49 +  25 +  405 +  -  w6. (4.32)
AT
Similarly, we can solve the law firm’s optimal human capital input from (4.29) 
which, as in (4.26), is e* =  0.
Comparing this with the Type I firm’s effort under the hourly fee r | ,  we find:
R e su lt 4.4: For a Type I  integrated law firm } under the conditional fee ar­
rangement its legal effort will be greater than under the hourly fee arrangement 
i f  and only i f  5 > ^ .
This result is similar to th a t in Result 4.2: i.e. once again, though we now 
see more explicitly the tradeoff between the difficulty of the case and the fee 
mark-up under conditional fees. The fee mark-up provides incentives to the 
law firm to invest in the case. Given a 6, increasing 5 is likely to  increase the 
firm’s marginal profit. However, the difficulty of the case represents the law 
firm’s risk and this deters it from investing. When the fee mark-up 5 is given,
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Legal effort of Type I firm under conditional fee
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Figure 4.5: Legal effort of the Type I firm under conditional fee
increasing in the difficulty of the case 6 will increase the risk of the conditional 
fee contracted firm since the firm will receive no fee if the case is lost. It is 
reasonable that, under this situation, the firm will reduce its effort to resist 
the risk. However, for the hourly fee contracted firm, its income does not 
change with the difficulty of the case. Therefore, when 0 increases to a certain 
level, the firm will provide more effort under the hourly fee than it under the 
conditional fee.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the effects of the fee mark-up 5 and difficulty 9 on the 
law firm’s effort decision. It is clear tha t the law firm’s legal effort is increasing
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with the mark-up but decreasing with the difficulty.23 Since < 0, we can 
see tha t removing the reputational incentive from the law firm removes the 
incentive to increase hours over some (low level) range of difficulty.
Furthermore, if the condition 5 >  holds, under the conditional fee the law 
firm has higher legal effort than under the hourly fee, which gives r 5 >  w. The 
law firm and the insurer’s utility become:
TjLb _  ( !  +  ^ ) r 5 1 - 2  (-1 ^ 1 +  2 5 - 9  2
u -  -  2Ts ” > 1(TTW
9w
JJli> =  a - C j  +  TT ( u i—   'L2— W2 >  0t- C I + n — —v1 - t t — — w2.
\  t 5 +  9 w  t  +  9 w  J 1 +  19 1 +  <9
Comparing ULb and U15 with UIA and UM, we find tha t ULb > ULA when 
5 > ^  and U15 > U/4. We state:
R e su lt 4.5: When 5 > there exists a region where ULb > ULi and
U75 >  UM.
Result 4.5 implies that, in principle, for a given difficulty of case, the insurer 
and the law firm can choose a 5 such th a t both will prefer a conditional fee 
contract to an hourly fee contract. Also, not surprisingly, in the circumstance 
tha t 6 comparatively small (so th a t r  <  ~ i w—perhaps, though not necessar­
ily, as a result of regulation) the insurer will only offer the hourly fee contract
23T his can be proved theoretically by obtain ing partial derivatives which are
d r
85
1
- to 1 +
1 +  5 +  20
\ / l  4  2 5 4  <52 +  40 +  405 _ 
Since 0 >  0  and 5 >  0, >  0 and <  0
d r  1 — = —w 
80 2
- 2  + 2 +  25
\ / l  4  25 +  52 +  40 +  405
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to  the law firm.
4 .3 .2 .3 “E a t w h a t you  k ill”
Now the payment contract between the insurer and the firm becomes the “eat 
what you kill” scheme which means the insurer pays the firm a fixed fee F  
plus an hourly fee if the case is won and only the fixed fee if the case is lost. 
Under this scheme, using the defendant’s equilibrium effort choice, the law 
firm’s utility function becomes:
u u  = p r  + F - f , 1 -f> B - C L = + F - \ t 2 -  V  -  Cx. (4.33)
t  +  Ow 2 2
Thus, the law firm’s optimal effort level is given by maximizing UL6 with 
respect to r ,  which is
7 n  ______________
Tg =  - ( 1  +  V l +  40) -  6w. (4.34)
As before, the fixed fee F  does not affect the law firm’s effort decision. Compar­
ing this result with r | ,  we find th a t when J =  0, r |  =  Tg, otherwise r§ > Tq . 
In addition, given the difficulty 0 > 0, because y/1 +  40 < f f l  + 40 + 4<92, 
y/1 + 40 < 1  +  20, we have r |  <  w.
R e su lt 4.6: The Type I  integrated law firm  produces its lowest legal effort 
when it is paid under an “eat what you kill” arrangement.
From (4.29), we find tha t the firm’s human capital input still stays at its 
minimum e* = 0. Substituting the equilibrium effort r* and e* =  0 into the
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law firm’s utility function UL6, we have:
Tjlq _  1 +  50 4- 302 +  (1 +  0 -  02)yT  +  40^ 2 ^
2(1 +  y T + 4 0 )  l
1 4“ 0 — ^  2 20(1 +  0) 2 T-1 ^  /— ------  w2-4---------------   w + F  - C L. (4.35)
2 1 +  v T + 4 0   ^ '
Comparing this with UL4 and UL5, we find th a t if 0 <  1 , ‘the ‘eat what you
kill” arrangement brings higher utility to the Type I firm than hourly fees,
even when the transfer is fixed at F  =  0. However under other situations the
law firm chooses an “eat what you kill” arrangement only when F  is large
enough. The fixed payment F  actually dilutes its attitude towards the risk of
losing the case.
We now consider the insurer’s choice of fee contract (i.e. Stage 1 of our game). 
Substituting the firm’s optimal choices into the insurer’s utility function gives:
r/6   r~i r _ (  dw 2u  =  cm Cj  4- ixv1 — ------7r  — — w 2 +  F
7*6 T  Ow \T q- \ -0w
„  1 4~ \ / l  T  40 — 20 (  20 o \
= a  — Ci-V 7rz/i----------- -   7r ( ------- t.-—  w  +  F  ) . (4.36)
1 +  V T T 40  Vl +  x /T T 40 )  X }
In Stage 1, the insurer chooses a fee arrangement to maximise its utility. Com­
paring U16 with U14 and U15, since — t here is a region where 
U16 > U14 for a positive F. Also, jg jT W  > i+o o^r any d > 0, therefore 
UIQ < U15. This implies th a t the insurer prefers the “eat what you kill” ar­
rangement to the hourly fee arrangement, but its favorite is the conditional fee 
arrangement.
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Type I firm v.s. independent firm: conditional fee
Figure 4.6: Conditional fee: Independent firm vs Type I firm
The legal effort comparison between the independent law firm and the Type 
I integrated firm reveals the effects of organisational structure and ownership 
changes. Figure 4.6 shows the comparison of both under conditional fees. Ob­
viously, given the same S and 0 the Type I firm’s legal effort is below the 
independent firm’s effort. Since rj. > r4, r2 >  r5, r3 > r6 and the independent 
firm’s human capital input is greater than the Type I integrated firm, we con­
clude:
R e su lt 4.7: I f  the insurance company merges with an independent law firm  
and controls the ownership of the law firm  ’s assets, the law firm ’s legal effort 
will decrease and its input to human capital will stay at its m inimum (e = 0).
149
4.3.3 Type I I  integrated firm
Now we study the situation where the law firm merges the insurance com­
pany. The new firm is both the plaintiff’s financial supporter and legal service 
provider. We define the new firm’s running cost as Cn . Given in equilibrium 
the defendant’s legal effort is a constant w, Type II integrated firm’s utility 
function becomes:
Uu  — o l -  C H +  ir\pfw -  (1 -  p ) f D +  uR +  vB -  -  (()b\ (4.37)
Note th a t since the firm provides legal expenses insurance services, if the case 
is lost, the firm cannot charge its legal fee from the plaintiff. The fee is covered 
by the insurance policy which is underwrote by the firm itself.
H o u rly  fee
Under the hourly fee, f w = f °  ~  w r , it gives
Un  = a -  C u  +  7T r  Ow o r  1 9 1 9-t w  — w 4- v \    - t  4- v2e — - e
r  +  Ow r  +  Ow r  + Ow 2 2
The firm’s optimal effort decision is derived by maximizing the above utility 
function with respect to the legal effort r  and e. The reaction functions are:
2rw  t 2w  Ow  . 2 \
r  +  Ow ( t  +  Ow)2 ( r  4- Ow)2
v2 — e =  0
“E a t w h a t you  k ill”
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Under this scheme, f w =  w t  and f °  — F , the firm’s utility function becomes
UH =  a  — C H +  7r
Ow
w2 +  Ui
r
r  +  9w r  +  9w 2
Solving the above utility function with respect to the legal effort r  and e, the 
reaction functions are:
Comparing the above reaction functions, we can find th a t if the Type II firm 
charges “eat what you kill” , the firm has exactly the same effort as when it 
charges hourly fees.
C o n d itio n a l fee
Under the conditional fee, f w =  (1 +  5 ) w t , (4.37) becomes
The firm’s optimal effort decision is derived by maximizing above utility func­
tion with respect to the legal effort r  and e. The reaction functions are:
Comparing the reactions functions of the conditional fee with the hourly fee.
2 TW T W  9wor^w
{w2 + Vi) — r  =  0
r  +  9w ( r  +  9w)2 ( r  +  9w)2
V2 — e — 0
2 r( l +  5)w r 2(l +  £)w; 
t  +  9w ( r  +  9w)2
v2 -  e =  0 (4.39)
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Figure 4.7: Legal effort of the Type II integrated firm
We find tha t (4.38) and (4.39) can be seen as the general solutions of the 
Type II firm. When the proportional fee mark-up <5 =  0, (4.38) is the reaction 
function of the hourly fee and the “Eat what you kill” scheme. Figure 4.7 
illustrates the effects of the proportional fee mark-up 6 and the difficulty of
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the case 0 on Type II integrated firm’s legal effort level.24 The comparative 
statics with respect to r  proves th a t the legal effort r  is increasing with the 
the proportional fee mark-up J .25 If the firm charges hourly fees, which means 
the proportional fee mark-up 5 =  0, the legal effort r  is the lowest in its set 
given a difficulty 0. In addition, the Type II firm’s input into human capital 
is at the same level as the independent firm.
Now we compare the Type II integrated firm’s effort with the Type I and the
independent law firm in two scenarios. In scenario 1, the Type II integrated
firm is restricted to a hourly fee arrangement. So, for the Type II firm, 8 =  0.
Figure 4.8 illustrates the Type II firm’s hourly fee effort. Comparing its effort
with the hourly fee independent law firm, we find th a t when 0 <  1 the Type
II law firm has higher legal effort, when 0 >  1 the independent firm has higher
legal higher effort, and when 0 =  1 they has the same legal effort.26 When
24Since the assum ption requests r  >  0, so the only solution of th is cubic function is:
t *u =  (l/6 )[48™ 30<5 +  132™30 -  84™302 +  24w 3626 -  84w3892 +  893w 3 +  1080™ +  8 w 363 +  24w 352 
+24w35 +  8w3 +  12(—234w 693S -  36™602<52 +  8102™2 +  72w 402S +  36w 49S2 +  36w 495 
+36w48202 -  126w4593 +  12w 4639 +  198w 402 -  126w 403 +  12™40 +  1204 ™ 4  -  162™603 
+57™ 6 04  +  1O5™6 02  -  12™6 05 -I- 12™60 +  24w 6925 -  108w69352 +  9O™6 04<5 -  48™602<J3 
+12™ 606'3 +  36w6952 +  36™60<5 -  36™6<!i303 +  45™6<5204 -  12w 6S402 -  12™6<505) 1/ 2]1/ 3 
+6[(2 /9)™ 20 +  (2 /9  )™2<50 +  ( l /9 ) 0 2 ™ 2  +  ( l/9 )™ 2 <52 +  (2 /9  )w 2S +  ( l/9 )™ 2]/[48™306 +  132™30 
—84™302 +  24w3529 -  84w 3S92 +  803™3 +  1080™ +  8™3 53 +  24™3<52 +  24™3d +  8 ™ 3 
+ 1 2 (—234™6035 -  36™60252 +  8102™2 +  72w4928 +  36w4082 +  36w49S +  36w48292 
— 12Qw4893 +  12w4S39 +  198™402 -  126™403 +  12™40 +  1204 ™ 4  -  162™603 +  57™e04 
+1O5™6 02 -  12™6 05 +  12™60 +  24™6025 -  1O8™6 03 <52 +  9O™6046 -  48™602<53 
+12™ 6 0<53  +  36™60<52 +  36™60<5 -  36™6<5303 +  45™6<5204 -  12™65402 -  12wG595)1/2]1/3
+(l/3)™ <5 +  (1/3)™  -  (2/3)0™ .
25Since =  (r  +  29w )rw  >  0  and by the second-order necessary condition <  0 ,
S > ° -
26W hen 0 =  1, T\ — tij =  1.205™.
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Legal effort of the Type II firm under hourly fee
0
Figure 4.8: Type II firm under hourly fee
compared with the Type I firm, only when the difficulty of the case is very 
high 0 > 2, the Type I firm has higher effort.27 To sum up, under the hourly 
fee, for these three organisational structures, if 0 < 1, the Type II firm has 
higher effort, if 0 > 1 the independent firm has higher effort, and if 9 — 1 the 
Type II firm and the independent firm have the same legal effort.
In scenario 2 , we assume the Type II integrated firm can charge a conditional 
fee and the proportional fee mark-up 5 is set as the same as in the independent 
law firm. Under this situation the integrated firm’s legal effort is always greater 
then the independent law firm’s. Figure 4.9 shows the comparison. Since we
27W hen 9 — 2, r4 =  7 7 /  =  w.
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Type II v.s Independent firm under conditional fee
Figure 4.9: Conditional fee: Type II firm v.s. independent firm
have already shown tha t the independent firm has higher legal effort than 
the Type I firm, given an exogenous 5, under conditional fees the Type II 
integrated firm has higher legal effort level than the other law firms.
4.4 W elfare im plications
In the previous sections, we examined how organisational structure and own­
ership changes affect the incentives of the law firm to act in the best interests 
of litigants. In this section, we focus on welfare effects of these changes.
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4.4.1 Defendant’s welfare
As Result 4.1 claims, the organisational structures and ownerships of the law 
firm will affect the defendant through the plaintiff’s legal effort level. Since 
the defendant’s legal effort can be regarded as a constant, as Equation (4.13) 
shows, his post-accident welfare is decreasing in the plaintiff’s legal effort. 
The ex post welfare under different organisational structures are expressed as 
follows:
Independent firm hourly fee VI =  Vd — (A +  +  wt\)
Independent firm conditional fee V2 =  Vd — — [A +  2w2 +  (1 +  8 ) w t 2 ] 
Independent firm “eat w hat you kill” Vz = V d ~  +  2u>2 +  wrs)
T ype I firm hourly fee V4 = yD -  q ^ { A  +  2w2 +  wr4)
T ype I firm conditional fee V5 =  yD -  7 7 ^  [A +  2w2 +  (1 +  S)w t 5]
T ype I firm “eat w hat you  kill” V6 = yD -  +  2 w2 +  wtq)
T ype II firm Vn  =  yD ~  777^ 7; (A +  2w2 +  wrn )
Using the results of the last section, we can conclude that: (1)1+ > V3 >  Vj j , 
v 5 > V 2 > Vn -, (2) If S > V4 > and (3) V ,, Vj if 6 2,
V4 > V n > V , if 2 >  6 > 1 , Vi >Vt >Vn  if 1 , and Vx if =  1 .
These results are briefly summarised in the follow table:
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T A B L E  4-2: D e fe n d a n t’s ex  p o s t  w elfare
Conditional fee T yp e l > Independent > T y p e l l
“Eat what you kill” T yp e l > Independent > T yp e l I
Hourly fee: 9 <  1 T yp e l > Independent > T yp e l I
Hourly fee: 9 = 1 T yp e l > Independent = T yp e l I
Hourly fee: 2 >  9 > 1 T yp e l > T y p e l I  > Independent
Hourly fee: 9 > 2 T yp e l I  > T yp e l > Independent
In addition, from the above ex post welfares, we have 77 <  0, where r  is 
the plaintiff’s legal effort. Hence, when the plaintiff’s legal effort increases, the 
defendant’s ex post welfare decreases. In the ease tha t the defendant can affect 
the probability of the accident, adopting the endogenous accident probability 
setting of Gravelle & Waterson (1993), the defendant’s pre-accident or ex ante 
welfare becomes
H  — [1 — ir(x)](yD — x) +  n { x ) (y  -  x) =.[1  -  n{x)]yD +  tv(x )V  — x  (4.40)
where x  is the defendant’s expenditure on care to avoid the accident, 7r is 
the accident probability which is a decreasing function of x  (also tt' <  0 and 
7r" >  0). The defendant chooses x  to maximise his ex ante welfare H , and 
the first order condition is: — 1 +  + (x){V  — yD) — 0. It is clear tha t x  is de­
creasing in V. Therefore, the volume of accidents is increasing in V . Since V  
is decreasing in r ,  the volume of accidents is decreasing in the plaintiff’s legal 
effort. Moreover, V  — yD is the defendant’s cost of litigation, so the increase 
in the input of care can tradeoff the risk increase caused by the extra legal 
effort of the plaintiff. However, the effect of the plaintiff’s legal effort on the 
defendant’s ex ante welfare is still not clear. This is because the sensitivity
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of 7T to a change in x  plays an im portant role in calculating II. For example, 
when 7r is very elastic, if the plaintiff’s legal effort increases, the defendant’s 
welfare may increase. Only when n(x) is clearly defined, can a firm conclusion 
on the defendant’s ex ante welfare be given. In an extreme setting, when n is 
a constant (i.e. an exogenous probability of accident), the defendant’s ex ante 
welfare is decreasing in the plaintiff’s legal effort. We state:
R e su lt 4.8: Changes in the organisational structure and ownership o f the law 
firm  make the volume o f accidents reduce i f  they increase the p la in tiff’s legal 
effort.
An obvious application of the above statem ent is tha t accidents will increase if 
the conditional fee contracted law firm is organized as the Type I firm rather 
than independent or Type II.
4.4.2 P la in tiff’s welfare
The effects of the organisational structure and ownership on the plaintiff’s wel­
fare, especially ex ante welfare, are more difficult to determine because they 
directly change his net expected income as well as decision of the defendant 
which affect the plaintiff’s welfare. The general form of the plaintiff’s expected 
ex post welfare has been given by Equation (4.11). We use U f  to denote the 
plaintiff’s ex post welfare under the situation tha t his law firm is independent 
and charging hourly fee; Up to denote the independent firm with conditional 
fee; Up to denote the independent firm with “eat what you kill” ; U [  to  denote 
the Type I integrated firm with hourly fee; Up to denote the Type I integrated
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firm with conditional fee; UP to denote the Type I integrated firm with “eat 
what you kill” ; and Uff to denote the Type II integrated firm. Some results 
can be obtained from (4.11) and the effort comparisons: (1 )UPj > UP > UP, 
U f > U£> Uf; (2) If i > jg*, Uf> and (3) > f  > if 2,
U f > U f  > Ufif 2 > e > 1, U f > U [ > if 1, and U f
We summarise:
T A B L E  4-3: P la in tif f ’s ex  p o s t  w elfare
Conditional fee T y p e l l  > Independent > T yp e l
“Eat what you kill” T y p e l l  > Independent > T yp e l
Hourly fee: 0 < 1 T y p e l l  > Independent > T yp e l
Hourly fee: 0 =  1 Independent =  T y p e l l  > T yp e l
Hourly fee: 2 > 0 >  1 Independent > T y p e l l  > T yp e l
Hourly fee: 0 > 2 Independent > T yp e l > T y p e l l
In the above table, in most of the situations, the Type I firm produces the 
lowest ex post welfare for the plaintiff. The reason for this is th a t the property 
right on the reputational asset gives an incentive to firms. Since the Type I 
firm does not have any return from its assets, it will only choose a “breakeven” 
effort where the legal fee income equals the effort disutility. While for the Type 
II firm and the independent firm, since winning can increase the firm’s rep­
utational asset, there is an incentive to supply more effort. While under the 
hourly fee, since the Type II firm has no income if the case is lost, when dealing 
with a very difficult case (6 > 2), the incentive from the reputational asset has 
been offset. This is the reason why under this situation, the Type I firm has 
higher effort than the Type II firm.
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Y p =  yp — a  +  7r(—L  +  p A ) = yp — a + ttUp (4.4-1)
For an exogenous insurance premium a, the comparisons of any two ex ante 
welfare do not yield any firm conclusion. This is because although the com­
parisons of ex post welfare are clear, there is not enough information about the 
accident probability ix. As discussed in the last subsection, 7r is decreasing in 
the plaintiff’s legal effort. For example, for two hypothetical ex post welfares 
Uf and Uf, if Uf > Uf, it must be tha t na < irh. It will be difficult to evaluate 
7TaU% and TTbUf without specified 7r. Once again, only when 7r is exogenous, 
does the plaintiff’s ex ante welfare change in the same direction as his ex post 
welfare.
The plaintiff’s ex ante welfare is
If a  is endogenous the situation is more complicated. One way to satisfy the 
endogenous a  assumption is to assume the insurance market is competitive. We 
start from the independent law firm. If the insurance premium is actuarially 
fair it becomes a  = Cj + n -+Jew(w2 + f °). For the hourly fee f °  = t w , therefore 
the plaintiff’s ex ante welfare is:
Y1p =  V P - C ,  +  n T\ . 9w , 9 '— L  H------ —7T~A--------—~ ( w  + T i )
T \ + 9w T \ +  9w 
For the conditional fee f °  = 0, then the plaintiff’s ex ante welfare is:
Y p =  y p - C ,  +  7r - L  + T2
9w
■w
t2 +  9w t2 +  9w 
Even for an exogenous 77 it is difficult to compare Y p with Y p if t\ > r2. How-
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ever, in the region tha t t\ <  r 2, if 7r is exogenous, we can confirm Y f  < Y f .
For the “eat what you kill” scheme f °  = F , the plaintiff’s ex ante welfare is
Y f  =  ijp -  Cj +  ir - L  + t3 ■A
6w
r 3 +  Ow r 3 +  Ow 
Since r3 <  r2, if 7r is exogenous, Y f  <  Y f .
(w2 +  F)
The insurance premium under the situation of the Type I integrated law firm 
is a  =  Ci -  7r l + i ; ^  ~  +  / ) ] .  For the hourly fee f °  = rw , therefore
the plaintiff’s ex ante welfare is:
Y f  = y p - C I + 7t .£  _|------— - A  + Vy TA
Ow
r4 +  Ow 74 +  Ow 74 +  Ow
(w2 +  r4w)
Substituting f°  — 0 for the conditional fee and f °  = F  for the “eat what you 
kill” scheme, the plaintiff’s ex ante welfares under these two arrangements are 
respectively:
y f  =  y p  — C i  +  ir - L  + T 5  A  , T5A  +
Ow
75 +  Ow 75 +  Ow 75 +  Ow
w
Y f  =  y p  ~  C i  +  7T T  1 ^6 a . Fs—L +  —— A +  z/i-
0'ZO
+6 +  070 Te +  Ow To +  Ow
If 7r is exogenous, since 75 >  r6, we can conclude YjT > Y6P.
(io2 +  F)
The case of the Type II integrated firm is more complicated. In equlibrium the 
insurance premium becomes a  = C h - t t  [7 ^ ( 1  +  S ) t w  -  +  ^ 1 7 7 7 7 ;  -  \ r 2]
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The plaintiff’s ex ante welfare is
Y u  = y p - C n +7r l —L  +  — ~ F “ [(1 +  d)TUw + A ]  -----
L rn  +  Ow tjj +  Ow Tjj +  Ow 2
Now, comparisons amongst above welfare (Y ff to  Yff)  can not generally pro­
duce a firm conclusion. First, as we discussed above, the accident probability 
needs to be well defined. Second, the size of the accident loss L  and the com­
pensation A, and their relations (L > A  or L = A  or L < A), play im portant 
roles in the ex ante welfare. Third, specified costs Cj and C n  affect the plain­
tiff’s welfare. For example, if C n  can be reduced to the same level as Cj,
Y ff is more likely to exceed Y ff and Y ff, given a very inelastic 7r. Finally, for 
the “eat what you kill” scheme, as Y ff and Y ff show, the fixed payment F  
is actually imputed to  the plaintiff. In this case, a suitable setting on F  will 
increase the plaintiff’s ex ante welfare.
4.5 Sum m ary and conclusions
In this chapter we studied the effects of a law firm’s organisational structure 
and ownership changes on its legal effort provision. We were particularly in­
terested in organisational integrations between legal expenses insurers and law 
firms. Therefore, we chose two types of integration and compared them to 
the current organisational structure (the independent law firm). The results 
suggest th a t an alternative organisational structure which allows law firms 
to provide legal expenses insurance services will motivate higher legal effort 
from lawyers than other structures. Although there are some ambiguities in 
the welfare analysis, our conclusions clearly suggest tha t under the integrated
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structure (Type II) higher legal effort and welfare status can both be achieved 
by an appropriate setting of the conditional fee mark-up.
Our work also suggests some directions for research. This chapter mainly stud­
ied the effort incentive within integration. Indeed, for integrated firms, our 
research findings are based on the situation where the ownership is controlled 
by lawyers. If lawyers lose their ownerships in a new firm, their willingness 
to provide effort will accordingly be reduced. This implies th a t partners and 
legal employees have different levels of effort. Therefore, studying managerial 
structures within the integrated firm would be worthwhile.
Moreover, in our model, we assume the defendant’s lawyer can only charge 
hourly fees. Our conclusions are all based on this assumption. If this as­
sumption is relaxed, some of the results may change. For example, if the 
defendant’s lawyer charges conditional fees, her decision on effort provision 
will change accordingly. In this case, the difficulty of the case may become the 
most im portant factor in the litigation subgame. This can be an interesting 
topic for future research because it may give some insights on why lawyers 
drop cases.
We have concentrated on the role of law firm’s organisational structure in 
providing effort incentives. As we described at the beginning of the chapter, 
changes brought by new business structures in reality will far exceed the com­
plexity of this. For example, under the new organisational structure (Type I 
or Type II), if the integrated firm goes public, which is currently suggested by 
some big law firms in the UK, the transaction decisions of stockholders may
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significantly affect the law firm’s legal effort. Our model must be extended if 
these arrangements are to be studied carefully. Nevertheless, our framework 
may provide a foundation from which advances can be made.
It is clear that, when introducing an alternative organisational structure, and 
conducting a full welfare analysis, ambiguous results are almost certain ap­
pear here. A clear lesson from this chapter is tha t alternative organisational 
structures will have subtle effects and these should be studied carefully when 
evaluating policy in this area.
Chapter 5 
Conclusions
This chapter has two objectives: first, to summarise the results derived in 
Chapters 3-4 and their relation to our research questions as set out in Chapter 
1; second, to indicate the limitations of our models and to suggest further 
studies which can be based on our frameworks. Section 6.1 and 6.2 address 
these objectives respectively.
5.1 D iscussion  o f resu lts
Before we summarise our results and relate them to our research questions, it 
is useful to review the analytical structure from which they are derived. This 
enables us to distinguish our work from existing literature.
5.1.1 A nalytical structure
In Chapter 1, we highlighted the current legal reform in England and Wales 
and the three-way relationship in the market of legal services and proposed 
our research questions. The literature review in Chapter 2 had shown tha t 
these research question have not been answered yet.
Chapter 3 focuses on litigants’ trial/settlem ent decisions. In the model, we 
considered both the plaintiff’s side’s and the defendant’s side’s decisions. The 
purpose of the model was to examine the combined effects of legal expenses 
insurance and conditional fees on settlement. The model in Chapter 4 fo­
cused on the lawyer’s effort provision. Similar to the model of Chapter 3, 
this model considered both sides of the litigation. However, the model anal­
ysed the legal effort provision from the perspective of industrial organisation.
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So, organisational structures, human capital and reputation incentives were 
accommodated. In terms of the three-way relationship set out in Chapter 1 
(Figure 1.2), Chapter 3 considers the contract between the insurer and the 
plaintiff, while the models in Chapter 4 focus on the contract between the in­
surer and the lawyer. Thus, to a large extent, the thesis considers all elements 
of the three-way relationship.
This study differs from other contributions in this area for two reasons. First, 
it recognises the complementarity between fee reform and structural develop­
ments. Several authors have examined conditional fees (Emons (2007); Emons 
&  Garoupa (2006)) and legal expenses insurance (van Velthoven Sz van Wijck 
(2001); Heyes et al. (2004); Kirstein & Rickman (2004)). Others (in addition 
to Fenn et al. (2006); Abrams (2002)) have recently begun to examine the 
market structure implications of d e m e n ti’s proposals (Grout (2005); Grout, 
Jew itt & Sonderegger (2007)). These have not been combined together be­
fore. Second, it considers the effects of these arrangements on lawyer effort. 
None of the above papers look at this while others who look at lawyer effort 
do not do so in the context of the fee and structural reforms described ear­
lier (see Schwartz & Mitchell (1970); Halpern & Turnbull (1983); Rubinfeld & 
Scotchmer (1993)).
5.1.2 Answers to the research questions
In this subsection, we summarise our results in relation to the research ques­
tions of Chapter 1.
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Research Q uestion 1 : What are the combined effects of legal expenses in­
surance and legal fee arrangements on litigation?
In Chapter 3, we looked into the combined effects of legal expenses insurance 
and fee arrangements on settlement. The combined effects on settlement are 
ambiguous. Compared to BTE hourly fees, ATE conditional fees reduce the 
plaintiff’s initial probability of accepting an offer but consequently increase the 
defendant’s settlement offer. Information on the distribution of accident loss 
plays an im portant role. For example, in the case of the uniform distribution, 
“an optimistic plaintiff”1 is more likely to settle under ATE conditional fees 
than BTE hourly fees. In a dynamic setting, ATE conditional fees lead to a 
faster settlement.
Chapter 4 looked at the combined effects of legal expenses insurance and legal 
fees in a different way -  i.e. it made the comparison between insured con­
ditional fees and insured hourly fees and focused on the lawyer’s legal effort 
provision. Now, the difficulty of the case and the success fee affect the result 
significantly. Indeed, comparison between conditional fees and hourly fees is 
actually a trade-off between the difficulty and the success fee. Given a difficulty 
level, we find tha t only when the success fee is high enough, do conditional 
fees motivate more effort. If the lawsuit is highly risky, hourly fees bring more 
legal effort than conditional fees.
R esearch Q uestion 2: What are the effects of a law firm ’s organisational
1This follows the definition of Gravelle & Waterson (1993). For them, an optimistic 
plaintiff is defined as one for whom p  >  cq/cp. Here the right hand side compares the cost 
of “stopping” ( c q )  with that of continuing a trial (cp).
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structure on a lawyer’s incentives to act in the best interests of clients?
This question was addressed in Chapter 4. We first looked into the relation­
ship between litigants’ welfare and the lawyer’s legal effort. We found tha t 
if the law firm’s organisational structure affects the lawyer’s legal effort, liti­
gants’ welfare will change. This result actually implies th a t in legal reform the 
customers’ best interests can be achieved by suitable choice of organisational 
structure. For comparison with the current organisational structure of the 
English legal market, we examined two possible types of integration, inspired 
by the Clementi Review (2004) in England and Wales. Both of them allow 
outside financial capital to enter the legal services market. The difference be­
tween them is whether lawyers still own the firm’s assets. Of course, legal 
fee arrangements also play an im portant role in legal effort provision. As one 
main result, in a model where only the plaintiff is insured and the defendant’s 
lawyer charges hourly fees, we found tha t, under conditional fees, the structure 
which also allows law firms to provide legal expenses insurance services (i.e. 
Type II in Chapter 4) will bring higher legal effort from lawyers than other 
structures including the independent law firm model th a t currently prevails 
in many jurisdictions. Although there were some ambiguities in welfare anal­
ysis, our conclusions clearly suggest th a t under the combined legal expenses 
insurance structure higher legal effort and welfare levels can be achieved by 
appropriately setting the conditional fee mark-up. For an inappropriately set 
fee mark-up, more difficult cases mean th a t hourly fees are preferred by the 
insured client. Our finding also confirms tha t property rights are one of the 
key incentives for effort provision. This implies tha t a legal employee provides 
less effort than a partner lawyer and an independent law firm works harder
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than an insurer’s in-house lawyer. Also, if outside capital takes the lawyer’s 
control of the firm’s assets, the client’s interest is in danger. This is because the 
lawyer’s long term  return from his assets is appropriated by the outside capital.
Research Q uestion 3: What is the optimal legal expenses insurance system?
The answer of this normative question is based on analysis and results of Chap­
ter 3 and 4. The optimal legal expenses insurance system can be justified by 
at least three perspectives. First, the optimal insurance system should min­
imise total litigation costs. This means the system will encourage settlement 
and reduce trial since the la tter is more costly. When there are only two sys­
tems, BTE plus hourly fees and ATE plus conditional fees, to  choose, if the 
distribution of the accident loss is uniform, ATE plus conditional fees is the op­
timal system. Second, the optimal insurance system should give incentives to 
lawyers to provide more effort since by this way clients’ profits may increase. 
However, in this sense the optimal system depends on the lawsuit itself. If 
the conditional fee mark-up is regulated, for a comparatively easy case, insur­
ance plus conditional fees can be the optimal system, but for a comparatively 
difficult case, insurance plus hourly fees may be the optimal one. Third, the 
optimal insurance system requires an organisational structure in which lawyers 
have incentives to act in the best interests of clients. In this sense, the sys­
tem th a t law firms can provide insurance and also offer conditional fees is the 
optimal system. In addition, from the perspective taken from the three-way 
relationship, an optimal legal expenses system should be a combination of an 
optimal insurance contract and an optimal provider payment contract, i.e. the 
fees charged by the provider. The designing of an optimal insurance system
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is complicated. However, the relatively recent introduction of conditional fees 
may have enhanced the prospects of insurers designing optimal arrangements.
5.2 Further research
Our work suggests several directions for research. Naturally, if data  are acces­
sible (through survey or interviews) an empirical analysis based on our theo­
retical models (especially in Chapter 3) can be conducted. In what follows, 
we restrict attention to further research on the model themselves. A number 
of assumptions of our models could be relaxed or adapted in order to address 
other relevant questions. Here we list some of them.
Conflicts of interest between the lawyer and the client are an im portant issue 
in these principal-agent problems. In the general model of Chapter 3, we do 
examine the interactions between a plaintiff and his lawyer. However, when 
we look at specific fee arrangements, we assume the lawyer is altruistic in or­
der to make analysis tractable. Therefore, we do not look into the the role 
played by the lawyer’s self-interest in determining the effects fees and insur­
ance on settlement behaviour. Some aspects of this question have been studied 
in early literature. Both Gravelle & Waterson (1993) and Rickman (1999) ex­
amine self-interested lawyers under specific fee arrangements (contingent fees, 
hourly fees and conditional fees). To pursue this question, our model of specific 
fees can be easily extended by adapting the weight variable (which reflects the 
lawyer’s influence on the plaintiff’s decision) of our general model in Chapter 3.
A related issue is the effects of fee arrangements and insurance on the plaintiff’s
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decision to file a case. The role of lawyer self-interest could be central to this 
because output-based payments may encourage “cherry picking” by the agent. 
This would have im portant implications for the welfare comparison between 
hourly fees (BTE) and conditional fees (ATE).
In Chapter 4, it would be worthwhile to distinguish clients’ risk types as sug­
gested by Heyes et al. (2004) and also it would be interesting to extend this 
chapter to cover pre-trial behaviour, where most litigation activity taken place. 
In the chapter, we assume tha t all lawyers in a law firm are equal partners. 
In practice, this is not the case. In large firms in many jurisdictions, we can 
observe several levels of partnership. For example, in England and Wales, 
there are typically three categories of partnership: equity, bonus and salary. 
Lawyers at different levels control different resources and assets. They may 
consequently choose different strategies to pursue their best interests. There­
fore, introducing hierarchies into our model may make results richer. This 
could be achieved by combining the recent hierarchy model of Garicano & 
Hubbard (2007) with our model. Also, in the chapter, we did not consider the 
interactions between human capital and the result of litigation (winning prob­
ability). Our settings actually rule out the possibility of “learning by doing” . 
If this question is pursued, a refinement to our contest success function may be 
required (i.e. counting human capital as one term  of the function). Moreover, 
the chapter mainly studied the effort incentive of integration. If lawyers lose 
their ownership in new firms, their willingness to provide effort will accord­
ingly be reduced. Therefore, study of managerial structures of integrated firms 
within an incentive framework would be worthwhile.
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Finally, there are potential linkages to be made between the chapters. For 
example, optimal insurance may be affected by institutional features (such as 
integration). Indeed, having characterised our chapters as each focusing on 
two elements of the three-way relationship in Figure 1.2, it would be ratio­
nal to try  to combine these together. Another aspect of both chapters that 
could be developed relates to the assumption tha t the lawyer cannot refuse a 
potential client’s case. This seems unrealistic and optimal insurance arrange­
ments should provide incentives for screening out weaker cases -  something not 
present in those we study. Also, the assumption of zero profit can be relaxed 
according to asymmetric information in the market.
As we described in Chapter 1, changes brought by recent and proposed le­
gal reforms far exceed the complexity of those we have studied in this thesis. 
For example, under a new organisational structure, if the integrated firm goes 
public, which is suggested by some big law firms in the UK, the transaction 
decisions of stockholders may significantly affect the firm’s effort provision. 
Our model must be extended if these arrangements are to be studied carefully. 
Nevertheless, the frameworks presented in this thesis provide a foundation 
from which advances can be made.
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